Technology Pooling Licensing Agreements: Promoting Patent Access Through Collaborative IP Mechanisms by Armillotta, Monica
MIPLC Studies
Technology Pooling Licensing 
Agreements: Promoting Patent Access 




https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
MIPLC Studies
Edited by
Prof. Dr. Christoph Ann, LL.M. (Duke Univ.) 
Technische Universität München
Prof. Robert Brauneis 
The George Washington University Law School
Prof. Dr. Josef Drexl, LL.M. (Berkeley)
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, 
Competition, and Tax Law
Prof. Dr. Thomas M.J. Möllers 
University of Augsburg
Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Joseph Straus, 
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, 
Competition, and Tax Law
Volume 10
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Monica Armillotta
Technology Pooling Licensing 
Agreements: Promoting Patent 
Access Through Collaborative 
IP Mechanisms
Nomos
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
D 19
1. Auflage 2010
© Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2010. Printed in Germany. Alle Rechte, auch 
die des Nachdrucks von Auszügen, der fotomechanischen Wiedergabe und der Über-
setzung, vorbehalten. Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier.
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of 
the material is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illus-
trations, broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machine or similar means, and 
storage in data banks. Under § 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made 
for other than private use a fee is payable to »Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort«, Munich.
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in  
der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische  
Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de  abrufbar. 
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche  
Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available 
in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de . 
Zugl.: München, Univ., Diss., 2010 
 
ISBN 978-3-8329-5976-0
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52










To My Angel 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
7 
Acknowledgements 
My fondest thanks are for my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Joseph Straus, for 
having believed in me by offering me the chance of attaining a doctoral degree, in 
the first place, and for dedicating his time and experience into reviewing my work, 
which has greatly benefited from his comprehensive and constructive suggestions.  
I would also like to convey my sincerest thanks both to Prof. Dr. Michael  
Lehmann, for his appreciative second report, and Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Gerhard 
Schricker, for having attended to my oral exam. 
I also owe my deepest thanks to the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center 
(MIPLC) for providing me with a scholarship award to sustain my doctoral research 
endeavours. In fact prior to pursuing my Ph.D, I had the good fortune of attending 
the MIPLC’s LL.M. program, which moved me into exploring more in depth the 
challenging domains of IP and competition law.  
In the context of the MIPLC, I would like to dedicate a very special note of 
thanks to Prof. Martin J. Adelman and Honourable Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, 
for their inspiring feedback on the US patent law’s system and their lasting friendly 
support all along my academic and professional endeavours.  
I would also like to express my true gratitude to the Max Planck Institute for In-
tellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law for offering exceptional research fa-
cilities and for the friendly support I have always received during my stay, and to the 
Law Faculty of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU), for welcom-
ing me in their doctoral program. I felt truly privileged to be part of such a great and 
stimulating academic environment. 
Furthermore I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to the editors of the 
MIPLC Book Series for the honour of having retained my work for publication, as 
well as to the Nomos’s staff, for the extremely cooperative technical and substantial 
support. 
A particular thanks goes also to my friend and colleague Dr. Kristina 
Janušauskaitė for all her good and practical advices on the journey we shared to-
wards our doctoral degree.  
Finally my most deeply felt gratitude goes to my best friend and companion, for 
his endless patience, encouragement and selfless support all along the way. It is with 








https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
9 
Table of Contents 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 15 
Chapter 1 Introduction: Putting Patent Pools into Perspective 21 
A. Promoting Patent Access through Collaborative IP Mechanisms: 
Encountered Problems and Desired Outcomes 22 
I. Finding a Way Through the “Patent Thicket” 22 
II. The Solution Offered by Collaborative IP Mechanisms: 
A Brief Overview 25 
1. Patent Pools 25 
2. Clearinghouses 26 
B. Patent Pools as Business Models and Comparison with 
Alternative Sharing Solutions 27 
I. Process Leading to the Establishment of a Patent Pool 28 
II. A Step Forward from: 29 
1. Bilateral Negotiations 29 
2. Cross-Licensing Agreements 30 
C. Patent Pools and Standards: Endeavors to Promote Access to  
Standard-Related Patents for Interoperability Purposes 32 
I. Overlaps and Demarcation between Patent Pools and  
Standard-Setting Organizations 32 
1. Interface / Interoperability Standards 32 
2. Pivotal Role of Patent Rights and Advantages of  
Collaborative Settings: Patent Pools Strategies to Overcome  
“Hold-Up” Problems 34 
II. Boosting Access to Standard-Related Patents for a Competitive  
Market Integration 36 
1. European Commission: General Policy Concerns and Recently 
Announced Actions 37 
2. Overcoming the Perceived Shortcomings in the Patent Regime 39 
a. Debated Opportunity of Legislative Interventions 39 
aa. From an Antitrust Law Standpoint 40 
ab. From a Patent Law Standpoint 41 
b. Internal IPR Policies as Self-Regulatory Solutions 43 
ba. Standard-Setting Bodies’ Recommendations 43 
bb. Patent Pools’ Enforced Licensing Terms 46 
D. Patent Pools and the Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and 
Antitrust Law 47 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
10 
I. Confuting the Traditionally Perceived Antagonism between  
Patent and Antitrust Law: Introducing the Concept of “Competition 
of First Level” and Refuting the Idea of “Patent Monopolies” 48 
II. Matured View of Complementarity between IP Protection and 
Competition 49 
1. Stance of the US Antitrust Authorities 51 
2. European Commission’s Corresponding Position 53 
3. WTO’s TRIPS Acknowledgement of IP as a “Good of Trade” 54 
Chapter 2 Historical Outlook 57 
A. Case Survey: The First Distinguished Patent Pools 57 
I. Sewing Machine 57 
II. Motion Picture 57 
III. Folding Bed 59 
IV. Airplane 59 
V. Radio 60 
VI. Hartford-Empire 60 
VII. Video 61 
B. Discussed Patent Pools’ Examples 62 
I. The Debated Case of Software:  
The “Open Innovation Network” Initiative 62 
1. Targeting Collective Free “Open Source” Access to  
Software Patents 62 
a. From Linux-Based Cooperative Research Paradigms 63 
b. To Institutionalised Consortia, as Advocated by IBM at  
the Madrid OECD Conference on the Research Use of  
Patented Inventions in May 2006 64 
2. Drawing up a Balance of “Open Innovation” as Alternative 
Business Models 66 
II. The Celebrated “MPEG LA” Case 69 
1. From the First Steps to a Rising Star 69 
2. Still a Necessary Evil? 71 
Chapter 3 Comparative Analysis: US Legal Treatment of Patent Pools - 
Delineating the Modern Archetype 73 
A. Outlook on the American Model: The Early Years 73 
I. From the Initial Patent Holders’ Immunity to the Fierce  
Supreme Court’s Antitrust Scrutiny 73 
II. The Patent Act of 1952 and the “Nine No-Nos”: Defining the  
Spheres of Interference between Antitrust and Patent Law 76 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
11 
B. US Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property:  
The Current View 79 
I. The Institution of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in  
1982 and the 1988 Department of Justice’s Antitrust Guidelines: 
Advocating the “Rule of Reason” 79 
II. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s  
1995 IP Guidelines and their Funding Principles 81 
III. Driving Criteria for Patent Pools in the IP Guidelines and Business 
Review Letters: Sanctioning an Overall More Favourable Approach 83 
IV. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s  
Joint Hearings on Competition and IP Law Policy and the Ensuing 
Innovation Reports: Paving the Way for a Sustainable Balance 86 
Chapter 4 The EU Legal Framework 89 
A. Art. 81 of the EC Treaty 89 
I. The Proscription of Art. 81 (1) and Its Legal Consequences,  
in Particular as Set by the 2006 Guidelines on Methods of  
Setting Fines 89 
II. The Scope of the Individual Exemption under Art. 81 (3) 93 
B. The Way to the TTBER 96 
I. TTBER 1996 and Commission Evaluation Report 96 
II. TTBER’s Review Process 98 
C. Current TTBER and Accompanying Guidelines 103 
I. New TTBER’s Operative Principles 103 
1. Systematisation and Definition of Technology Pools 104 
2. Questionable Demarcation of the Pool’s Agreements  
between TTBER and Guidelines 106 
II. Antitrust Scrutiny of Technology Pools under the Guidelines 109 
1. Nature of the Pooled Technologies:  
Substitutes v. Complements and the Concept of Essentiality 109 
2. Beyond Categorizations: Competitive Efficiencies from a  
Consumer Perspective 112 
3. Different Categories of Technologies and Possible Combined 
Scenarios 112 
4. Antitrust Concerns Beyond Merely Technological  
Systematizations 115 
5. Particular Obligations upon Standard-Related Technology  
Owners Involved in a Pool: Early Disclosure and  
Licensing Terms 116 
a. A Delicate Balance of Interests as Base for the  
Commission’s Recommendations 116 
b. The Precedence Set by Standard-Setting Bodies 118 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
12 
III. Assessment of Individual Restraints: Non-Compete,  
Grant-Back and Non-Challenge Clauses 120 
1. General Principles 120 
2. Contextual Implementation 122 
IV. Institutional Framework Governing the Pool 125 
1. Independent Experts 126 
2. Open and Indiscriminate Participation 126 
3. Overseen Exchange of Sensitive Information 127 
4. Neutral Dispute Resolution Mechanism 127 
D. Selected EC Case Law on Patent Pools 127 
I. Videocassette Recorders (VCR) 128 
II. Advanced Photographic System (APS) 128 
III. Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) 129 
IV. Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) 130 
V. Third Generation Patent Platform Partnership (3G3P) 130 
VI. Philips and Sony’s CD Disc Licensing Program 133 
Chapter 5 Collaborative IP Mechanisms’ Applications:  
Exploring New Frontiers of Life Sciences 139 
A. Patent Pools and Biotechnology: Legal and Business Considerations 139 
B. Pilot Experiences 140 
I. Cases at Hand 140 
1. Golden Rice 140 
2. SNPs 147 
3. SARS 153 
4. HNPCC 157 
II. Some Common Remarks 159 
1. General Considerations 159 
2. The Issue of Funding 162 
Chapter 6 The Alternative Approach of Clearinghouses:  
Distinctive Features and Applications in Biotechnology 167 
A. Defining Characteristics 167 
B. Models and Applications 169 
I. Information Clearinghouse 170 
1. Biosafety Clearing-House 170 
2. CAMBIA’s Patent Lens 172 
II. Technology Exchange Clearinghouse 174 
1. BirchBob 174 
2. Pharmalicensing 175 
 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
13 
3. TechEx 177 
4. PIPRA 177 
III. Royalty Collection Clearinghouse 184 
IV. Open Source Clearinghouse 188 
1. Science Commons - A Creative Commons’ project 189 
2. BioBricks Foundation 192 
3. CAMBIA’s Biological Open Source (BiOS) 193 
Chapter 7 Conclusions: the Way Forward 198 
List of Works Cited 205 
 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
15 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
3G 3rd Generation of mobile phone standards 
3G3P Third Generation Patent Platform Partnership 
AACC American Association for Clinical Chemistry 
AG Aktiengesellschaft 
AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
AIPPI American Intellectual Property Association 
AIPPI International Association for the Protection of Industrial 
Property 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
APS Advanced Photographic System 
Art. Article 
ASCAP American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers 




BBF BioBricks Foundation 
BCCA British Columbia Cancer Agency 
BCH Biosafety Clearing-House 
BGH Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) 
BIOS Biological Innovation for Open Society 
BiOS Biological Open Source 
Biotech. Biotechnology 
BNI Bernhardt-Nocht institute 
CAFC Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
CAMBIA Centre for the Application of Molecular Biology to Interna-
tional Agriculture 
CASRIP Center for Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual Prop-
erty 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 
CC Creative Commons 
CD Compact Disc 
CDC Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
CEMI Chair of Economics and Management of Innovation 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
Cf. Confer, compare 
CIER Centrum Voor Intellectueel Eigendomsrecht 
  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
16 




Contra In contrast, in opposition 
Corp. Corporation 
CPTech Consumer Project on Technology 
Dec. December 
DG Directorate-General 
DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid 
DOE Department of Energy 
DOJ Department of Justice 
Dr. Doctor 
DRCSC Development Research Communication & Services Centre 
DRUID Danish research Unit for Industrial Dynamics 
DVD Digital Versatile Disc 
EC European Commission 
EC Treaty Treaty Establishing the European Community 
ECN European Competition Network 
ECR European Commission Review 
ed. Edition 
EEA European Economic Area 
EEC European Economic Community 
EG Europäische Gemeinschaft 
EIA Electronic Industries Alliance 
EICTA European Information & Communications Technology Indus-
try Association 
EMC Erasmus Medical Centre 
EPC European Patent Convention 
EPO European Patent Office 
Esq. Esquire 
et al. et alii, and others 
et seq. et sequens, and following 
ETH Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
EU European Union 
EUPACO European Patent Conference 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization 
Feb. February 
fn. Footnote 
FRAND Fair, Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory 
FTC Federal Trade Commission 
  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
17 
GAAC German-American Academic Council Foundation 
GBS Global Bio-Collecting Society 
GM Genetically Modified 
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
GMO Genetically Modified Organisms 
GPL General Public License 
GRUR Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 
HA Hemaglutinin 
HapMap Haplotype Map 
HGP Human Genome Project 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
HKU Hong Kong University 
HNPCC Hereditary Non-Polyposis Colorectal Cancer 
HUGO Human Genome Organization 
i.a. inter alia, among other 
i.e. id est, that is, namely 
IBM International Business Machines Corporation 
ICABR International Consortium on Agricultural Biotechnology Re-
search 
ICTSD International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
id. idem, the same 
IEC International Electro-technical Commission 
IEC International Engineering Consortium 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IEEE-SA Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards 
Association 
IET Institution of Engineering and Technology 
IIC International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law 
IIP Institute of Intellectual Property 
IMT International Mobile Telecommunications 
Inc. Incorporated 
IP Intellectual Property 
IP Guidelines Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
IPLA Intellectual Property Lawyers Association 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
IRRI International Rice Research Institute 
ISAAA International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Ap-
plications 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
IT Information Technology 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
IUPAC International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry 
  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
18 
JAMA Journal of the American Medical Association 
Jan. January 
JASRAC Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Pub-
lishers 
JPO Japanese Patent Office 
L Legal 
LA Licensing Agency 
lett. letter 
LLP Limited Liability Partnership 
LSU Louisiana State University 
MAA Manufacturers Airplane Association 
MIP Managing Intellectual Property 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MMR Mismatch-Repair 
MPEG Moving Picture Experts Group 
MPEG LA Moving Picture Experts Group Licensing Administrator 
MPI Max Planck Institute 
Mr. Mister 
MTA Material Transfer Agreement 
NA Neuraminidase 
NCAs National Competition Authorities 
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations 
NHGRI National Human Genome Research Institute 
NICs National Influenza Centres 
NIH National Institutes of Health 
no. Number 
Nov. November 
NY New York 
Oct. October 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OGC Open Geospatial Consortium 
OIE World Organization for Animal Health 
OIN Open Invention Network 




PCT Patent Cooperation Treaty 
PIPRA Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture 
PLC Public Limited Company 
PP Patent Pool 
Prof. Professor 
  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
19 
R&D Research and Development 
RAM Random Access Memory 
RAND Reasonable And Non-Discriminatory 
RCA Radio Corporation of America 
Reg. Regulation 
Rep. Report 
RETMA Radio Electronics Television Manufacturers Association 
RF Royalty-Free 
RMA Radio Manufacturers Association 
ROM Read-Only Memory 
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
Sect. Section 
Sept. September 
SIPPI Science and Intellectual Property in the Public Interest 
SIRC Social Issues Research Centre 
SLA Standard License Agreement 
SMEs Small and Medium Size Enterprises 
SNPs Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms 
SSO Standard-Setting Organization 
STS Science and Technology in Society 
supra see above 
TGA Therapeutic Goods Administration 
TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
TTBE Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
TTBER Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation 
UCSF University of California at San Francisco 
UIS UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion 
UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
US United States 
USA United States of America 
USC United States Code 
USD United States Dollars 
USPTO United States Patent and Trademark Office 
v. versus, against 
VAD Vitamin A Deficiency 
VCR Videocassette Recorders 
  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
20 
vol. Volume 
W3C World Wide Web Consortium 
WHO World Health Organization 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization 
WTO World Trade Organization
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
21 
Chapter 1 Introduction: Putting Patent Pools into Perspective 
Patent pools are essentially agreements where different patent holders “pool” to-
gether, i.e. assemble, their respective technologies in order to license them as a 
unique “package” to third parties.1 Nowadays, in response to the globalisation of 
technologies and more severe conditions of competition, resulting in a faster pace of 
innovation also at an international level, technology pools have increasingly gained 
relevance as successful cooperative IP licensing models.2  
Reflecting the importance won by such practices, the purpose of this contribution 
is to outline the defining features and the strategic considerations underlying the es-
tablishment of patent pools, both in a legal and empirical context, in order to identify 
the best conditions for such cooperative practices to prosper in a competitive setting, 
with a view to cultivating innovation. 
In this respect, attention will be brought both to the internal organizational 
framework adopted, with regard to the particular nature of the technologies in-
volved, and on the legislative treatment that patent pools have been reserved in dif-
ferent jurisdictions, with particular attention to the EU and US systems,3 in a global 
perspective. 
In fact, there are many questions still to be answered, and correspondingly many 
new fields of application in which the successful implementation of patent pools still 
needs to be explored. However, within the scope of this research project, the present 
contribution hopes to shed at least some light on and raise interest in such collabora-
tive IP mechanisms and their goal to promote technology access. 
 
1  Taking the European system as our standpoint and referring to the legislative interpretation 
adopted by the Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to 
technology transfer agreements, Technology pools are defined as: “arrangements whereby 
two or more parties assemble a package of technology which is licensed not only to contribu-
tors to the pool but also to third parties”, in O.J. C 101, 27/04/2004.  
2  For a contextual analysis picturing patent pools in a wider policy context, see also: Ullrich H., 
“Patent Pools – Policy and Problems”, In: Drexl J. ed.: Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 
2008, p.  139 et seq. 
3  The legal and empirical analysis of patent pools within the Japanese system, on the other 
hand, has constituted the theme of a separate dissertation by this author, pursuant to a re-
search invitation program sponsored by the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) at the Institute of 
Intellectual Property (IIP) in Tokyo, between May and August 2008. In this respect, see: Ar-
millotta M., “Japanese Guidelines on Standardization and Patent Pools Arrangements: Prac-
tical and Legal Considerations under the Current Antimonopoly Act – A Global Perspective”, 
Institute of Intellectual Property, Book Series, October 2008. 
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A. Promoting Patent Access through Collaborative IP Mechanisms: 
Encountered Problems and Desired Outcomes 
I. Finding a Way Through the “Patent Thicket” 
This study deals primarily with patent pools, as a type of collaborative IP model, 
to show how and under which conditions - bearing in mind antitrust concerns in the 
framework of the main western systems under consideration - collective licensing 
schemes could be effectively implemented to promote access to patented technolo-
gies, eventually fostering scientific and economic progress. Therefore, our practical 
aim is to illustrate how patent rights can be exploited to forge sustainable partner-
ships, extracting value from collaboration and sharing. 
In these premises, in order to justify the relevance of this contribution it is impor-
tant to outline the actual problem to be dealt with, as that will provide the starting 
platform on which to build a constructive solution, as supported and further devel-
oped at the core of this dissertation. In fact, we believe that every problem, if not 
isolated, but instead considered in its concrete context, can be seen as an input for 
improvement.  
Now, the observation of our economic and social environment leads us to a fac-
tual evidence: nowadays technologies have become more and more complex. In-
deed, competitive pressure for interoperability, increased functionality and improved 
product performance are to a great extent driven by a growing consumers’ demand.4 
From the side of the consumers to the one of the producers, this pressure leads to an 
urgent need for different patents, which are typically held by multiple right holders 
and which are simultaneously needed in order to develop new products based on 
complex technologies.  
Under a legal angle, we can assist in these latest years in a big “explosion” of pa-
tent awards, reflecting a more widespread recognition of the fundamental impor-
tance intellectual property rights have assumed in our “knowledge-based society”. 
From an international perspective, the strong increasing trend recently registered in 
patent applications follows the establishment of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1995 and the simultaneous coming into force of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),5 which made a more exten-
 
4  The economic pressure to resolve blocking patent positions and extract value from patents is 
thoroughly analyzed by Haller M. and Palim M., “The Rise and Rise of Patent Pools”, Intel-
lectual Asset Management Magazine, October/November 2005, Issue 14, p. 9 et seq. 
5  The Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPS) 
has been concluded under the general umbrella of the WTO Agreement, establishing the 
World Trade Organization, adopted at Marrakech in April 1994 (hereinafter WTO). The 
TRIPS constitutes indeed Annex 1 C of the WTO. Within part. II of TRIPs, on the “Standards 
Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property Rights”, Section 5 is ded-
icated to “Patents”.  A full version of the TRIPS is available at:  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
23 
sive protection of IP rights an actual, although still expensive, possibility.6 Besides, 
the increasing stream of applicants to patent offices is also a result of the unleashed 
creative potential of great nations, such as China, India, Russia and also Japan, 
which has been long restrained under the former regimes.7 
Indeed, empirical data point to a growing confidence also in Japan's and China's 
economies, with Japanese inventors filing more than twice as many patent applica-
tions in 2005 as their US colleagues, and with China ranking as the fourth biggest 
patenting nation in the world. In fact, in 2005 statistics from the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) revealed a significant yearly increase in patent appli-
cations world-wide, in particular accounting for 32.9% in China, 14.8% in the Re-
public of Korea, 9.5% in the United States, 6.8% in Russia and 4.1% in the Euro-
pean Patent Office, to quote just some telling figures.8  
The most extreme case is represented by China, registering, within the time-span 
from 1995 to 2005, a 834% increment for domestic filings and 819% for non-
domestic ones. Besides, the statistics for Japan were also symptomatic: whereas the 
rise in residents’ applications was constant at about 1% per year, the surge of filings 
from abroad by 69% is representative of the domestic impact pursuant to the ab-
olishment of the former trade barriers with the outside and the corresponding open-
ing of the Japanese market.9 
Just to illustrate this figures with some concrete numbers:10 Japanese inventors 
applied for 300,623 patents in 2005 compared  to 149,936 patents filed by US appli-
cants. China topped the 32,521 patents submitted by tech-heavy South Korea with 
40,821 applications. Japan and the US are in fact the two top countries, followed by 
Germany, where 47,651 patents were submitted. China is fourth-ranked, followed by 
South Korea in fifth place. Next come Russian inventors with 17,384 submitted pa-
tents, then French inventors with 11,394 patents and the UK with 10,378 patents. 
Taiwan is in ninth place with 4,973 patents filed, followed by Italy with 3,724 pa-
tents.11 
 
6  For an engaged discussion on the impact of TRIPS on competition, see: Drexl J., “Intellectual 
Property and Competition: Sketching a Competition-Oriented Reform of TRIPS”, In: Bakard-
jieva Engelbrekt, Antonina / Ulf Bernitz, Bengt Domej, Annette Kur, Per Jonas Nordell  ed.: 
Festkrift Marianne Levin. Stockholm, Norstedts Juridik, 2008, p.  261 et seq. 
7  The current scenario of the rise in patent applications, and its deeper underling economic and 
legal grounds, has been effectively depicted, most recently, by: Straus J., “Is There a Global 
Warming of Patents”, The Journal of World Intellectual Property, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 58 et seq. 
8  See: World Intellectual Property Organization (hereinafter WIPO), “Patent Report - Statistics 
on Worldwide Patent Activities”, Geneva 2007, figure B. 3, p. 12, available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/patents/931/wipo_pub_931.pdf  
9  Such figures are reported and commented in: Straus J., supra, fn. 7, p. 59-60. 
10  From: “Patent fever grabs Japanese and Chinese inventors”, Managing Intellectual Property 
Magazine, Weekly News - January 2006.  
11  For a supporting analytical background, see: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), “What 
do Biometric Indicators Tell Us About World Scientific Output?”, UIS Bulletin on Science 
and Technology Statistics, Sept. 2005, vol. 2, p. 1 et seq. 
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This “rush” to secure patent grants entails that it has become increasingly hard to 
innovate without infringing on prior IP rights detained by different holders, given 
the presence of partly overlapping patents, thereby figuratively treading on each oth-
er’s feet. This scenario has been stigmatised in the patent literature as the one of the 
so-called “blocking patents”, leading to the compelling metaphor of a “patent thick-
et”.12 The ensuing problem that needs to be faced is that, as might be expected, when 
confronted with litigation companies or, even more, individuals are more “vulnera-
ble”, thus being more likely to accept and conclude less favourable and, depending 
on the other party's “force of persuasion”, even quite inequitable deals. This is due to 
the threat of the alternative of having to face litigation,13 which would lead on a 
lengthy and costly path with an uncertain end. 
Alongside the registered proliferation of IP rights, another discernable trend in IP 
has been the expansion of licensing activities. In this respect, it has been reported 
that the growth of royalties and revenues from patent licenses collected worldwide 
amounted to almost 80 billion US dollars in the year 2000 alone, about eight times 
higher than the respective figure registered in 1983.14 Confirming the same tenden-
cy, substantial licensing statistic were reported also in a subsequent study based on a 
survey of about 500 firms that concluded licenses in the US and Canada in 2004: in 
total, more than 14 billion US dollars of in-licensing revenues were accounted.15 As 
far as Europe is concerned, similarly notable figures were registered: statistical re-
sults showed that on average 10% of all patents were licensed by their holders.16  
In this respect, looking at the current dynamics of our market, a wide-ranging 
survey conducted in 2006 with executives across Europe revealed that companies 
are becoming more aware of the strategic importance of their IP rights. The identi-
fied challenge for undertakings is therefore to align their business and patent licens-
ing tactics more closely. As it has been determined, this involves the recognized 
need of building stronger IP portfolios in order to gain business and technological 
edge, by collaborating with other firms so that innovative processes may reach the 
market in a more piercing way.17 
 
12  Shapiro C., “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standards-
Setting”, University of California at Berkeley, March 2001, available at:  
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~shapiro/thicket.pdf 
13  For an interesting overview on the scenario of patent litigation in Europe, see: Straus J., “Pa-
tent Litigation in Europe - A Glimmer of Hope? Present Status and Future Perspectives”, 
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, 2000, p. 403 et seq. 
14  Athreye S., “Creating Competition? Globalization and the Emergence of New Technology 
Producers”, Research Policy, 2007, vol. 36, p. 209 et seq. 
15  Razgaitis R., “US / Canadian Licensing in 2004: Survey Results”, Les Nouvelles, 2005, vol. 
35, p. 145 et seq. 
16  Giuri P. et al., “Inventors and Invention Processes in Europe”, Survey Results, Research Poli-
cy, 2007, vol. 36, p. 1107 et seq 
17  The survey was conducted in September and October 2006 and involved overall 405 senior 
executives from across Europe. For details, see Tyrrell P., “The Value of Knowledge: Euro-
pean Firms and the Intellectual Property Challenge”, Economist Intelligence Unit White Pa-
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All these data point to highly profitable “markets for technology”,18 where inno-
vations are traded, thereby opening the way for downstream dissemination of IP. 
Accordingly, the registered rising trends both in patent registrations and licensing 
activities are seen as positive indicators of innovative growth, representing driving 
factors of economic progress. However, the potential for such technology markets is 
still not fully utilized, since in industrial sectors characterized by particularly dense 
and scattered IP rights, resulting in “patent thickets”, inefficiencies may arise, im-
posing additional costs and drags on downstream product developments, thereby ob-
structing the way for innovation.19 
Within this perspective, this contribution is dedicated to exploring strategic ways 
in which the encountered costs may be reduced by facilitating access to IP rights, so 
that markets for technologies can function more efficiently and their actual potential 
can be unveiled. In this respect, this research is going to focus on voluntary business 
schemes, operating through free market mechanisms, rather than mandatory regula-
tory or legal approaches, such as compulsory licensing or research exemptions. In 
this context, the models considered are going to encompass multiparty IP licensing 
strategies, such as patent pools and clearinghouses, imprinted to a collaborative, but 
still pragmatic spirit. 
II. The Solution Offered by Collaborative IP Mechanisms: A Brief 
Overview 
1. Patent Pools 
Faced with this situation which is occurring ever more often today, “prevention” 
is certainly better than “cure”: in this sense, entering a patent pooling agreement – 
where competitors, i.e. potential infringers, become contributors, i.e. business part-
ners – at an earlier stage would prevent the “collateral effects” of a patent thicket. 
Indeed, the terms governing a patent pooling licensing agreement are typically bene-
ficial to all participants, providing for free or low-cost access to all pooled technolo-
gies and a fair distribution of the third parties’ incoming licensing fees. In the end, 
right owners can win respective blocking positions by bringing their technologies 
together, while granting each other access, thereby overcoming the impasse of these 
 
per, January 2007, also available at:  
http://graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/eiu_EuropeIPR_wp.pdf  
18  Arora A. et al., “Licensing the Market for Technology”, Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 2003, vol. 52, p. 277 et seq. 
19  For an economic study of patent pools and intellectual property clearinghouses, as systems 
for promoting efficient access to licensable IP and thereby enhancing a market for technolo-
gy, see: Aoki R., “Promoting Access to Intellectual Property: Patent Pools, Copyright Collec-
tives, and Clearinghouses”, R&D Management, March 2008, vol. 38, issue 2, p. 189 et seq. 
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“blocking patents”, as a vital step for maintaining and fostering innovation, which 
ultimately represents the fuel of our economical and social wealth. 
The phenomenon of “pooling” multiple technologies together has accordingly be-
come a common practice of business and has attracted increased - though not yet 
full - attention, also for its legal implications, as the omnipresent antitrust scrutiny 
warns.20 These kinds of licensing agreements gave birth to those relatively new, 
above-mentioned entities, known as “Patent Pools”, which are gradually gaining 
recognition – and cautious acceptance – also by public authorities, as proven by the 
significant recent legislative production in this field, of which we will give due ac-
count. 
However, in order for these premises to provide “the big picture”, it is due to 
mention that patent pools are not the only kind of collaborative IP mechanisms in 
place to ensure patent access, even if at present they are certainly the most visible 
and constitute the central point of this contribution, in consideration of the great 
economic and legal implications that those types of licensing agreements usually 
engender.  
2. Clearinghouses 
Clearinghouses are basically managing entities based on the collecting societies’ 
paradigm, as widely established for copyrights, which have recently gained more 
and more ground also within the patent domain. Specifically, they operate as inter-
mediate bodies between different patent holders and interested third parties to pro-
mote future negotiations, according to the scope of their constitutional mandate 
more or less proactively. In fact, as will be further outlined,21 the simplest “informa-
tion clearinghouse” model has already been enhanced on the premises of facilitating 
access and exchange of relevant data concerning specifically targeted technological 
sectors, ultimately in order to foster a more direct collaboration among the con-
cerned patent holders.Overall, all the collaborative IP mechanisms that are under 
consideration here share the common aim of facilitating third parties’ access to use a 
given technology, which once it is patented typically happens by way of licensing. 
In fact, while on the one hand it is undisputed that a patent is mainly a “negative” 
right, i.e. the right to exclude others from making, using and exploiting the inven-
tion, on the other hand it is believed that the effective value of a patent relies on its 
“positive” content, i.e. its ability to be employed in the marketplace by competitive 
 
20  For an outlook on patent pools’ antitrust issues, see i.a.: Ullrich H., “Patentgemeinschaften”, 
In: Fuchs, A. et al. ,Wirtschafts- und Privatrecht im Spannungsfeld von Privatautonomie, 
Wettbewerb und Regulierung - Festschrift für Ulrich Immenga zum 70. Geburtstag. Mün-
chen, 2004, p. 403 et seq. 
21  For a more detailed overview on clearinghouses, see further: Part V of this contribution on 
“The Alternative Approach of Clearinghouses: Distinctive Features and Applications in Bio-
technology”. 
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operators. Indeed, by allocating his exclusive rights, the patent owner can cash in his 
own IP by granting licenses on convenient terms.  
A smart licensing strategy represents in fact a sustainable way to extract value 
from patents and is often a more profitable alternative than exploiting the invention 
alone, since by way of licensing a much wider public can be targeted; besides, that 
may well facilitate the technology's effective implementation also outside the paten-
tor's main area of activity, where the latter would otherwise not be able to invest re-
lying on his own resources alone. 
Therefore, by granting each other licenses, the right holders are likely to speed up 
technology adoption both by effectively reducing uncertainties regarding respective 
rights allocation and by avoiding the costly and time-consuming way of litigation 
thereby preventing even more costly damages to business relationships and reputa-
tion often arising from asserting one’s patent directly. Indeed, these considerations 
constitute the basis for the establishment of patent pools, on which, due to the com-
pelling relevance assumed by this phenomenon, we will mainly concentrate our 
analysis in the first place. 
B. Patent Pools as Business Models and Comparison with Alternative Sharing 
Solutions 
Patent pools could be placed at halfway, quite as a “hybrid”, between arm’s 
length contracting and full integration, i.e. joint ventures, which have been at the 
centre of antitrust censorship and calls for a more extensive overall regulation, 
beyond otherwise fragmental and non-exhaustive approaches, for the benefit of legal 
certainty and eventually economic efficiency.22 In fact, patent pools might well 
represent a viable solution to redress the problem, generally outlined above, of over-
lapping intellectual property rights, i.e. the so-called “patent thickets”, where inven-
tors find it difficult to commercialise new innovations without stepping into each 
others’ feet. 
Indeed, the choice of adopting a patent pool model has not only proven to be a vi-
able one, but also to constitute an extremely successful business: a quite recent esti-
mate suggests that in the year 2001 in the United States the revenues generated from 
sales of devices based in whole or in part on patent pool technologies amounted at 
least to 100 billion US Dollars.23 
 
22  See, in this respect, Lerner J., Strojwas M., Tirole J., “The Design of Patent Pools: The De-
terminants of Licensing Rules”, November 2005, p. 1 et seq., available at:  
http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/PatPoolEmpiricalPaper.pdf  
23  Clarkson G., “Objective Identification of Patent Thickets: A Network Analytic Approach”, 
2003, p. 7 et seq., available at:  
http://stiet.si.umich.edu/researchseminar/Fall%202004/Patent%20Thickets%20v3.9.pdf  
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I. Process Leading to the Establishment of a Patent Pool 
While prospective benefits of entering into a technology pooling strategy are very 
significant, the initial costs of setting up and negotiating a technology pooling 
agreement may be quite high and must not be underestimated. In fact, all steps in the 
process of establishing a patent pool, which may be briefly reproduced as follows, 
involve non-negligible costs:24 
• A so-called initiator shall monitor the marketplace, possibly with an eye to the 
new filings at the patent office, in order to signal the upcoming emergence of a 
“patent thicket” in a given sector. This initiative represents the first necessary 
step to put the whole mechanism of establishing a patent pool into run. 
• Once a particular “patent thicket” has been delimited, the patent and scientific 
experts shall identify all “essential technologies” within that determined tech-
nology field. For the purpose of a patent pool, we call into mind that a technolo-
gy or a patent is deemed to be “essential” if there are no substitutes for that 
technology, inside or outside the pool, and the technology in question consti-
tutes a necessary part of the package of technologies for the production of the 
product or the carrying out of the process to which the pool pertains. This 
process allows to screen, among all the available technologies, those that will be 
needed to ensure the pool operational freedom in its activity field, i.e. under the 
elected technology. 
• The next step will be to couple each technology that is identified as “essential” 
with the corresponding patent holder, who will need to be involved in the pool. 
This task will be normally carried out by patent experts, who will typically look 
up at the patent files and database of the relevant granting authority. 
• Legal experts will then come into play in setting up an IP working group. They 
will be responsible, in a first instance, for sending so called “invitation letters” 
to the identified patent holders to be involved in the pool and, in a second in-
stance, for the setting up of the necessary legal framework to gain a preliminary 
agreement among the right owners, which will normally be expressed by sign-
ing a “letter of intent”. This step constitutes the supporting platform on which 
further negotiations will be carried on and, eventually, a more mature arrange-
ment will accordingly be finalized. 
• At this point the targeted patents have not been contributed to the pool yet, since 
the latter is still to be formally constituted, as the conditions for the accession of 
the identified right holders have still to be agreed upon by the interested parties. 
To this purpose, the evaluation of the patents at issue - i.e. the determination of 
the value to be attached to a given patent, as an “intangible asset” resulting from 
a combination of financial, business as well as legal factors - plays a fundamen-
 
24  A pictorial overview of the successive steps in the process of setting up a patent pool, can be 
found at: Van Overwalle G. et al., “Patent Pools and Diagnostic Testing”, TRENDS in Bio-
technology, vol. 24, no. 3, 2006, p. 117. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
29 
tal role in assessing the “right price” to be paid to the right holder as a consider-
ation for his contribution to the pool, also in terms of subsequent allocation of 
the corresponding portion of the royalty stream deriving from the third parties’ 
licensing of the pooled technologies. Thus, a well-calibrated patent evaluation 
will provide the basis for negotiations for the terms and conditions to be agreed 
on with the interested right holders in view of entering into a technology pool. 
• Once a preliminary agreement on the general features of participation into a 
pool has been reached, a legal expert will be primarily in charge of promoting 
negotiations to their subsequent stage, which is the eventual establishment of the 
patent pool consortium itself, for which all terms and conditions have to be fi-
nally agreed on by all parties involved, i.e. the patent pool members.  The mul-
tiparty licensing agreement establishing the consortium is frequently referred to 
as the “Magna Charta” of the pool, as containing all the essential terms defining 
the internal collaboration mechanisms and functioning of the newly created enti-
ty. 
• When the pool is finally established, it may act as a legal person towards third 
parties and thereby conclude valid licensing contracts through legal representa-
tives. The execution of the patent pooling agreement, over the life of the consor-
tium, will typically involve not only the expertise of numerous licensing attor-
neys, but also the management and supervision of independent experts in charge 
of the administration of the pool. The latter provides, as has already been out-
lined on other occasions, a good recommended guarantee of impartiality and 
fairness in the operation of the consortium which is mostly well received by 
competition authorities, thus pending decisively in favour of the pool, in case an 
antitrust scrutiny occurs. 
In order to better understand this relatively new trend in the licensing methods, it 
may be useful to compare it with more traditional licensing techniques, namely bila-
teral negotiations.25  
II. A Step Forward from: 
1. Bilateral Negotiations 
The key character of bilateral negotiations is their individuality. There is no for-
mal framework and, at the outset, each party shall conduct their patent evaluations 
independently. Consequently, the two contractual parties directly involved may free-
ly determine, outside any pre-defined scheme, their applicable licensing terms, most 
importantly those concerning their respectively due royalties and the specific rights 
 
25  Goldstein L., Kearsey B., "Technology Patent Licensing: An International Reference on 21st 
Century Patent Licensing, Patent Pools and Patent Platforms", ed. Aspatore Books, “A com-
parison of Licensing Methods”, p. 67 et seq. 
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thereby covered. Evidently, this entails higher costs of negotiations, which often in-
volve the individual assessment of highly skilled, independent experts in order to 
overcome possible divergences arising among the parties, so that the conclusion of 
the agreement is likely to extend over a longer period. Nevertheless, this is the pre-
ferred approach where individualized licensing terms are required, this normally be-
ing the case when the underlying technology is quite simple. 
A pool represents a step forward when the technologies involved are more com-
plex, and it typically involves the combined contribution of multiple parties. The 
evaluation of patents deemed to be “essential” within the pool - i.e. covering the pa-
tented technologies necessary, in the absence of substitute technologies26 inside or 
outside the pool, to carry out the processes or to produce the products to which the 
pool relates - is typically conducted by an independent person or group expert in the 
field. The selected patents are licensed within the pool as a package to every licen-
see, either for free, in consideration for their respective endeavours, or for a standard 
price. Thus there is normally no flexibility to adapt the licensing terms to individua-
lized circumstances. However, for the same reasons, there is typically a significant 
saving in transaction costs in the negotiations, both within and outside of the pool, 
towards third interested licensees. Therefore, the pool may represent a way for licen-
sors to maximize their royalty revenues, while minimizing the necessary costs and 
efforts during the negotiations, while, in the same time, managing to use essential 
patents on terms that would allow them to operate effectively. 
2. Cross-Licensing Agreements 
At this point, this contribution ought to spend still a few more words about some 
other possible “sharing solutions” for securing access to intellectual property rights. 
Namely, aside from simple bilateral arrangements, as outlined above, different par-
ties may also enter into cross-licensing agreements, according to which they grant a 
license to each other for the exploitation of the subject-matter claimed in patents, 
thus allowing a mutual sharing of the respective rights without a corresponding ex-
change of license fees, at least up to the equal value of the patents at issue.  
The basic difference to patent pools is that those agreements are limited in their 
scope to the participating parties that simply grant each other rights, without further 
investing in a common work to commercialise the contributed technology, as a 
package, to the benefit of third interested licensees operating in the market. In a 
cross-licensing scheme typically the organisational framework for inter-operation 
 
26  “Substitute Technologies” are defined as such: “When either technology allows the holder to 
produce the product or carry out the process to which the technologies relate”. Conversely: 
two technologies are considered “Complementary”: “When they are both required to produce 
the product or carry out the process to which the technologies relate”, in: Commission Notice 
- Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology Transfer 
Agreements, O.J. C 101 , 27 April 2004, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 216. 
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towards external third parties is thus missing. In other words, simple cross-licensing 
arrangements between two patent holders, firms or individuals, do not involve any 
intention of cooperatively engaging in future licensing transactions, but are limited 
in their scope by the terms of the concluded agreement. Ultimately, cross-licensing 
solutions, on the one hand, focus merely on reciprocal access to IP rights while pa-
tent pools, on the other hand, aim at licensing the contributed technology package to 
third interested parties, thus taking a step further. 
Moreover, although a portfolio cross-license, under which two companies agree 
to license large blocks of their respective patents to one another, may also provide a 
partial solution to the problem of overlapping IP rights, removing the need for pa-
tent-by-patent licensing, this bilateral licensing scheme is not adequate in case an 
investor requires licenses to a respective small number of technologies held by a 
multitude of other firms. In similar cases, patent pools might represent the only suit-
able solution, as they may generate substantial transaction efficiencies by enabling 
more right holders to pool their license technologies together and license them, 
through a joint entity, to third parties.27 Consequently, pooling agreements, other 
than cross-licensing, reduce the transaction costs of multiple negotiations, mitigating 
royalty stacking and hold-up problems28 that occur when multiple patent holders in-
dividually demand royalties from a licensee.29  
Thus, the greater convenience of one licensing solution as compared to another 
greatly depends on the concrete business context in which it is deemed to intervene, 
rather than on merely conceptual legal considerations. 
 
27  US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, “Antitrust Enforcement and Intel-
lectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition” - Chapter 3: “Antitrust 
Analysis of Portfolio Cross-Licensing Agreements and Patent Pools”, Joint Report, April 
2007, p. 57 et seq. 
28  Merges R., “Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations”, 84 California Law Review, 1996, vol. 9, p. 1293 et seq.: “A hold-out 
is someone who refuses to agree to a bargain for strategic reasons.  For example, if a city 
government needs to buy five parcels of land from property owners A, B, C, D, and E, E 
might wait until the other four (A-D) have sold their land.  This puts E in the driver’s seat in 
bargaining with the city:  E can now charge a very high price—in theory, up to the total 
amount the city has to spend on the project, minus what was paid to A-D—for his or her land. 
Since this price will often be more than the average price paid to A-D, and in any event more 
than the price E could have obtained if he or she were not the last to sell, such a holdout strat-
egy will be rational in many cases”.  See generally, Calabresi G. et al., “Property Rules, Lia-
bility Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral”, Harvard Law Review, 1972, vol. 
1089, p. 1106 et seq. 
29  Merges R., “Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools”, 
August 1999, in “Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property - Innovation Policy for 
the Knowledge Society”, Oxford University Press, 2001, also available at:  
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/pools.pdf  
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C. Patent Pools and Standards: Endeavors to Promote Access to 
Standard-Related Patents for Interoperability Purposes 
I. Overlaps and Demarcation between Patent Pools and Standard-Setting 
Organizations 
In order to confute the too often generalized association between patent pools and 
standard-setting organizations, it shall be observed that, as a matter of fact, the sce-
nario is much more heterogeneous and, while there might certainly be areas of over-
laps, the actual demarcations in the scope and range of activities of such practices 
shall not be overlooked. On the one hand, standardization bodies,30 i.e. institutions 
purposefully committed at the development of standards, which can be formally 
constituted at national, trans-national31 and international levels,32 tend to closely 
cooperate, rather than to fiercely compete with each other, both by seeking to define 
boundaries between their respective fields of activities and, in principle, by operat-
ing in a hierarchical fashion, as far as their geographical scope is concerned. On the 
other hand, a patent pool does not necessarily have to support a standard at all, or it 
may even, under some circumstances, encompass partly substitute specifications, 
thus not necessarily identifying itself with a particular technological solution; then 
again, different patent pools, each ideally implementing and commercialising one 
given technology of which it shall detain all rights, may eventually support alterna-
tive standards. 
1. Interface / Interoperability Standards 
So-called “interface or interoperability standards” detail how products, also from 
different manufacturers, shall interconnect with one another - as opposed to “quality 
or safety standards”, which establish characteristics required for a good to be either 
 
30  In this respect, very clear and illustrative is the presentation from Tirole J., “Pools, Standards 
and Access to Intellectual Property”, Conference on “Guidelines for Merger Remedies - 
Prospects and Principles”, January 2002, available at:  
http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/cerna_regulation/Documents/ColloqueMetR/Tirole.pdf  
31  In the EU, standards bodies are actually recognized under: Directive 98/34 of June 22, 1998, 
on “Technical standards and regulations”, OJ L 204, July 21, 1998, p. 37 et seq. 
32  For some instances of international standards organizations, see, i.a.:  
ANSI - American National Standards Institute (http://www.ansi.org);  
IEC - International Electro-technical Commission (http://www.iec.ch);  
IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (http://www.ieee.org);  
ISO - International Organization for Standardization (http://www.iso.org);  
ITU - The International Telecommunication Union (http://www.itu.int/net/home/index.aspx); 
IUPAC - International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (http://www.iupac.org);  
OGC - Open Geospatial Consortium (http://www.opengeospatial.org);  
W3C - World Wide Web Consortium (http://www.w3.org). 
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certified or sold in the marketplace. Remaining within the scope of this contribution, 
"interoperability" can basically be defined as the ability of products or processes to 
work together in order to fulfil a common task. Said quality may be enabled by en-
suring seamless access to the technical information underling an interface standard.33  
Thus, interoperability, as a target, and open standards, as a means, are the corner-
stones of fast growing, complex industries, such as markedly the information and 
communication technologies’ sectors,34 where the traditional boundaries between 
distinct products or compounds are becoming increasingly faint. For this reason, it is 
fundamental to ensure that access to interface specifications is not obstructed by ex-
ercising unreasonably high licensing thresholds in relation to other prospectively in-
terested market entrants. 
Standards can arise either spontaneously - due to the high degree of market pene-
tration of a particular technical solution, and be consequently followed for conveni-
ence (i.e. "de facto" standards) - or as a result of a previous convention, such as a 
norm or measure pursuing from a consensual procedure, thus legally binding the 
parties involved (i.e. "de jure" standards).35 Within the latter case, we may still dis-
tinguish between so-called “formal” and “ad-hoc” standards, fundamentally accord-
ing to the organism leading the process. In brief, “formal” standards, on the one 
hand, are commonly established by official standardization bodies, typically sub-
jected to some kind of governmental control; “ad-hoc” standards, on the other hand, 
are set by unofficial industry groups, which purposefully cooperate together within 
the framework of the particularly initiated standard-setting procedure. Accordingly, 
while “de facto” standards emerge outside any pre-ordered standardization mechan-
ism, both last-mentioned cases are certainly going to involve particularly pondered 
decisions about the technologies to be included under the elected specification and 
the IPR policy to be adopted. 
 
33  For a comprehensive account of the interoperability debate in the software industry, see i.a.: 
Band J. and Katoh M., “Interfaces on Trial: Intellectual Property and Interoperability in the 
Global Software Industry”, Westview Press, 1995. 
34  For a major reference, see the definition adopted by the European Information & Communi-
cations Technology Industry Association (EICTA), according to which interoperability is 
“the ability of two or more networks, systems, devices, applications or components to ex-
change information between them and to use the information so exchanged”, EICTA White 
Paper on Standardization and Interoperability, Brussels, Nov. 2006, available at:  
http://www.eicta.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/document1166544474.pdf  
35  For a systematic classification and an economic analysis of the concepts adopted, see: Funk 
J., “Global Competition Between and Within Standards: the Case of Mobile Phones”, Pal-
grave Macmillan Publisher, January 12, 2002, p. 1 et seq. 
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2. Pivotal Role of Patent Rights and Advantages of Collaborative Settings: 
Patent Pools Strategies to Overcome “Hold-Up” Problems  
Unfortunately, in spite of all efforts for harmonization, there may be a fierce 
competition among different standards, and consequently their underlying support-
ing organizations, as many of them may never make it to the marketplace and, in a 
figurative way, go under before reaching the surface, as just few, dominant stan-
dards actually manage to finally become acclaimed as commercially endorsed speci-
fications. This entails a significant waste, in terms of loss of technological solutions 
and undergone efforts, which is not always justified under purely objective criteria, 
since there is no merely scientific basis for the success of a particular standard over 
others, as they may in fact often eventually be selected on conventional grounds, es-
pecially within the publicly driven setting of standard-setting organizations.36  
When a managing entity - either in the form of a standard-setting organization (in 
the case of “formal” standards) or as elective representative of industry groups (in 
the case of “ad-hoc” standards), the latter ideally convening into a patent pool - is in 
charge of the standardization process, the participants are   anyway encouraged in 
the context of orchestrated collaborative endeavours to openly share their know-
ledge, thereby making their contributions to the development of the standard, strong-
ly relying on the confidence that their technology is protected by IP rights. Such le-
gal coverage represents, on the one hand, a means to overcome the risk of free riding 
over their own investments and, on the other hand, a promising source of royalty in-
come to recoup the incurred R&D costs.37 
Indeed, the view is shared that if patent rights did not actually apply to standard 
contributions at all, innovation in the field would have to rely on trade secrets, which 
paradoxically would eventually lead to more proprietary, even less open standards.38 
 
36  See in this respect the affirmation, supported by empirical evidence, according to which: 
“Companies should move proactively to have their patented and non-patented technologies 
incorporated in standards. These recommendations are common regardless of the form of 
standardization activities whether it is public or private. Standardization activities are political 
negotiations and not a forum for assessing which technologies excel over others. Therefore, 
companies should delegate skilled negotiators to participate in such activities. Companies 
should also provide their employees with educational opportunities to improve their negotia-
tion skills” […] “If the participants in a standardization activity come to recognize a patent 
pool as a future option, coordination may become easier”, in : Yamada H., “International 
Standardization as a Strategic Tool - Standardization and Patent pools: Using Patent Licens-
ing to Lead the Market”, International Engineering Consortium (IEC), Centenary Challenge, 
2006, Geneva, respectively in Sect. 6.2 “Taking Advantage of Standardization Activities as 
Political Negotiations” and Sect. 6.3 “Exploring the Possibility of Forming Patent Pools”, al-
so available at: http://www.iecchallenge.org/papers/pdf_iecchallenge/yamada.pdf  
37  For a supporting view, see i.a.: Yamada H., “Patent Exploitation in the Information and 
Communications Sector: Using Licensing to Lead the Market”, Science and Technology 
Trends: Quarterly Review, 2006, vol. 19, p. 11 et seq. 
38  See in this respect, i.a.: Frain T., “Patents in Standards and Interoperability”, Colloquia on 
Selected Patent Issues, World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, November 29, 
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Hence, the framework underpinning open standards, as constructed over the delicate 
balance set by the patent legislator, would collapse and the overall number of initia-
tives to develop open standards would in the end decrease. Thus, together with the 
protection, a big deal of incentives would be ultimately lost. In fact, the revaluation 
of patent rights as catalyst for participation in the regulated context of standard-
setting mechanisms offer a more mature standpoint to the ostensible allegation that 
wants patents and standards as respective antagonists. 
Interestingly, it may consequently be deduced that, refuting the common preju-
dices here, the biggest threat to interoperability in the standards’ domain is not ac-
tually posed by patent holders who are contributing to the specification, but, on the 
contrary, rather from owners of relevant technologies who are keeping out of the 
undergoing standard-setting process.39 Indeed, non-participating patentees could 
hamper the benefits of standardization by exercising their exclusive prerogatives 
over their standard-related specifications, thus “holding-up” practicable access to the 
standard, not being bound to offer licenses under either reasonable and non-
discriminatory (hereinafter RAND) or any other favourable conditions sponsored 
within the standard-setting body.  
In fact, considering the terms constituting the RAND commitment, in principle 
the “reasonable” prong is supposed to eliminate the risk of monopoly overcharges in 
the royalty rate, while the “non-discriminatory” part shall protect against the poten-
tial of standard-related patent owners stifling downstream competition.40 
While “hold-up” problems notoriously strike technological sectors more highly 
characterized by dense patent production, in this respect they become even more 
critical in case a standardization process is on the way. Among the several studies 
addressing the issue,41 an effective solution advanced has been making participation 
in a standard-setting process subject to the preliminary condition that the relevant 
 
2006, p. 2 et seq., available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/meetings/en/2006/patent_colloquia/11/pdf/frain_paper
.pdf 
39  On the problem of deficient participation in patent pools, where it has been empirically dem-
onstrated that between half and two-thirds of the eligible firms decide not to join the consor-
tium, as conclusive founding, see more generally: Lerner J. et al., “To Join or Not to Join: 
Examining Patent Pool Participation and Rent Sharing Rules”, January 2008, available 
through the Social Science Research Network at:  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=945189  
40  Nevertheless, it has been argued that the “non-discriminatory” prong of the RAND commit-
ment shall be read narrowly to prohibit only discriminatory licenses to downstream competi-
tor, but not also price differentiation overall, otherwise that would turn into an inflexible obli-
gation to license at identical terms to all potential licensees. See on the point: Crane D., “Pa-
tent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price Discrimination”, Cardozo 
Legal Studies Research Paper, no. 232, April 2008, also available through the Social Science 
Research Network at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120071 
41  For a thorough analysis of the issue, see, i.a.: Shapiro C. et al., “Standard Setting, Patents, 
and Hold-Up”, Antitrust Law Journal, 2007, vol. 74, p. 603 et seq., also available at:  
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/standards2007.pdf  
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patent owners agree to join a patent pool for the implementation of the standard, the-
reby delegating the power to conclude licenses under RAND terms to the pool’s 
administration and, not last, also overcoming the related divergences of interpreta-
tion, and the deriving uncertainties, “a priori”.42 For the patent holders involved this 
is a “trade-off” between giving up their sovereign exclusivity in the determination of 
maximum royalties and the eventuality that their technology shall not be included in 
the standard upon refusal of committing to cooperate at an early stage. However, the 
threat of being excluded from orchestrated standard-setting endeavours at the outset 
seems compelling enough to choose the way of cooperation instead. 
Alternatively, a complementary, “ex post” solution to counter “hold-up” prob-
lems, as advocated by this contribution and tailored around the flexibility of patent 
pooling arrangements, may consist in making the establishment of a patent pool sub-
ject to the “suspensive condition” of positively attracting all essential patent holders 
identified for implementing the pooled technology. In such a case, patent holders 
that shall not enter the pool will not be able to “free ride” the cooperative efforts un-
dergone by “holding-up” the pool’s licensees with the demand of higher royalties for 
their essential patent, which they would opportunistically keep outside of the pool. 
Indeed, following the scheme advanced, the pool itself would dissolve shall attempts 
to include all essential technologies eventually fail, leaving the need to conclude 
multiple individual licenses as the only, certainly less attractive alternative, where 
the sum of marginal costs may eventually result in higher total royalties and, conse-
quently, diminished demand for all patentors, which is certainly an overall less con-
venient alternative than the one of constituting a pool.43  
II. Boosting Access to Standard-Related Patents for a Competitive Market 
Integration 
Looking now at the overall ramifications of standardized applications on the 
economy, it is clear that they are gaining momentum in business reality today, and it 
surely represents a major “bonus” to be endorsing a positively established technical 
specification, taking into account the significant financial repercussions of the wide-
spread adoption of a standardized solution on the marketplace, translated in terms of 
royalty income for the patent holders involved, ideally organized in the form of a 
pooling consortium. Besides, from a wider perspective, standards, if properly devel-
 
42  Approaching the issue from an economic perspective, said solution has been recently advo-
cated by: Leveque F. and Meniere Y., “Early Commitments Help Patent Pool Formation”, 
Cerna Working Paper, June 2008, also available through the Social Science Research Net-
work at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=428080  
43  In fact, because of the multiple marginalization costs the demand may fall as the overall price 
charged may be too high. In simplified exemplificative terms, what happens is that the higher 
licensing fees demanded by owner A, also diminished the demand for the related technology 
licensed by owner B, because conveying in higher, less competitive total costs. 
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oped, play a beneficial role in promoting the efficient dissemination of resources, as 
has become particularly apparent in hi-tech markets, thereby being advantageous to 
consumers and to the economy in general.44 
In order to appreciate the positive effects the adoption of a standard potentially 
entails, this shall be developed in a truly competitive environment from the outset. 
Accordingly, as is also true within patent pools, when the choice of technologies to 
be incorporated into a standard is made in an open and transparent way, on the basis 
of objective merits and economic convenience, any potential restriction of competi-
tion - engendered by the affirmation of a position of market dominance around an 
aggregation of technologies - is normally outweighed by countervailing economic 
benefits. In fact, standards have the positive effect of driving economic interpenetra-
tion, fostering the developments of new markets of compatible products, providing 
for improved supply conditions through interoperability and lowering transaction 
costs, thereby promoting efficiency and convenience for consumers.45  
1. European Commission: General Policy Concerns and Recently 
Announced Actions 
Moreover, within the frame of the European internal market, standards offer the 
additional advantage to contribute to the policy objective of market integration with-
in the EU,46 as the European Commission, issuing a formal Communication on the 
role of standardization in the framework of European policies and legislation in 
200447 has recognized. In fact, the Commission had already in the past advocated a 
general set of recommendations to standard setting bodies for the ways to manage 
standard-related intellectual property rights in order to fully comply with EU compe-
tition rules.48  
 
44  For a thorough overwiew and legal analysis on standard-related technology licensing practic-
es, see i.a.: Ullrich H., “Patente, Wettbewerb und Technische Normung”, GRUR, 2007, p. 
817 et seq. 
45  On the point, see: Piesiewicz G. and Schellingerhout R., “Intellectual Property Rights in 
Standard Setting from a Competition Law Perspective”, Competition Policy Newsletter, Au-
tumn 2007, no. 3, p. 36 et seq., also available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2007_3.pdf 
46  For a wider, critical overview on the interaction of IP and competition law and the related 
policy implications within the European Internal Market, see i.a.: Enchelmaier S., “Intellec-
tual Property, the Internal Market and Competition Law”, In: Drexl J. ed.: Research Hand-
book on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, 
USA, Edward Elgar, 2008, p. 405 et seq. 
47  Commission Communication on the role of European Standardization in the Framework of 
European Policies and Legislation COM (2004) 674 final, Oct. 18, 2004, available at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0674:FIN:EN:PDF  
48  Commission Communication on IPRs and Standardization, COM 92/445, October 22, 1992. 
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Indeed, the underlined advantages, inherent in the implementation of standardized 
specifications for interoperability, may be undermined when a standard encompasses 
competitive and therefore partly substitute technologies, hence foregoing consum-
ers’ choices and alimenting antitrust concerns, such as the risk of collusion disguised 
beyond the typical collaborative framework of a standard-setting process. Such pit-
falls were closely scrutinized by the European Commission, when specifically deal-
ing with the applicability of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation 
agreements.49 As a result, under European competition law, standard-setting agree-
ments will be caught by Art. 81, and therefore prohibited, if they “use a standard as 
a means amongst other parts of a broader restrictive agreement aimed at excluding 
actual or potential competitors”.50 However, an exemption may be granted based on 
the prevailing advantages that a standardization process may boost, conditioned 
upon the double finding that, on the one hand, (1) the standard-setting agreement 
does not contain restrictions of competition that are not indispensable to achieve its 
most creditable goals, such as to facilitate the development of integrated products 
for the benefit of consumers and to overcome inefficient constraints to innovation,51 
and that, on the other hand, (2) access to the standard must be readily available to 
new market entrants wishing to comply with it.52 
Besides, the current European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Ms. Neelie 
Kroes, has ultimately intervened during an official speech in Brussels in June 2008 
to announce her will to pursue a more pro-active antitrust enforcement policy in or-
der to enhance European competition. In this respect, she expressly acknowledged 
the fundamental importance of standards for “interoperability”, which in its turn 
“encourages competition on the merits between technologies from different compa-
nies, and helps prevent lock-in”.53 Accordingly, it is maintained that standardization 
agreements should be based on the merits of the technologies involved and, in this 
sense, if comparable solutions are available, non-proprietary technologies shall be 
preferred in order to avoid “lock-in” problems at the outset. For the case that pro-
prietary technologies are nonetheless included in a standard, the European Commis-
sioner supports the view that “ex ante” disclosure shall help those involved make a 
“properly informed decision” and this is supposed to encompass both (1) the exis-
tence of essential patents and (2) the maximum royalty rates demanded, based on the 
assumption that “both can increase the effectiveness of the standard setting process, 
lead to more competitive solutions and reduce the risk of later antitrust problems”.  
Finally, it may therefore be assumed for the future that final commitments taken in 
 
49  Commission Notice Guidelines on the Applicability of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements (2001/C 3/02). 
50  Id., para. 165. 
51  Id., para. 173. 
52  Id., para. 169. 
53  See the official EC press release: Kroes N., “Being Open About Standards”, European Com-
missioner for Competition Policy, OpenForum Europe, Brussels, June 10, 2008, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/317& 
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
39 
this sense before standard-setting organizations by participating patent holders shall 
be backed-up by appropriate antitrust enforcement remedies. 
2. Overcoming the Perceived Shortcomings in the Patent Regime 
Within the scope of this contribution, aimed at exploring collaborative IP me-
chanisms to ensure access to patented technologies, the current debate around the 
perceived shortcomings in the current patent regime assumes a special relevance. In 
practice, actual conflicts between IP rights and standards arise when the implemen-
tation of the latter necessitates the use of patented technology, in case a right holder 
refuses to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.  
Fundamentally, the tension between standards and patents, as discussed, is greatly 
alimented by the polar principles that they allegedly incarnate: the former mostly 
profiting from an “open”, “public” free environment, so that the underlying technol-
ogies can be seamlessly spread and widely adopted in the market place, encouraging 
the diffusion of complying products; the latter being essentially based on a “close”, 
“private” exclusive system, formed around individual exclusionary rights, which 
could be employed as bargaining tools to reap the highest achievable commercial 
benefits from licensing negotiations. 
Nevertheless, these two seemingly conflicting systems could in fact be reconciled 
by coordinating their ultimate, common goal of serving, even if at different levels, 
the public good of innovation,54 which they both finally do, since, as a closer analy-
sis reveals, they are only apparently following antithetical paths. From this perspec-
tive, we shall consider possible approaches to overcome the shortcomings detected 
within the patent regime when it comes to dealing with standard-related technolo-
gies in order to afford access for interoperability purposes.55 The solutions advanced 
are essentially based either on an “external”, legislative intervention, or on what we 
may consider to be an “internal” self-regulatory action. 
a. Debated Opportunity of Legislative Interventions 
The legislation intended to amend the gaps left by the current patent system, ei-
ther intervening directly into the applicable IP regime or, indirectly, by way of anti-
 
54  On the point, see i.a.: Drexl J., “The Critical Role of Competition Law in Preserving Public 
Goods in Conflict with Intellectual Property Rights”, In: Maskus K. and Reichman J., “Inter-
national Public Goods and Transfer of Technology Under a Globalized IP Regime”, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005, p. 709 et seq. 
55  Frain T., “Patents in Standards and Interoperability”, Colloquia on Selected Patent Issues, 
World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, November 29, 2006, p. 2 et seq., available 
 at: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/meetings/en/2006/patent_colloquia/11/pdf/ 
frain_paper.pdf   
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trust remedies, belongs to the first category. The second group encompasses, on the 
other hand, appropriate IPR policies and recommendations internally adopted by 
standard-setting bodies, eventually binding for the participating institutions, as well 
as, following the same paradigm, patent pools, these latter involving a stricter com-
mitment from its members, beyond the need for individual implementation.  
The biggest challenge, from a policy standpoint, in case essential patents are un-
derlying a given standard, is to strike the proper balance between, on the one hand, 
the rightful expectation of a patent holder to recoup the costs undergone for the in-
vention, thus fully benefiting from his exclusive right and the freedom of third par-
ties to develop and, on the other hand, market standard-compliant products, giving 
end-users the choice between alternative technological solutions, thereby avoiding 
that consumers are locked into a particular proprietary platform. 
aa. From an Antitrust Law Standpoint 
In this respect, competition law provides for a system of corrections that is exter-
nal to the patent domain and traditionally addresses serious situations of misuse of 
IP rights. Relevant abusive practices have then to be well pre-defined in order to 
avoid unnecessary interferences, thus the available remedies in this area are even-
tually quite circumscribed. The mainstream jurisprudential developments on the 
matter, as openly professed in the US,56 is to delimit cases of “misuse” only where, 
broadly speaking, the patent holder detains a position of “dominant supplier” and is 
abusing it by, for instance, refusing to license, thereby entailing substantial foreclo-
sure on the marketplace. This approach consequently leaves the most recurrent ordi-
nary cases of opportunistic IP exploitation unsolved, which does not appear satisfac-
tory in the actual state.57 Indeed, if a dominant position is absent, there is traditional-
ly no mechanism, in the current legal regime, to adequately confront situations 
where, for example, a patent holder may make leverage to block technical standards, 
using his right to hinder interoperability and gain an exclusive advantage over com-
petitors. 
Ultimately, however, as outlined above, some developments have been an-
nounced on the European side by the Commission, which is willing to back-up pre-
liminary licensing commitments assumed by patent holders actively participating in 
a standard-setting process. This is indeed supposed to open the way to a new set of 
effective antitrust remedies. 
 
56  For a representative, fairly recent reference, see: the US Supreme Court, in “Illinois Tool 
Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.”, March 1, 2006, In: 547 U.S. 28, 2006, also available at: 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/04-1329.pdf  
57  Frain T., supra, fn. 55, p. 3-4. 
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ab. From a Patent Law Standpoint 
Aside from competition measures, other remedies may intervene, as anticipated, 
within the patent domain itself. The span of the solutions available may range from 
compulsory licensing provisions limited to interoperability purposes - where, as a 
matter of right, standard-related patents would be available to third parties under 
RAND terms - to more drastic substantial amendments to the patent regime, such as 
a narrow-cut exception to the exclusive rights of the patent holder that would allow 
the free use of the technology’s interface, without the need for a license, to the ex-
tent that this would be indispensable for the development and sale of interoperable 
products.  
The latter approach may be eventually softened by introducing the additional re-
quirement that, in order for such tailored limited exception to operate, the holder of a 
patented interface shall be actually engaging in an abusive conduct, by proving the 
existence of a casual link between the patentee’s alleged obstructive behaviour and 
its potential impact in the marketplace, irregardless of the formal existence of a do-
minant position as constructed against the background of competition law.  
In other words, following a less strictly limited exception approach, an interface-
related patent would only become unenforceable if the patentee’s refusal to license58 
or excessive royalties’ charge would render it either commercially or technically un-
attractive for prospective licenses to make independent, but interoperable products, 
thereby markedly impairing competition.59 
Whereas both above-mentioned solutions, and their variants, would have clear 
advantages for third parties - which could then legitimately develop and bring to the 
market novel technologies interoperating with existing proprietary platforms, thus 
particularly benefiting small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), as well as new 
market entrants needing access to patented interfaces - on the other hand, they may 
have a disincentive effect on the affected right holders, eventually impairing their 
willingness to commit important resources for investments into viable interface 
technologies. This is particularly obvious in the instance of cutbacks in the patent 
owners’ rights, where no license would be needed for interface specifications; never-
theless, this would also be true for introducing compulsory licenses under RAND 
terms for interoperability purposes, although the economic revenue here will be cer-
tainly lessened, in comparison with the royalties that could be freely negotiated on 
individual basis, but not annulled.  
As far as such legislative solutions are concerned - aside from considerations of 
commercial convenience that could, as observed, entail the undesired side-effects of 
 
58  On the issue of abuse of a dominant position integrated by a refusal to license, see: Drexl J., 
“Abuse of Dominance in Licensing and Refusal to License - A More Economic Approach to 
Competition by Imitation and to Competition by Substitution”, In: Ehlermann, Claus Dieter / 
Isabela Atansiu  ed.: Competition Law Annual 2005: The Interaction between Competition 
Law and IP Law. Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, p.  647 et seq. 
59  Frain T., supra, fn. 55, p. 4-5. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
42 
diminishing the incentive for substantial innovation investments into interface tech-
nologies in the first place - other limitations ought to be recalled. In particular, any 
formal intervention that might derogate from the exclusive rights conferred upon the 
patent holder would have to comply with the relevant international treaty obliga-
tions, which member states are to fulfil under the Agreement on Trade-related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).60  
Specifically, pursuant to Art. 30 of the TRIPS, limited exceptions to patent rights 
may only be allowed, provided that they do not “unreasonably conflict with a nor-
mal exploitation of the patent”, nor “unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the patent owner, taking into account legitimate interests of third parties”. Such 
strictly tailored derogations are to be read in combination with the provision of Art. 
31 TRIPS, setting up the exceptional conditions under which, basically in order to 
accomplish purposes of public interest, use without the authorization of the right 
holder can be permitted, as a basis for the granting of compulsory licenses.61 
In a wider perspective, such limitations pertaining to the patent regime shall be 
interpreted and implemented in conjunction with Art. 7 and 8 TRIPS. The former 
sets out the ultimate objectives underlying the protection and enforcement of IP 
rights, serving: “to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, 
and to a balance of rights and obligations”.  As a well-tailored exception to this gen-
eral principle, Art. 8 TRIPS allows member states to partially derogate to such IP 
protection only on the base of conflict with higher-ranking collective interests, such 
as public health, or in case of serious abuses from the IP holders negatively affecting 
the market. 
Because of the constraining formal boundaries within which derogations to patent 
rights may only be admissible, as binding for all WTO Member States under the 
TRIPS Agreement, relevant legislative interventions in the field, designed to amend 
the gaps left by the current patent system in order to ensure access to standard-
related technology for interoperability purposes – as outlined above, either interven-
ing directly into the applicable IP regime, i.e. from a patent law standpoint, or, indi-
rectly, by way of antitrust remedies – ultimately may not prove particularly effective 
when confronted with such operative limitations. 
 
60  See: Part II “Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property 
Rights”, Sect. 5 “Patents” of TRIPS; For a legal appraisal on the discussed implications of 
TRIPS on patent rights, see i.a.: Janis M., “Minimal Standards for Patent-Related Antitrust 
Law under TRIPS”, In: Maskus K. and Reichman J., “International Public Goods and Trans-
fer of Technology Under A Globalized IP Regime”, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 
774 et seq. 
61  For a critical overview on the fundamental impact of TRIPS on patent rights, see in particu-
lar: Straus J., “Implications of the TRIPs Agreement in the Field of Patent Law”, In: Beier F.-
K., Schricker G.  (Ed.), “From GATT to TRIPs”, IIC Studies, vol. 18, Weinheim, 1996, p. 
160 et seq. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
43 
b. Internal IPR Policies as Self-Regulatory Solutions 
For these reasons, we shall eventually also consider alternative approaches, as an-
ticipated in these premises, by turning now to an investigation of the efficacy of self-
regulatory solutions, encompassing appropriate IPR policies and recommendations, 
as internally adopted both by standard-setting bodies, on the one hand, and patent 
pools, on the other hand, these latter being characterized by an appreciable higher 
level of inner cohesion and reciprocal commitment. 
In order to ensure access to essential standard-related patents by way of self-
regulation, it is important that, in the first place, relevant patented technologies can 
be timely identified through reliable precursory disclosure requirements, and that, in 
the second place, ensuing licenses are made available on FRAND terms. This com-
plementary pair of principles underlies the developments of commercially sustaina-
ble standards, encouraging competitive investments into the implementation of a 
broad range of interoperable products. 
ba. Standard-Setting Bodies’ Recommendations 
As anticipated, such self-regulations may occur within the collaborative frame-
work of standard-setting bodies,62 as here, in an attempt to contain the risk of con-
flicts once a standard is adopted, and thereby ensuring its seamless and broadest 
possible dissemination in the marketplace afterwards, patent policies regulating the 
obligations to which the participating entities shall commit are frequently estab-
lished beforehand.63 In this respect, many organizations require the parties involved 
in the standard-setting process to timely disclose information regarding relevant pa-
tents and, sometimes, also patent applications, in order to dispose of the relevant 
facts in the selection procedure.64 In a second step, shall any relevant technology be 
 
62  In the EU, standards bodies are actually recognized under: Directive 98/34 of June 22, 1998, 
“Technical standards and regulations”, OJ L 204, July 21, 1998, p. 37 et seq. 
63  For a critical overview, see i.a.: Jacobson K., “Revising Standard-Setting Organizations’ Pa-
tent Policies”, Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, Fall 2004, vol. 
3, no. 1, p. 43 et seq., also available at:  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v3/n1/3/jakobsen.pdf  
64  For a representative instance, see: Art. 4.1, ETSI IPR Policy, Annex 6 of ETSI Rules of Pro-
cedure, March 29, 2007, available at:  
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_IPR-Policy.pdf, requiring that: “[...] each 
member shall use its reasonable endeavors, in particular during the development of a standard 
or technical specification where it participates, to inform ETSI of essential IPRs in a timely 
fashion. In particular, a member submitting a technical proposal for a standard or technical 
specification shall, on a bona fide basis, draw the attention of ETSI to any of that member's 
IPR which might be essential if that proposal is adopted”. 
 The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) is a recognized European 
standardization body, which produces globally-applicable standards for Information and 
Communications Technologies, including fixed, mobile, radio, converged, broadcast and in-
 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
44 
identified, the patentee is required to agree on appropriate licensing conditions, such 
as that the license must be granted under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms 
(RAND) or even that the license must be royalty free.65  
As far as the timely disclosure requirement is concerned, the main issue is that the 
reliability of the information revealed is grossly based on the involved company's 
own internal judgement. As for this point,66 the declaration policy of each individual 
firm may greatly vary, bearing the risk of false or misleading declarations of essen-
tiality, so that the final figure of the overall estimated royalties to be charged is 
eventually distorted. From a business perspective, the advanced solutions have been 
undertaken with a view to backing the consistency of specific statements by compel-
ling to include full reference of the claimed essential technology to the standard, as 
well as by obliging the patentee, when requested by a prospective licensee and on a 
confidential basis, to provide supporting evidence of essentiality, such as claim 
charts, in the framework of undertaken bilateral negotiations. Such supplementary 
commitment is supposed to serve the right owners as a disincentive to “over-
disclose” their own patents, thereby slowing down the whole assessment process, in 
cases of feeble grounds for essentiality. 
As far as the commitment to license under RAND or royalty-free (RF) terms is 
now concerned, other critical issues are raised. However, in the premises, it should 
be considered that firms participating in standardization activities naturally expect to 
see some rewards for the investments they have been undertaking in developing in-
teroperable accessible solutions, which is why RAND terms tend to represent a more 
desirable, and therefore significantly more diffused, model than RF. In fact, whereas 
some participants may be truly inspired to collaborating within an open and free en-
vironment, the requirement of RF conditions may spawn the reluctance, on the other 
hand, of important technology owners to take part in the process and support the 
 
ternet technologies. ETSI operates as a not-for-profit organization with almost 700 ETSI 
member organizations drawn from 60 countries worldwide. For the official website, refer to: 
http://www.etsi.org   
 The ETSI IPR policy was first adopted as an interim policy in November 1994, and con-
firmed as a permanent policy in November 1997, after protracted negotiations among the 
membership over many years, and ultimately achieving approval of the competition authori-
ties in Europe, US and Japan. In November 2005 the General Assembly of ETSI approved the 
creation of a new IPR ad hoc group, whose work officially started in January 2006, to review 
the IPR policy and investigate issues like FRAND and cumulative royalties. 
65  Again, for an illustrative instance, see Art. 6.1, ETSI IPR Policy, supra, fn. 64, requiring that: 
“When an essential IPR relating to a particular standard or technical specification is brought 
to the attention of ETSI, the Director-General of ETSI shall immediately request the owner to 
give within three months an undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable li-
censes on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions [...]. The above under-
taking may be made subject to the condition that those who seek licenses agree to recipro-
cate”. 
66  See in this respect, i.a.: Frain T., “Patents in Standards and Interoperability”, Colloquia on 
Selected Patent Issues, World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, November 29, 
2006, p. 7 et seq. 
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standard, ultimately leading to market fragmentation and lack of interoperability, 
which means the standard-setting endeavours are failing. 
However, on the one hand, even leaving the RF option out, there is actually no 
undisputed definition of RAND terms yet, missing an unambiguous authoritative 
interpretation establishing clarity on the point,67 beyond the diverse regulatory 
frameworks of standard-setting bodies, which may anyway solely direct the conduct 
of parties electively participating in the process. In this respect, some faults also ap-
pear from a business perspective, as the implementation of a RAND policy, in prin-
ciple, does not necessarily lead to a limitative effect as far as the practised licensing 
fees are concerned, so that these indeed remain subject to different individual inter-
pretations.68 Thus, in practice, effective access to interface technologies may still be 
obstructed, should the patent holders who retain standard-related technologies fail to 
implement truly reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, exploiting the interpreta-
tive gaps left by the undersigned IPR policies to their own individual interest, when 
eventually concluding licenses with third parties. Moreover, the problem of arising 
costs for third party licensees only becomes more obvious in the most frequent in-
stance of multiple patent owners all detaining standard-related essential technolo-
gies, in which case unaccounted separate charges may sum up and eventually in-
crease the cumulative due royalties.  
On the other hand, as with any other policy matter, if the applicable terms have 
not been unambiguously drafted, different interpretations may be the source of dis-
putes and disparities among the parties involved through their rights and obligations. 
Nevertheless, even appreciable attempts towards transparent and unblemished IPR 
guidelines on the part of standard-setting organizations do not made up for the fact 
that, ultimately, these latter neither get directly involved into the specific licensing 
arrangements for the relevant standardized specifications, finally concluded among 
the respective patent owners and third parties, nor into settling disputes with respect 
 
67  In Germany, although ultimately the issue was brought to the attention of the Federal Su-
preme Court in the context of a patent infringement case, no clear definition on the point has 
yet been provided, except for relying on the “reasonable discretion” of the patent holder with 
reference to the common practice in the relevant business sector. See on the point: Bundes-
gerichtshof, Decision of 6 May 2009, full text of the judgement available at:  
 http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh& 
Art=en&Datum=2009&Sort=3&Seite=8&nr=48134&pos=269&anz=1424&Blank=1.pdf. 
 This decision will be analysed in greater depth further in Part III, lett. D, n. 6 of this Contribu-
tion. 
68  For a legal analysis on the matter in the light of the recent German Federal Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, see i.a.: Conde Gallego B., “Die Anwendung des kartellrechtlichen Miss-
brauchsverbots auf ‚unerlässliche’ Immaterialgüterrechte im Lichte der IMS Health- und 
Standard-Spundfass-Urteile”. In:  GRUR Int., 2006, p. 16 et seq.; Conde Gallego B., Macke-
nrodt M., Enchelmeier S. (Ed.), “Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New En-
forcement Mechanisms?”, Berlin, Springer, 2008; Schoeler K., “Patents and Standards: The 
Antitrust Objection as a Defense in Patent Infringement Proceeding”, In: MPI Studies on In-
tellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law – Patents and Technological Progress in a 
Globalized World – Liber Amicorum Joseph Straus, 2008, vol. 6, Springer ed., p. 177 et seq. 
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to the validity and scope of the patents at issue, hence leaving a gap of effective en-
forcement. In other words, in case a participant acts in disregard of the IPR policy 
adopted by the standardization body of reference, they may eventually face internal 
sanctions, but the agreement concluded with third parties may irrespectively remain 
binding. Thus, the option for a patent holder to either adhere to the commitments 
endorsed or act in spite of them may, from a business perspective, ultimately be 
simply a choice of prevailing incentives.69  
bb. Patent Pools’ Enforced Licensing Terms 
Both the lack of uniform interpretation of RAND terms and the gap of effective 
enforcement towards the licensing commitments assumed by standard-related patent 
holders in the standard-setting process may be obliterated by entering a patent pool-
ing agreement.70 In fact, the pool’s administration is invested with the authority to 
act autonomously with third parties, thereby concluding licenses with them accord-
ing to uniform RAND conditions, typically following a standardized, pre-arranged 
scheme. Therefore, in this case the conventional inclusion of RAND terms is direct-
ly effective towards licensees, through the bilateral contracts negotiated, since the 
collective mandate to the pool in force of which the latter are concluded substitutes 
the additional need for implementation by the individual patent owners involved - 
thereby also undermining the risk of divergence between the IPR policy agreed on, 
in principle, and licensing conditions eventually applied, in practice.71 
 
69  Some troubling conclusions about the performance of standard-setting organizations have 
been expressed by: Delacey B. et al., “Strategic Behavior in Standard-Setting Organizations”, 
Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 903214, May 2006, available through the Social Science 
Research Network at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=903214  
70  For an authoritative support, see in this respect the position expressed by WIPO in the outline 
of its patent law’s current issues, dealing with patents and standards, available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/standards.html; 
 besides, the advocated solution also finds empirical support by recent economic studies, such 
as: Leveque F. and Meniere Y., “Early Commitments Help Patent Pool Formation”, Cerna 
Working Paper, June 2008, also available within the Social Science Research Network at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=428080 
71  For a balanced outline of some of the issues arising in this context, see i.a.: Raymond D., 
“Benefits and Risks of Patent Pooling for Standard-Setting Organizations”, Annual Review of 
Antitrust Law Developments, Summer 2002, p. 41 et seq.; Hovenkamp H., “Standards Own-
ership and Competition Policy”, Boston College Law Review, March 2006, vol. 48, p. 87 et 
seq., also available at: 
 http://bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/bclawreview/meta-elements/pdf/48_1/ 
04_hovenkamp.pdf 
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D. Patent Pools and the Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and 
Antitrust Law 
The legal treatment of patent pools lies at the crossroads between intellectual 
property rights, as conferred upon the different patent holders who contribute their 
technologies to the pool for a consideration, and antitrust law,72 as these kinds of li-
cense agreements may fall under the scrutiny of competition authorities, to the ex-
tent that they may represent a significant obstacle to competitors seeking access to 
the relevant contract product or technology market,73 where concerns arise due to the 
collective pricing of pooled patents and to the regrouping of a large number of par-
ties, which may entail greater possibilities for collusion.74 
 
72  For a comprehensive study focusing on the wider and complex interface between IP and 
competition law, in the current global context, see i.a.: Drexl J., “Research Handbook on 
Competition and Intellectual Property Law”, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008; Ullrich H., 
“The Interaction between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law - An Overview”, 
In:  Patent Pools: Approaching an Intellectual Property Problem via Competition Policy, 
2007, p. 305 et seq.; Anderman S., “The Interface Between Intellectual Property Rights and 
Competition Policy”, Cambridge University Press, 2007; Ghidini G., “On the ‘Intersection’ 
of IP and Competition Law”, “Intellectual Property and Competition Law: The Innovation 
Nexus”, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006, p. 99 et seq. 
73  The former defined in the Commission Regulation (EC) No. 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on 
the application of Art. 81 (3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements, 
OJ 2004 L 123/11 (hereinafter TTBER), available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&m
odel=guicheti&numdoc=32004R0772; Art. 1, para. 1, lett. F “contract product”, as products 
produced with the licensed technology. Besides, the relevant technology and product market 
are defined, with regard to competing undertakings, in the same article 1, respectively under 
lett. J (i) “competing undertakings on the relevant technology market, being undertakings 
which license out competing technologies without infringing each other' intellectual property 
rights (actual competitors on the technology market); the relevant technology market includes 
technologies which are regarded by the licensees as interchangeable with or substitutable for 
the licensed technology, by reason of the technologies' characteristics, their royalties and their 
intended use” and lett. J (ii) “competing undertakings on the relevant product market, being 
undertakings which, in the absence of the technology transfer agreement, are both active on 
the relevant product and geographic market(s) on which the contract products are sold with-
out infringing each other' intellectual property rights (actual competitors on the product mar-
ket) or would, on realistic grounds, undertake the necessary additional investments or other 
necessary switching costs so that they could timely enter, without infringing each other' intel-
lectual property rights, the(se) relevant product and geographic market(s) in response to a 
small and permanent increase in relative prices (potential competitors on the product market); 
the relevant product market comprises products which are regarded by the buyers as inter-
changeable with or substitutable for the contract products, by reason of the products' characte-
ristics, their prices and their intended use”. 
74  For a broader overview, see i.a.: Hovenkamp H., et al., “IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of An-
titrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law”, 2002, para. 34, p. 34 et seq. 
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I. Confuting the Traditionally Perceived Antagonism between Patent and 
Antitrust Law: Introducing the Concept of “Competition of First Level” 
and Refuting the Idea of “Patent Monopolies” 
Traditionally, it was believed that there is an inherent conflict between intellec-
tual property, which grants exclusive rights, and antitrust law, that prohibits mono-
polies, with these two disciplines also pictured as “antagonists”. However, said as-
sumption is based on the misleading association and confusion of “monopolies”, on 
the one hand, which are actually situations of fact where there are no alternatives on 
the relevant market, and “exclusive rights”, on the other hand, which are conversely 
situations where the law confers a certain exclusivity of exploitation, both tempora-
rily and territorially defined, on the right holder, as a consideration of the undertaken 
endeavours, without this being necessarily followed by a situation of market mono-
poly,75 with foreclosure of actual “alternatives”, as previously considered.  
Indeed, the view is taken that where patent protection is provided and in the inter-
play between offer and demand, substitute technologies are generally available as 
valid alternatives, since “competition of first level” - i.e. at the stage where research 
and development take place - may be in its turn rather enhanced by the perspective 
of a return of investment, provided by the niche of exclusivity which intellectual 
property confers upon the right holder in the marketplace - i.e. where “competition 
of second level” finally occurs.  
Hence, IP protection provides a valuable incentive for distinctive players to breed 
their ideas and step in, eventually challenging already established contenders, there-
by supplying the market with alternative choices. Thus, patent exclusivity typically 
does not coincide with market monopoly.76 This important distinction, which has 
been duly endorsed by a qualified doctrine, addresses a fundamental legal issue ly-
ing at the very heart of patent protection. Putting it in quite simple terms: “patent 
rights are not legal monopolies in the antitrust sense of the word. Not every patent is 
a monopoly and not every patent confers market power”.77 
Whereas IP rights “as such” do not create privileged realms of “economic mono-
polies”, as legal oasis detached by the surrounding harshness of competition - since 
 
75  For a critical, analytic approach on the issue, see i.a.: Drexl J., “The Relationship Between the 
Legal Exclusivity and Economic Market Power: Links and Limits”, In: Ullrich H. and Go-
vaere I., “Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public Interest. Brussels, 2008, p.  13 et 
seq. 
76  In this sense, see i.a.: Clifford A., “Patent Power and Market Power: Rethinking the Relation-
ship Between IP Rights and Market Power in Antitrust Analysis”, In: Drexl J. ed.: Research 
Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, 
MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2008, p.  239 et seq.; Ullrich H. and Govaere I., “Intellectual Prop-
erty, Market Power and the Public Interest. Brussels”, 2008. 
77  Harmon R., “Patents and the Federal Circuit”, Sect. 1.4 (b), 5 ed. 2001, p. 21. Also sharing 
the same fundamental perspective, see i.a.: Pitofsky R., “Challenges of the New Economy: 
Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property”, Antitrust Law Journal, 2001, 
p. 913 et seq. 
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patent protection, as considered, typically allows the entrance of independent and 
innovative substitute products into the market - in some particular circumstances, it 
may occur that the market power enjoyed by IP holders reaches unintended dimen-
sions, resulting in an actual foreclosure of third party competition, thus leading to a 
“de facto” monopoly. In other words, depending on the availability of substitute 
technologies on the relevant market, exclusive rights may ultimately lead to market 
power and even monopoly as defined under competition law. In such a scenario, ex-
pected business dynamics is endangered78 and the delicate balance between competi-
tion and IP law shall be accordingly re-adjusted, eventually by carefully delineating 
the specific circumstances in which antitrust remedies should intervene to correct 
the unwanted impasse that occurs when, for the concurrence of encountered factual 
and economic circumstances, patent protection grows beyond its foreseen conven-
tional scope.79  
II. Matured View of Complementarity between IP Protection and 
Competition 
Here, the question to be dealt with is whether an intervention of antitrust law to 
correct a patent misuse may be pertinent and, eventually, desirable.80 Concerns stem 
from the debated “intersection” between intellectual property and competition law, 
with their deriving conflicts, traditionally rooted in the seeming antinomy of the re-
spective direct goals of the named disciplines: promoting innovation through the at-
tribution of exclusive rights, on the one hand, and preserving open access to the 
market, on the other hand.81 However, we may be merely confronted with an appar-
ent source of conflict, because at the highest level of analysis, IP and competition 
law may well serve “complementary” scopes,82 as they both ultimately aim at pro-
moting consumer welfare and, in different ways, innovation.  
 
78  For a broader, critical approach on the issue, see i.a.: Ghidini G., “Patent Protection of Inno-
vations: A Monopoly with a Wealth of Antibodies”, In: “Intellectual Property and Competi-
tion Law: The Innovation Nexus”, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006, p. 13 et seq. 
79  Along the same line: Ghidini G., “Exclusive Protection and Competitive Dynamics of Inno-
vation: Striking a Balance”, supra, fn. 78, p. 23 et seq. 
80  For a thorough review on the matter, see: Ullrich H., “The Interaction between Competition 
Law and Intellectual Property Law: an Overview”, European University Institute - Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 2005, 
Introduction, p. 1 et seq., available at:  
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2005/200612-CompUllrichOVERVIEW.pdf  
81  Ghidini G., “On the Intersection of IPRs and Competition Law with Regard to Information 
Technology Markets”, European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies, EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 2005, Introduction, p. 1, available at: 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2005/200510-CompGhidini.pdf  
82  Lowe P., “Intellectual Property: How Special Is It for the Purposes of Competition Law En-
forcement?”, European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
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Specifically, on the one hand, competition policy tends to fulfil the named goals 
by preserving market access, as a driving condition for an efficient and dynamic 
economy, where suppliers offering the best price-quality conditions would eventual-
ly flourish. On the other hand, IP law tends to foster scientific progress for the ulti-
mate benefit of consumers by offering an adequate reward for the innovator, thus 
nurturing his motivation to invest in new technological solutions, while attempting 
to strike the right balance between over- and under-protection of inventive endea-
vours, being the exclusivity conferred upon the right holder limited in scope and in 
time in order not to undermine follow-on innovation or leading to unnecessarily long 
periods of high prices for consumers, i.e. longer than required to elicit the innovative 
effort.  
Therefore, by calibrating the means at their disposal and through a profitable di-
alectical exchange, both IP and competition law share the same long-term objectives 
in promoting innovation for the benefit of the public at large. It should consequently 
be up to the legislator to revamp the boundaries between these two interacting dis-
ciplines by carefully considering their evolving, but nevertheless interdependent dy-
namics.83 Nowadays, accordingly, a more mature view has evolved around the belief 
that intellectual property rights and antitrust law do not have “antagonist”, but 
“complementary” roles.84 As highlighted, both systems of law “are aimed at encour-
aging innovation, industry and competition”.85 Indeed, as argued further, competi-
tion, along with IP protection, should be merely one of the “means” to foster produc-
tion and distribution of goods and, ultimately, to promote innovation and consumer 
welfare, these latter being the real “goals” to be attained. 
Nevertheless, the need to resort to antitrust law might in many cases be avoided at 
the source, thereby significantly reducing the costs of litigation, should the IP para-
digm truly be structured and consequently applied, so as to trace the right balance 
and reconcile the conflicting interests of the first and subsequent innovators, who are 
often rivals in the marketplace. Unfortunately, this does not seem to be regularly the 
case, since, quoting a straightforward statement, “because legislators often fail to 
properly define the limits of exclusive property rights, the exercise of those rights in 
 
EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 2005, Introduction, p. 1, available at: 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2005/200510-CompLowe.pdf 
83  For the heated discussion over the interplay between intellectual property and antitrust law, 
see in particular: Arezzo E., “Competition Policy and IPRs: an Open Debate Over an Ever 
Green Issue”, Diritto d’Autore, 2004, vol. 3, p. 81 et seq.; Pitofsky R., “Antitrust and Intellec-
tual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy”, Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal, 2001, p. 535 et seq. 
84  Hewitt P., “Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Before the American Intellectual Property As-
sociation”, Mid-Winter Institute, Jan. 2003, available at:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200701.pdf  
85  US Federal Trade Commission, “To Promote Innovation: the Proper Balance of Competition 
and Patent Law”, Report, October 2003, Executive Summary, p. 2, available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf  
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new situations, and especially with regard to new technologies, attracts scrutiny un-
der competition law, with a view to preventing market foreclosure”.86  
Indeed, it could be argued that if IP protection always managed to strike the right 
balance between the conflicting interests at stake, there would be less need for com-
petition law to intervene. In fact, whether IP law does actually hit the perfect equili-
brium between over- and under-protection of innovative endeavours and whether, 
and under which circumstances, competition policy should intercede in this delicate 
domain are complex questions that ought to be properly addressed. 
1. Stance of the US Antitrust Authorities 
In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) confronted in an offi-
cial report,87 released in October 2003, the issue of the complementary role of com-
petition and patent law in promoting innovation.88 Following the wording of the 
Commission, “Innovation benefits consumers through the development of new and 
improved goods, services, and processes. An economy's capacity for invention and 
innovation helps drive its economic growth and the degree to which standards of liv-
ing increase. Technological breakthroughs such as automobiles, airplanes, the per-
sonal computer, the Internet, television, telephones, and modern pharmaceuticals 
illustrate the power of innovation to increase prosperity and improve the quality of 
our lives. Competition and patents stand out among the federal policies that influ-
ence innovation. Both competition and patent policy can foster innovation, but each 
requires a proper balance with the other to do so. Errors or systematic biases in how 
one policy's rules are interpreted and applied can harm the other policy's effective-
ness”.  
On the one hand, the report continues, “American antitrust law, as codified in the 
Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and other statutes, seeks “to max-
imize consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave competitively […] Compe-
tition can stimulate innovation. Competition among firms can spur the invention of 
new or better products or more efficient processes. Firms may race to be the first to 
market an innovative technology. Companies may invent lower cost manufacturing 
processes, thereby increasing their profits and enhancing their ability to compete. 
Competition can prompt firms to identify consumers’ unmet needs and develop new 
products or services to satisfy them”.89  
 
86  Ullrich H., “Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and Reductionist Competition 
Rules: A TRIP Perspective”, Journal of International Economic Law, 2004, vol. 7, p. 401. 
87  US Federal Trade Commission, supra, fn. 85, p. 1 et seq.  
88  Ferguson R., “Patent Policy in a Broader Context”, Remarks - Financial Markets Conference 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, April 2003, available at:  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030407/default.htm  
89  US Federal Trade Commission, supra, fn. 85, p. 1. 
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On the other hand, the same report properly acknowledges that patent policy also 
stimulates innovation, since it confers an exclusive right that can enable firms to in-
crease their expected profits from investment in research and development, thus fos-
tering innovation that would not occur if not because of the prospect of a patent. Be-
sides, since the patent system requires public disclosure, it can promote the dissemi-
nation of scientific and technical information for the public benefit.  Accordingly, 
the US Constitution authorizes Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to […] Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective […] Discoveries”.90  
The same conciliatory, matured trend between IP and antitrust was also con-
firmed more recently: in April 2007, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
jointly with the Department of Justice (DOJ), again issued a report dedicated to “An-
titrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and 
Competition”91 in order to exhaustively illustrate the federal agencies’ competition 
views with respect to a wide range of questions involving intellectual property li-
censing, including patent pooling92 and collaborative standard setting.93 The report 
follows a series of hearings, started in cooperation by the named agencies in 2002, 
entitled “Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge 
Based Economy”.94 The overall aim was to tackle the complex issues arising when 
antitrust laws are applied to IP, typically in a setting where business practices are 
rapidly evolving, on the premises that both antitrust and intellectual property law 
share the common goal of promoting innovation, with ultimate benefits for consum-
ers.95 In fact, the report recognises that “patent pools can help solve the problems 
created by these overlapping patent rights, or patent thicket, by reducing transaction 
costs for licensees while preserving the financial incentives for inventors to com-
mercialise their existing innovations and undertake new, potentially patentable re-
search and development”.96 
Accordingly, the principles adopted for the assessment of intellectual property 
practices are pragmatically oriented both at preserving competition and at maintain-
ing incentives for creativity and innovation, adopting a flexible “rule of reason” ap-
 
90  US Constitution, para. I, Sect. 8. 
91  US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, “Antitrust Enforcement and Intel-
lectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition”, Joint Report, April 2007, 
also available at: 
 http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/ 
P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf  
92  Id., “Chapter 3: Antitrust Analysis of Portfolio Cross-Licensing Agreements and Patent 
Pools”, Joint Report, April 2007, p. 57 et seq. 
93 Id., “Chapter 2: Competition Concerns when Patents are Incorporated into Collaborative Set 
Standards”, Joint Report, April 2007, p. 33 et seq. 
94  For more details, see: http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.shtm  
95  Press Release, “Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice Issue Report on Anti-
trust and Intellectual Property”, April 2007, available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/04/ipreport.shtm  
96  US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, supra, fn. 91, p. 57. 
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proach, which weighs the efficiencies and anti-competitive effects of a particular 
activity, considering the concrete circumstances of the case under consideration, ul-
timately providing a certain degree of legal certainty and business predictability. 
More specifically, with respect to cross-licensing and patent pools, express reference 
is made to the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (US 
Antitrust - IP Guidelines),97 issued in 1995, which share the same general flexible 
view re-proposed by the report, while then providing a more comprehensive frame-
work for the evaluation of said licensing practices. 
2. European Commission’s Corresponding Position 
Correspondingly, the European Commission has also expressed a conformed 
view on the complementary role of intellectual property rights and competition 
law.98 Indeed, being aware of the strategic impact of the discussed issues, the Com-
mission launched a public consultation on how future patent policy action to create a 
EU-wide system of protection can be committed to boost the competitiveness of EU 
industry, in an attempt to improve the framework conditions in which its business 
operates99 and in order to make the patent system itself “effective and credible with-
in society”.100  
On the same premises, with particular reference to technology transfer agree-
ments, the Commission has adopted some rules for applying competition policy to 
the licensing of patents, know-how and software copyrights, as encompassed by the 
new Block Exemption Regulation on the application of Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty 
to categories of technology transfer agreements and accompanying Guidelines.101 
 
97  US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, “Antitrust Guidelines for the Li-
censing of Intellectual Property”, April 1995, available at:  
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm 
98  The progressive proximity gained by EU and US competition law systems has been exten-
sively analyzed, i.a. by:  
 Clifford A., “Foundations of Competition Policy in the EU and USA: Conflict, Convergence 
and Beyond”, In: Ullrich H., “The Evolution of European Competition Law: whose regula-
tion, which competition?”, ASCOLA Workshop on Comparative Competition Law, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2006, p. 17 et seq. 
99  For further details about the European Commission’s consultation process, whose closing 
date for submissions was finally set for the end of March 2006, see:  
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/38&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 
100  European Commission, Directorate General for Internal Market and Services, “Questionnaire 
on the Patent System in Europe”, January 2006, p. 3 et seq., available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/consult_en.pdf 
101  Commission Notice - Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Tech-
nology Transfer Agreements, O.J. C 101 , 27 April 2004, para.7., p. 2 et seq., available at: 
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In the specific, it is expressly made clear that “The fact that intellectual property 
laws grant exclusive rights of exploitation does not imply that intellectual property 
rights are immune to competition law intervention. […] Nor does it imply that there 
is an inherent conflict between intellectual property rights and the community com-
petition rules. Indeed, both bodies of law share the same basic objective of promot-
ing consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources. Innovation constitutes 
an essential and dynamic component of an open and competitive market economy. 
Intellectual property rights promote dynamic competition by encouraging undertak-
ings to invest in the development of new or improved products and processes. So 
does competition, by putting pressure on undertakings to innovate. Therefore, both 
intellectual property rights and competition are necessary to promote innovation and 
ensure a competitive exploitation thereof”.102  
Besides, with reference to the assessment of licensing agreements under Article 
81 of the EC Treaty,103 it is further stated that “there is no presumption that intellec-
tual property rights and licence agreements as such give rise to competition con-
cerns. Most licence agreements do not restrict competition and create pro-
competitive efficiencies. Indeed, licensing as such is pro-competitive as it leads to 
dissemination of technology and promotes innovation”. 
It is therefore acknowledged that licensing agreements might certainly bear pro-
competitive advantages by contributing to the dissemination of new technologies.104 
Indeed, this may happen not only through the disclosure of the invention through the 
patent office, but also through third parties’ transactions.  
Ultimately, technology transfers, by way of licensing, facilitate an efficient inte-
gration of complementary assets, as the individual patent holder is not necessarily at 
the same time the best-placed producer. In this respect, licensing helps generating 
incremental innovation not only by avoiding duplication of research and develop-
ment, but also by allowing a more strategic allocation of resources in the market.  
3. WTO’s TRIPS Acknowledgement of IP as a “Good of Trade” 
Ultimately, the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property 





102  Id., para. 7. 
103  Id., para.9. 
104  Lowe P., “Intellectual Property: How Special Is It for the Purposes of Competition Law En-
forcement?”, European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, 2005, Introduction, p. 8, available at: 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2005/200510-CompLowe.pdf 
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tion policy and intellectual property,105 specifies standards concerning the availabili-
ty, scope and use of intellectual property rights, within the legal framework of the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO),106 thus implicitly 
recognizing IP as a “good of trade”.107  
Indeed, Art. 27 obliges TRIPs members in principle to grant patent protection to 
inventions in all fields of technology, meaning that for the first time in the history of 
industrial property innovations, i.e.. immaterial creations, will receive extraterritorial 
treatment similar to that accorded to other objects of commercial exchange on a 
wider global scale.108 In fact, even if the TRIPs contains only rather rudimentary 
provisions on competition policy, they are quite significant for the essence of its re-
lation to intellectual property.109  
In general, the objectives and guiding motives of TRIPs are given a somehow 
more concrete expression in Art. 7, according to which “the protection and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technolo-
gical innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner con-
clusive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations”. 
Furthermore, Art. 8(2) recognizes that appropriate measures may be needed to pre-
vent the abuse of intellectual property.  
Besides, Art. 40(1) acknowledges that licensing practices, which restrain compe-
tition may have adverse effects on trade or may impede technology transfer and 
therefore innovation. Following Art. 40(2), member states may adopt measures 
against licensing practices that have anticompetitive effects and constitute abuses of 
intellectual property rights.  
 
105  Mackenrodt M., “Trade, Intellectual Property and Competition – 1. The Interface of Competi-
tion Policy and Intellectual Property in the WTO”, IIC, 2005, vol. 36, p. 124 et seq. For a tho-
rough analysis on the issue, see in particular: Straus J., “Implications of the TRIPs Agreement 
in the Field of Patent Law”, In: Beier F.-K., Schricker G.  (Ed.), “From GATT to TRIPs”, IIC 
Studies, vol. 18, Weinheim, 1996, p. 160 et seq.; Ullrich H., “Technology Protection Accord-
ing to TRIPs: Principles and Problems”, In: Beier F.-K., Schricker G.  (Ed.), “From GATT to 
TRIPs”, IIC Studies, vol. 18, Weinheim, 1996, p. 357 et seq. 
106  The WTO is the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted at Marra-
kech in April 1994 (WTO). One of the multilateral agreements signed within the institutional 
and legal framework provided by the WTO is the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPs), which constitutes the Annex 1 C of the WTO. 
Within Part. II of TRIPs, on the “Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of In-
tellectual Property Rights”, Section 5 is dedicated to “Patents”. A full version of the TRIPS is 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm 
107  For a comprehensive legal study on how the international protection of IP rights has been 
influenced in combination with the international free trade system established through the 
TRIPS-agreement, see: Beier F.-K. and Schricker G., “From GATT to TRIPs: The Agree-
ment on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”, IIC Studies, vol. 18, Wein-
heim, 1996. 
108  As incisively observed by: Straus J., supra, fn. 105, p. 180-181. 
109  Along the same line, see i.a.: Anderman S., “The Interface Between Intellectual Property 
Rights and Competition Policy”, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 7.  
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The TRIPs provisions, however, do not provide more specific conditions and cri-
teria under which the relevant licensing practices should be evaluated and, therefore, 
they do not offer any guidance in assessing more complex competition policy issues 
arising with respect to specific IP licensing strategies.110 
 
110  For a critical overview on the issue, see: Ullrich H., “Expansionist Intellectual Property Pro-
tection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIP Perspective”, Journal of International 
Economic Law, 2004, 7, p. 401 et seq. 
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Chapter 2 Historical Outlook 
A. Case Survey: The First Distinguished Patent Pools 
Patent pools are a quite recent phenomenon, making their first appearance on the 
licensing scene only in the second half of the XIX century.111 Here is a selection and 
a short description of the most significant examples of patent pools throughout the 
history.112 
I. Sewing Machine 
Actually, when retracing the story of patent pools throughout the last technologi-
cal developments, it is widely agreed that one of the first recognized examples of a 
patent pool has been established in 1856 by sewing machine manufactures with the 
Sewing Machine Combination, consisting of sewing machine related patents aggre-
gated together. 
By the 1890s, pooling agreements had become a commonplace in the United 
States. The rising interest in technology pools stemmed in part from the widely felt 
desire to avoid the anti-competitive scrutiny pursuant to the Sherman Act of 1890, as 
patent pools were curiously considered as exempted from regulatory restrictions. 
This privileged perception was buttressed when in 1902 the US Supreme Court re-
fused to invalidate and dissolve a patent pool, asserting “the general rule is absolute 
freedom in the use or sale of patent rights under the patent laws of the United 
States”.113 
II. Motion Picture 
In December 1908, the Edison Film Manufacturing Company, the Biograph 
Company, and the other Motion Picture Patents members ended their competitive 
feuding in favour of a cooperative system under which the four firms assigned “all 
the patents in the early-day motion picture industry” to a newly created pool. The 
 
111  Merges R., “Institutions For Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools”, in 
“Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge 
Society”, August 1999, available at:  
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/pools.pdf) 
112  Consumer Project on Technology (CPTech) on Collective Management of IP Rights, “Patent 
Pool”, available at: http://www.cptech.org/cm/patentpool.html    
113  Bement E. & Sons v. National Harrow Company, 186 US 70, 1902, p. 91 et seq. 
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agreement also specified the royalties that were to be paid into the pool by licensees 
of the pool patents such as movie exhibitors.114 Thus the motion picture inventors 
and industry leaders organized the first great film trust called the “Motion Picture 
Patents Company”, designed in fact to bring stability to the chaotic early film years 
characterized by patent wars and litigation. By pooling their interests, the member 
companies legally monopolized the business and demanded licensing fees from all 
film producers, distributors, and exhibitors.  
A January 1909 deadline was set for all companies to comply with the license. By 
February, unlicensed outlaws, who referred to themselves as “independents” pro-
tested the trust and carried on business without submitting to the Edison monopoly. 
In the summer of 1909 the independent movement was in full-swing, with producers 
and theatre owners using illegal equipment and imported film stock to create their 
own underground market. The Pool reacted by coercive tactics, such as the confisca-
tion of unlicensed equipment, discontinuation product supply to theatres that showed 
unlicensed films, and so on.  
However, as the independent outlaws flourished, the Motion Picture Patents 
Company was also hit with antitrust charges by the United States government. In 
October 1915, the courts determined that the Patents Company and its General Film 
division acted as a monopoly, falling under the prohibition of Sect. 1 of the Sherman 
Act115 banning agreements, conspiracies or trusts “in restraint of trade”.116 Conse-
quently, an order to dissolve the pool was later issued.117 This change of approach 
patent pools was a sign that the earlier, “golden years” were over, putting an end to 
the past unspoken “immunity” of those kinds of agreements, while the tide began to 
shift.  
In fact, private antitrust litigation regarding pooling agreements sharply increased 
after the US Supreme Court struck down the bathtub enamelling pool in 1912 in the 
Standard Sanitary decision.118 In the latter case, a trade multi-party agreement under 
which manufacturers, who were previously independent competitors, limited output 
and sales of their products, i.a. by orchestrating their prices, was held illegal under 
the Sherman Act. Thereby, it was established that patent rights are also subjected to 
the general prohibitions of antitrust law. Here the licenses, although on their face 
lawful, was in fact considered a shield under which to implement an anti-
competitive agreement. 
 
114  Aberdeen J., “The Edison Movie Monopoly: The Motion Picture Patents Company v. the In-
dependent Outlaws”, available at: http://www.cobbles.com/simpp_archive/edison_trust.htm  
115  US Department of Justice, Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 USC, Sect. 1-7, available at:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter2.htm  
116  For a critical analysis of the “conspiracy” theory developed under Sect. 1 Sherman Act, see: 
Strohm G., “Abgrenzung zu Conspiracy-Fällen” (Sec. 1 Sherman Act), in “Wettbewerbsbe-
schränkungen in Patentlizenzverträgen nach Amerikanischem und Deutschem Recht”, Schrif-
tenreihe zum Gewerblichen Rechtschutz, 1971, vol. 24, p. 252 et seq. 
117  Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917). 
118  Standard Sanitary v. United States, 226 US 20 (1912), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/226/20/case.html  
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III. Folding Bed 
In 1916, the owners of various patents related to folding beds and other similar 
devices entered into an agreement providing exclusive license to the Seng Company 
to manufacture and sell under the pool patents. Of the total royalties, 33 percent was 
allocated to the Pullman Couch Company. The license contract was signed by the 
Davoplane Bed Company (7 patents), the Pullman Couch Company (13 patents) and 
two inventors. The Seng Company paid a fixed percentage to the pool. Pool mem-
bers split the royalty according to a pre-defined formula in the pooling agreement.119 
IV. Airplane 
In 1917, the US government needed to purchase more airplanes to use in World 
War I. Holders of the early patents for airplane production and various intermediate 
goods needed for it were charging exorbitant royalties for the use of their patents. 
Besides, production of aircraft in the United States had nearly come to a halt as air-
plane producers sued each other for patent violations. In March of that year there 
were two developments leading to the formation of the Manufacturers Airplane As-
sociation (MAA).120  
An advisory panel, headed by then-Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, recommended the formation of the patent pool. Consequently, congress 
passed the Naval Appropriation Act of the Fiscal Year 1918, which included 
$1,000,000 for the purchase of airplane patents. Every major producer of airplanes 
became a member of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association. Members would pay 
$200 in royalties to the MAA. Of the money paid in royalties about 10% were put 
into a fund to pay for administration of the patent pool.121 
 
119  Serafino D., “Early Pools Associated with Monopolies and Cartels (1856-1919)” in “Survey 
of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures”, Knowledge 
Ecology International Studies, June 2007, p. 9, at: http://www.keionline.org/content/view/69/  
120  More on the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association available at:  
http://www.cptech.org/cm/maa.html  
121  For a more comprehensive overview on the importance of patents in the global market for 
civil aircraft, from an historical and legal perspective, see: Begemann A., “Die Rolle von Pa-
tenten in der zivilen Luftfahrtindustrie aus historischer und rechtsvergleichender Sicht”, Utz 
Herbert ed., Jan. 2008.  
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V. Radio 
In 1924, an organization first named the Associated Radio Manufacturers, and 
later the Radio Corporation of America,122 merged the radio interests of American 
Marconi, General Electric, American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) and Wes-
tinghouse. This pooling agreement was designed to control the licensing of the large 
number of radio patents, so that each member could have access to all the relevant 
patents necessary to build radio transmitters, antennas and receivers. The pool led to 
the establishment of radio parts standardization, airway frequency locations and tel-
evision transmission standards.  
This consolidation and standardization of radio technology123 allowed the Radio 
Manufacturers Association (RMA) to control the essential technology that aspiring 
radio manufacturers would need to supply the sudden public appetite for radio, 
which, during the early part of the 20's, was growing rapidly. It also allowed RCA 
and other RMA patent owners to litigate against infringers from a strong, consoli-
dated position. One of the benefits of this control was the ability to standardize the 
manufacture of electronic parts. This allowed manufacturers to make parts that could 
be used by radio producers interchangeably.124 
VI. Hartford-Empire 
However, the recently arising suspicion and misconception of patent pools was 
still persistent and political driven efforts to investigate and break up pools accele-
rated after some well-publicized hearings striking those kinds of agreements 
throughout the late 1930s. The famous US Supreme Court decision in the Hartford-
Empire case125 is still recalled for the harshness of Justice Hugo Black’s outburst, 
holding against patent pools that “the history of this country has perhaps never wit-
nessed a more completely successful economic tyranny over any field of industry 
than that accomplished by the pool members”. This statement was widely perceived 
as ushering in an era of regulatory intolerance against these arrangements. As a con-
 
122  In 1950, the organization changed its name again to Television Manufacturers Association 
(TMA), then to the Radio Electronics Television Manufacturers Association (RETMA), in 
1953. In 1957, the name became the Electronics Industries Association (EIA), now known as 
the Electronic Industries Alliance. Still quite active as a standards agency, among other 
things, the EIA maintains an Internet website at: http://www.eia.org/. 
123  More on the Radio Manufacturers Association available at:  
http://www.netsonian.com/antiqueradio/radiodocs/RETMA/ccodeindex.htm  
124  Burns R., “British Television: The Formative Years”, Published by IET, 1986, p. 337 et seq. 
125  Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 570 (1945), available at:  
http://supreme.justia.com/us/324/570/case.html; for more information see also the opinion of 
the court delivered by Mr. Justice Roberts, available at:  
http://www.ripon.edu/faculty/bowenj/antitrust/hart-emp.htm 
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sequence, the number of patent pools created in the United States indicatively dwin-
dled away to almost nothing until after World War II. 
Fortunately, the situation improved in 1995, after the US Department of Justice 
and the US Federal Trade Commission jointly issued their “Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property”,126 amending the previous misconception 
condemning those kinds of agreements while openly recognizing that “cross-
licensing and pooling agreements may provide pro-competitive benefits”. This posi-
tive approach was welcomed as an encouragement for the formation of new patent 
pools and opened the way to the establishment of those kinds of practices, especially 
flourishing within the new emerging video and entertainment industries. 
VII. Video 
A patent pool was then formed in 1997, by the Trustees of Columbia University, 
Fujitsu Limited, General Instrument Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.V. (Philips), 
Scientific-Atlanta Inc., and Sony Corp. (Sony) to jointly share royalties from patents 
that are essential to compliance with the MPEG-2 compression technology standard. 
The MPEG-2 standard patent pool comprises a number of essential patents put into 
the hands of a common licensing administrator empowered to grant licenses on a 
non-discriminating basis, collect royalties and distribute them on a pro-rata alloca-
tion based on each licensor's contribution. The terms of the arrangement were nego-
tiated with and approved by the US Department of Justice. 
In 1998, Sony, Philips and Pioneer entered a patent pooling agreement for inven-
tions that are essential in order to comply with certain DVD-Video and DVD-ROM 
standard specifications. In 1999, another patent pool was created by Toshiba Corpo-
ration, Hitachi, Ltd., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric 
Corporation, Time Warner Inc., and Victor Company of Japan, Ltd. for products 
manufactured in compliance with the DVD-ROM and DVD-Video formats.127 There 
are presently about 80 US Patents for DVD-ROM drives, DVD-Video players and 
DVD decoders, and 96 U. S. Patents for DVD-ROM discs and DVD-Video discs.128 
The royalties under the joint license for DVD-Video players and DVD-ROM drives 
are 4% of the net selling price of the product or US $4,00 per product, whichever is 
higher. Royalties for DVD decoders are 4% of the net selling price of the product or 
 
126  US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Guidelines for the Li-
censing of Intellectual Property (IP Guidelines)”, April 1995, available at:  
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm 
127  See Letter from Klein J., Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Antitrust Divi-
sion, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., available at:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm  
128  For more information on the VD6C Licensing Agency, see the DVD Licensing Site at:  
http://www.dvd6cla.com/faq.html  
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US $1,00 per product, whichever is higher. Besides, the DVD joint Patent Licence 
requires licensees to grant each of the licensing companies of DVD6C, as well as 
their licensees, a non-exclusive licence on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms to use any of their patents that are deemed essential for the manufacture, use 
or sale of DVD Products. This grant-back is restricted only to those DVD products 
actually licensed to the licensee. 
B. Discussed Patent Pools’ Examples 
I. The Debated Case of Software: The “Open Innovation Network” 
Initiative 
1. Targeting Collective Free “Open Source” Access to Software Patents 
Leaving aside for the moment the most targeted branches of the telecommunica-
tion industries,129 we should now say a few words about the issue of patent pools 
that include software technology, which surely represents a much-debated subject 
when it comes to IP protection.130  Confronted with this new prospective scenario, 
an argument of Bruce Perens, the well-known leader of the Free Software and Open 
Source community, in favour of Linux having a patent pool is that it would in fact 
be “a means of defence”.131 Indeed, the basic idea behind the platform “OpenPa-
tents.org”, which was consequently constituted, is to change the rules of the patent 
game and to help solve the problems of mutual blocking of software patents to the 
benefit of the participants.132 The resulting Open Patent License can in effect be de-
fined as a cooperative community convening around a reciprocal non-aggression 
pact, whose features can be further specified as follows: the participating parties 
may consent to be mutually non-confrontational with respect to: (1) only a specific 
set of patents; (2) all their software patents; or (3) all their patents. Besides, the con-
cluded agreement would require that companies wishing to obtain the full advantag-
 
129  For an overview on patent pools for the telecommunication sectors, see: Aoki R. et al., “Coa-
lition Formation for a Consortium Standard through a Standard Body and a Patent Pool: 
Theory and Evidence from MPEG2, DVD and 3G”, Institute of Innovation Research Work-
ing Paper, 2005. 
130  For a study on the merits of IP protection for software, see i.a.: Lehmann M., “Protecting 
Software? The Benefit of Exclusive Rights in Intellectual Property” In:  Publikationen des 
Europäischen Patentamts (EPA), 2006, p. 1 et seq. For a wider perspective, including a com-
prehensive examination of the EC Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, see also: Lehmann M. and Tapper C., “A Handbook of European Software Law”, 
Oxford University Press, 1993. 
131  For the official website, see: http://www.openpatents.org  
132  For an investigation on the debated merits of software patents, see i.a.: Hilty R. and Geiger 
C., “Patenting Software? A Judicial and Socio-Economic Analysis”, In:  IIC, 2005, vol.  6, p.  
615 et seq. 
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es of the pooled contributions with respect to software patents do not attempt to 
make an end-run around the license by using forms of IP other than patents that 
would restrict the re-implementations of works. These would include intellectual 
property rights, for instance, such as “look and feel” copyrights and restrictions on 
reverse engineering. 
a. From Linux-Based Cooperative Research Paradigms 
Pursuing the same popular widespread philosophy of ensuring free “open source” 
access to software patents - while opposing antithetical “proprietary” approaches133 - 
and in order to promote the continued growth of Linux and related software, IBM, 
Novell, Philips, Red Hat and Sony announced the establishment of a new collabora-
tive undertaking in November 2005, which they symbolically called “Open Inven-
tion Network” (OIN),134 based in New York City and headed by Mr. Rosenthal, 
formerly vice president of IBM’s Intellectual Property and Licensing Group.  
Interestingly, IBM, which has now emerged as an icon-star for staying on top of 
the open innovation bandwagon, was not always a quite “open” company, but used 
to be a rather traditional and secretive firm, based on a close corporate model and 
mostly known for producing hardware components.135 Indeed, its opponents argue 
that IBM finally became open in markets, like software, where they had fallen be-
hind,136 profiting from a devoted army of programmers around the world developing 
open source software at essentially no cost, by relying on their work for incorporat-
ing a functional and competitively cheap operating system in IBM computers and, 
eventually, charging customers for providing support and auxiliary services. On the 
other hand, in hardware markets, where IBM always had the lead, they were and still 
are extremely close. Anyway, as far as software is concerned, it is hereby main-
tained that IBM should at least be given some credit for having seized the potential 
of a new, more open, business approach and, consequently, invested its managing 
resources to make it workable. Apparently, the time was then ripe for a change. 
 
133  As notoriously represented, i.a., by the software giant Microsoft. 
134  For the official Open Innovation Network (OIN)’s website, see:  
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com  
135  For a critical analysis of IBM’s behavior, where it is argued that IBM's embrace of open 
source software comes not from a new-found ideology, but from its history of pragmatism, 
see: Campbell-Kelly M., et al., “Pragmatism Not Ideology: IBM's Love Affair with Open 
Source Software”, Working Paper Series, January 2008, available through the Social Science 
Research network at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1081613  
136  Referring to a statement of Kenneth Morse, head of the Massachusetts Institute of Technolo-
gy (MIT)’s Entrepreneurship Centre, as reported by The Economist in: “The Move Towards 
Open Innovation is Beginning to Transform Entire Industries”, The Economist, Special Re-
port, Oct. 11, 2007, also available at:  
http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9928227  
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b. To Institutionalised Consortia, as Advocated by IBM at the Madrid 
OECD Conference on the Research Use of Patented Inventions in May 
2006  
In consideration of the experiences that have been gathered in the meantime, par-
ticular attention to the heated issue of software patents was called up anew by Mr. 
Klett, IP counsel at IBM Research Centre in Zurich, in the course of an OECD Con-
ference on Research Use of Patented Inventions held in May 2006 in Madrid,137 
where “alternative cooperative approaches”, as opposed to traditional exclusionary 
patent practices, were closely scrutinized. Indeed, after stressing the importance of 
patents to IBM, he actually acknowledged that a more open research paradigm, 
based on mutual collaboration, is proving to be a viable option and gradually gaining 
ground, as shown by the increasing popularity and consequent visibility acquired by 
the open source software community in the latest years. 
Nevertheless, informal sharing activities, based on an exchange of communica-
tions and relevant information among researchers, might be quite frustrating,138 shall 
opposing patent rights be asserted. Even though infringement in early collaborative 
phases of implementation may still be quite difficult to detect and therefore litigation 
may eventually be avoided, still the problem encountered is that simple research ex-
emptions cannot always be relied on, as they are not fully harmonized throughout 
the countries. Accordingly, the solution advocated here rather consists of building 
solid consortia, more “institutionalised” in their character and far-reaching in their 
scope, ideally tracking all essential patent holders for the targeted technology at an 
early stage, while involving them through multiparty cooperation agreements and 
setting the terms of liabilities of their reciprocal exchange. Such common framework 
would serve as “stabilizing glue” for binding contributors of innovations together 
and guiding them during the steps of their collaboration.  
Following such paradigm, the “Open Innovation Network” was organized around 
the acquisition of software patents, mostly related to web services, in order to li-
cense them free of charge to others who, in their turn, would agree not to assert their 
own patents against the community, built around the use of “open source” applica-
tions.139 In practice, IBM’s IP policy did not comprise abolishing patent protection, 
 
137  OECD, “Conference on Research Use of Patented Inventions”, Madrid, 18-19 May 2006; For 
all related documents, including summary reports and presentations, refer to:  
https://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_34797_36060462_1_1_1_1,00.html  
138  According to Mr. Klett’s reported statement, “patents can be frustrating [because] they tell 
researchers how to do something, but prevent them from doing it”, in: OECD, supra, fn. 137, 
p. 13-14, available at: https://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/38/37868230.pdf 
139  Linux is an open-source operating system that has been created communally by developers 
around the world. The dispersed nature of Linux, however, means there is no single entity to 
collect patents and make them generally available. The term “open source” refers to software 
whose source code - i.e. the human readable code as opposes to the only computer readable 
binary “object code” - is published and made available to the public under a license that per-
mits users to study, change, and improve the software, and to redistribute it in modified or 
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but “softening” it by supporting a framework providing a friendlier environment for 
open collaboration and exchange. On the same line, also IBM’s other “Soft IP” initi-
ative should be briefly mentioned here,140 attempting to promote a smoother patent 
paradigm based on which the owner is not to be provided with a title to issue an in-
junction to an infringer, but simply with the right to collect license royalties. 
Originally, the term “Open Innovation”141 was coined by Henry Chesbrough, 
business professor at the University of California at Berkeley, back in 2003.142  The 
central idea behind the fancy name is that in a world of widely distributed know-
ledge, companies cannot afford to rely entirely on their own corporate R&D lab, but 
should instead also buy or license processes or inventions (i.e. patents) from others, 
thus taking part in a constructive dialogue including universities, suppliers and out-
side inventors.143  In this perspective, “open innovation” supporters used to describe 
an environment in which ideas could flow in and out of organizations, depending on 
where they could be most efficiently handled. The underlying belief endorsed was 
expressed in the statement that: “If you sit on an idea, you are likely to have it sto-
len, duplicated or rendered obsolete long before you develop the competences and 
capabilities needed to unlock its true value”144. It is far better, so it was argued, to 
have external partners to accelerate your innovation processes in return for royalties. 
Accordingly, internal inventions not being used in a firm's business should be taken 
outside the company (i.e. through licensing, joint ventures, spin-offs). In contrast, 
“closed innovation” refers to processes that limit the use of internal knowledge with-
in a company’s own internal R&D department and make little or no use of external 
knowledge.145 
In the past, in fact, most undertakings operated through the paradigm of “closed 
innovation”. Traditionally, companies tended either to keep their discoveries under 
 
unmodified form. It is often developed in a public, collaborative manner. For more detailed 
information, see: http://opensource.org; For a thorough analysis on the open source model 
and ethics, see i.a.: Hope J., “Biobazaar: The Open Source Revolution and Biotechnology”, 
Harvard University Press, 2008; Raymond E., “The Cathedral and the Bazaar”, O'Reilly Me-
dia, 1999. 
140  Sage J., “Soft IP”, Presentation at EPO Conference, Brussels, July 5, 2007, available at:  
http://www.ipjur.com/data/070705Jonathan_Sage.pdf  
141  For a thorough study on the concept of “Open Innovation”, see i.a.: Hilty R., “Open Innova-
tion in einer Welt mit geistigem Eigentum”, In: Picot A. et al., “Innovationsführerschaft 
durch Open Innovation, Chancen für die Telekommunikations-, IT- und Medienindustrie”, 
Berlin, Springer, 2009, p.  171 et seq. 
142  Chesbrough H., “Open Innovation”, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 2003. 
143  Chesbrough H., “Open Platform Innovation: Creating Value from Internal and External Inno-
vation,” Intel Technology Journal, August 2003, vol. 7, 3, p. 5 et seq. 
144  This was a statement of Andrew Gaule, a leading expert on open innovation, as reported in: 
Tyrrell P., “The Value of Knowledge: European Firms and the Intellectual Property Chal-
lenge”, Economist Intelligence Unit White Paper, January 2007, p. 13, also available at: 
http://graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/eiu_EuropeIPR_wp.pdf 
145  Chesbrough H., “Open Innovation: A New Paradigm for Understanding Industrial Innova-
tion,” in Henry Chesbrough, Wim Vanhaverbeke, and Joel West ed., “Open Innovation: Re-
searching a New Paradigm”, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 1 et seq. 
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trade secret, at least as long as it takes to come up with the next innovation, or to pa-
tent them, in order to stay ahead of the competition and to have their own exclusivity 
secured, thus not being open to assimilate information from outside their own R&D 
labs. In more recent years, on the contrary, major advances in technology and socie-
ty have facilitated the diffusion of information and, to a certain extent, the “globali-
sation” of knowledge. Break-through innovations in the domain of electronic com-
munications, including the Internet, have certainly speeded up this process:146 nowa-
days information can be transferred so easily that it seems impossible to prevent.147 
Hence, the “open innovation” model proceeds from a very pragmatic proposition: 
since firms cannot stop this phenomenon, they should learn to take advantage of it 
instead.148 
2. Drawing up a Balance of “Open Innovation” as Alternative Business 
Models 
According to a survey conducted by IBM in 2006 based on interviews with 765 
CEOs and business leaders, collaboration can pay off: a financial analysis explains 
why companies are more eager to create partnerships with other organizations than 
ever before: firms with higher revenue growth reported using external sources to a 
significantly higher degree than the slower ones. The most significant sources of in-
novative ideas came, in the first place, from employees (40%), business partners 
(37%), customers (34%), consultants (21%), competitors (20%). On the other hand, 
traditional sources of corporate innovation, such as internal sale and service units 
and the company’s own R&D departments, respectively, accounted for just 17% and 
16% of the overall efforts.149 
Nevertheless, the benefits of the “open innovation” model shall be put into right 
perspective and, somehow, downsized: in fact, critics have raised the legitimate ob-
 
146  Dodgson M., et al., “The Role of Technology in the Shift towards Open Innovation: the Case 
of Procter & Gamble”, R&D Management, 2006, vol. 36(3), p. 333 et seq. 
147  Christensen J., et al., “The Industrial Dynamics of Open Innovation - Evidence from the 
Transformation of Consumer Electronics”, Research Policy, 2005, vol. 34, p. 1533 et seq. 
148  In his recent book dealing with Open Business Models, Prof. Chesbrough explains how to 
make money in an Open Innovation landscape: he proposes a diagnostic instrument for as-
sessing a company's current business model, and gives suggestions on how to overcome 
common barriers to pursue a more open business paradigm, also offering examples of com-
panies that have developed such models - including Procter & Gamble, IBM, and Air Prod-
ucts. For the reference, see: Chesbrough H., “Open Business Models: How to Thrive in the 
New Innovation Landscape”, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006. 
149  IBM, “The Global CEO Study 2006”, available at:  
http://www-935.ibm.com/services/au/bcs/html/bcs_ceostudy2006.html, as from Press release: 
“The Move Towards Open Innovation is Beginning to Transform Entire Industries”, The 
Economist, Special Report, Oct. 11, 2007, also available at:  
http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9928227  
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jection that firms have always been “open” to some degree in order to stay receptive 
to new market trends.150 Arguably, the convenience of endorsing a wider “opening” 
solution with other undertakings greatly varies depending on the line of business 
adopted. In the specific, capital-intensive industries, such as the pharmaceutical sec-
tor, in which consistent time to develop products is required, which thereafter can be 
sold for years - i.e. are characterized by a long technology-life cycle - would proba-
bly benefit less from the open innovation pattern.  Ultimately, some scepticism and 
caution has been called to mind, because the costs of choosing an “open innovation” 
approach, in management distractions or lost intellectual property rights, has appar-
ently not been nearly as well studied as its putative benefits.151 
Generally - in industries marked by fast-paced technologies with a shorter prod-
uct-life cycle, such as for software applications, where traditional patent protections 
are often inadequate for keeping pace with innovations - where it may prove worka-
ble, the open innovation strategy needs some basic conditions to prosper, which I 
would summarize as follows: 
• Coordination - the benefits of an open innovation approach, based on a diversi-
fied multitude of contributions coming from internal and external sources, may 
only be actually achievable if all relevant inputs are properly orchestrated. This 
may suggest the need for a smart central leadership in order to avoid inconve-
nient gaps or overlapping endeavours. 
• Power of attraction - the chances for success of an open innovation strategy may 
depend not only on what a firm does, but also, and sometimes even more impor-
tantly, on how it is perceived in the market. Big corporations, such as IBM, 
promoting an open innovation approach, shall be valued mostly for disposing of 
competent experts to attract knowledgeable outsiders with brilliant ideas. What 
is needed is a valuable reputation to catalyse crucial contributions that would 
make the undertaken project workable. This pre-condition may indeed be diffi-
cult to fulfil by small, no-name companies, without the right back up for an 
open innovation enterprise. 
• Power of involvement - Still in some way related to the power of attraction re-
quirement, but eventually subsequent to it, is the capacity of a visionary compa-
ny to cultivate a “network” as a means to bound users, and possible contributors, 
building a common framework around them, where they may be able to share 
experiences and expectations. In this way, products and services could be truly 
customized around customer’s needs and evolve accordingly. The open innova-
tion model takes this process even a step further, as here customers are often al-
 
150  For a comprehensive overview on the “Open Innovation” trend, with a focus on the wide-
spread practices of firms relying on research and development that may lie outside their own 
boundaries, see i.a.: Chesbrough W. et al., “Open Innovation: Researching a New Paradigm”, 
Oxford University Press, 2006. 
151  Dahlander L., Gann D., “How Open is Innovation?”, Paper for the DRUID Summer Confe-
rence 2007 on Appropriability, Proximity, Routines and Innovation”, Copenhagen, June 18 - 
20, 2007, available at:  http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=1478&cf=9 
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so contributors. In this respect, we may well talk of “user-driven innovation”, 
because here the users are not only the end-goal - where innovation is directed - 
but also its starting point - where innovation is inspired. 
 
Drawing up a general balance, we may observe that, letting aside more or less 
well-grounded reported criticisms about the effective merits of “open innovation” 
patterns, these days, alternative collaborative strategies, as coming forth in software 
environments, are leading to the creation of new open communities, typically orga-
nized through cooperative paradigms, which are consequently going to co-exist 
along with more traditional and exclusionary means of IP protection.152 As is be-
coming particularly apparent in software development,153 new proactive, cooperative 
IP approaches are increasingly gaining ground and popularity also within other in-
dustrial sectors154 as “alternative business models”, aside from more conventional 
exclusive patent practices, i.e. “proprietary” paradigms.155 This demonstrates that a 
centrally planned approach may also be leading to a more open, even arguably anar-
chic, new model of innovation. These evolving patterns of IP management, based on 
open collaboration within a common sharing framework, are being consistently nur-
tured by passionate and dedicated communities of users and innovators and present a 
big true potential, certainly promising to leave their mark on a new era of technolo-
gical developments.156 
 
152  Burt R. et al., “Intellectual Property Strategy in the 21 Century - Balancing Open & Proprie-
tary Innovation”, European Patent Conference (EUPACO) Presentation, Brussels, January 24, 
2007, available at: http://www.ipjur.com/data/070124RogerBurt-IBM.pdf  
153  For a comprehensive study on the wider debate of IP protection for software, covering the 
whole spectrum of IP rights, see i.a.: Lehmann M. et al., “Rechtsschutz und Verwertung von 
Computerprogrammen”, ed. O. Schmidt, 1993. 
154  Chesbrough H., Crowther A.K., “Beyond High Tech: Early Adopters of Open Innovation in 
Other Industries”, R&D Management, 2006, vol. 36, 3, p. 229 et seq. 
155  Mr Janez Potočnik, European Commissioner for Science and Research recently affirmed, on 
the High Level Conference on the European Research Area “The Future of Science & Tech-
nology in Europe”, Lisbon (Portugal), October 8, 2007: “[...] Increasingly, businesses thrive 
in an environment of 'open innovation', where connections with each other and with public 
research institutions are vital to explore ideas and develop products more effectively than 
would be the case alone. [...]”, as reported in:  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/609&format=PDF&ag
ed=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en  
156  For favorable views on the open innovation model, see, i.a.: Chesbrough H., “Open Business 
Models: How to Thrive in the New Innovation Landscape”, Harvard Business School Press, 
2006; Pisano G., “Profiting from Innovation and the Intellectual Property Revolution”, Re-
search Policy, 2006, vol. 35(8), p. 1122 et seq. 
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II. The Celebrated “MPEG LA” Case 
1. From the First Steps to a Rising Star 
“MPEG LA” stands for “The Moving Picture Experts Group Licensing Adminis-
trator” and probably represents one of the most current and significant examples of a 
patent pool,157 from both an international and economic perspective. 
It all started in the late 1980’s when a panel of engineers came together to estab-
lish an industry-based standard for digital video compression, which is basically a 
process where digital videos are compressed in size, enabling high transfer rates. It 
covers the video compression tools that make it possible to squeeze full-length films 
onto DVDs, stream video over the Internet, and send high-resolution television over 
cable lines. For these reasons MPEG is among the most used digital standard for-
mats for movies and video-clips on the Internet today. 
The panel of experts recognized that the biggest problem in implementing the 
standard was that many different patent owners were involved, which resulted in a 
typical “patent thicket” situation,158 nowadays a notorious problem throughout the 
legal doctrine analysing patent pools. The solution has been to establish an indepen-
dent company that would manage the pool of patents allowing “one-stop shopping”, 
i.e. a centrally organized platform where all relevant licenses can be acquired as a 
unique package,159 for patent holders and licensees. In 1996 the MPEG LA was 
born.160 
Even if in recent years patent pools have become popular in the consumer elec-
tronics sphere, the MPEG-2 was the first one of its kind to take on such a significant 
dimension in the international and economic scene. In contrast to the so-called 
“mega-pools”, sharing all patents within a specific industry, the MPEG-2 pool was 
primarily based on one central technology and consequently limited to underlying 
essential patents, aside from various adjustment mechanisms for adding newly 
emerged patents, according to pre-determined criteria, and fixing royalty rates, the-
reby conferring on it a certain degree of flexibility. 
The initial members of the patent pool included: Columbia University, Fujitsu, 
General Instrument, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Lucent, Philips, Scientific-Atlanta and 
 
157  Baltes C., “Patent Pools - An Effective Instrument for the High Technology Co-operation?”, 
Spring 2003, available at:  
http://www.jur.lu.se/internet/english/essay/masterth.nsf/0/6C1CE2960E92A1BCC1256D2C0
03F6BEC/$File/xsmall.pdf?OpenElement, p. 27 et seq. 
158  Shapiro C., University of California at Berkeley, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Li-
censes, Patent Pools and Standards-Setting”, March 2001, available at:  
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~shapiro/thicket.pdf, p. 17 et seq. 
159  For an analysis of the notion, see i.a.: OECD, “Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 
2006”, OECD Publ., 2006, p. 157 and Takenaka T. et al., “Patent Law A Handbook of Con-
temporary Research”, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008, p. 714 et seq. 
160  Andersen S., “Inside MPEG LA, the Prototypical Patent Pool Recovering Lawyer Revolutio-
nizes IP Management Model”, Corporate Legal Times, vol. 12, no. 130, September 2002. 
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Sony. Altogether, they combined twenty-seven patents and offered one-stop shop-
ping for manufactures of television, digital videodiscs and players, telecommunica-
tions equipment as well as cable, satellite and broadcast television services. To get 
support for the formation of the pool, the nine patent holders identified all patents 
that are essential for being able to meet the MPEG-2 international standard. Their 
licenses were granted to all interested parties through a licensing agent (i.e. LA), 
administering the pool on behalf of its members and based in the United States in 
Denver, subsequently becoming popular as MPEG LA. 
As regards its functioning, the MPEG LA employed independent experts to de-
termine whether all relevant patents were essential and suitable to be included in the 
pool, in the absence of alternative specifications to reach the technical product or 
process targeted. At the time, the MPEG lawyers and experts reviewed over eight 
thousand US patents abstracts and over eight hundred patents owned by over thou-
sand companies and inventors. Finally, they identified twenty-seven essential pa-
tents, most of which were owned by foreign inventors.161 The license eventually 
conferred had a worldwide range and was granted, under pre-defined terms, to any 
licensee without discrimination.162 Consequently the MPEG LA collected royalties 
and distributed them among the members according to a pro-rata allocation based on 
each licensor’s proportionate share of the total number of patents contributed to the 
pool.163  
As mentioned above, an adjustment mechanism included in the license agreement 
of the pool pre-determined in what way new patents were added into the existing 
package. Specifically, a set of norms to be used for the evaluation of new essential 
technologies and the corresponding recalculation of the corresponding royalties was 
identified by a so-called “liability rule”.164 Furthermore, the MPEG-2 agreement had 
a grant back provision that required the licensee to grant the licensor a non-exclusive 
grant back of any essential patent eventually retained. On the other hand, there was 
no other major competitive restrictive obligation on the licensee, who remained sub-
stantially free to develop substitute products also outside of the pool.165  
A revealing article that appeared on the Intellectual property Law & Business Re-
view provided an accurate economic and legal assessment of the MPEG LA’s first 
patent pool and described it as a “royalty gold mine”. Lawrence Horn, a lawyer, ad-
 
161  The list of current licensors may be consulted at:  
http://www.mpegla.com/m2/m2-licensors.cfm 
162  The list of current licensees may be consulted at:  
http://www.mpegla.com/m2/m2-licensees.cfm  
163  For a legal analysis of the MPEG-LA patent pool, see, i.a.: Russell L., “Royalty Rates for 
Licensing Intellectual Property”, 
 Published by John Wiley and Sons, 2007, p. 75 et seq.; Taplin R., “Valuing intellectual prop-
erty in Japan, Britain, and the United States”, Published by Routledge, 2004, p. 84 et seq. 
164  For an insight in this legal notion, see: Merges R., “Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellec-
tual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations”, California Law Review, 1996, 
vol. 84, no. 5. 
165  For the details of the license agreement, see: http://www.mpegla.com/m2/m2-agreement.cfm 
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ministered the pool as the company's vice president for licensing and business de-
velopment. The report referred to him as “scouring the globe for intellectual proper-
ty, finding all the patents for a given technology and lumping them together in one 
convenient package”. As underlined, it could take a lot of effort and negotiating to 
get a patent pool off the ground, but the work was well paid off by the turnover ob-
tained by consortia such as the MPEG-2, defined as the most lucrative ever patent 
pool for a technology.166 
Since its creation, the MPEG-2 has evolved to comprise 650 patents from 24 
holders, with some 800 licensees, including industry giants like Apple Computer 
Inc., and Warner Home Video Inc. It has been calculated that each time a DVD 
player was sold, the pool received $2.50 for the MPEG-2 decoder contained inside 
the player. On the same line, each time a pre-recorded DVD was sold, the pool 
pocketed 3 to 4 cents. These royalties were split among the patent holders in the 
pool and MPEG LA took a 10 percent cut, according to the above-mentioned report. 
Besides, the pool picked up royalties from other products and services, such as on-
demand television or computer DVD drives, that used the MPEG-2 standard. Since 
MPEG-2 technology first entered the market, MPEG LA has formed six patent 
pools, all related in one way or another to video. One pool is based on a more ad-
vanced compression technology, called MPEG-4. 167 
2. Still a Necessary Evil? 
Yet, as underlined in the above-mentioned article, “even as the MPEG-2 owners 
take in the royalties, patent pools still cannot seem to shake their reputation as a ne-
cessary evil”. Quoting the report further: “In the past decade pools have become 
something like the licensing version of Donald Trump: increasingly popular, even if 
they still seem a bit suspect […] No patent holder goes into a pool completely happy 
about the idea: grouping one's patents with everyone else's patents, and licensing 
them en masse according to non-negotiable terms, means giving up a lot of the very 
control that a patent confers. Sharing IP can bring other forms of trouble, too, par-
ticularly with antitrust regulators. Pools can be structured to fix prices, stifle compe-
tition, discourage innovation, or divide markets. Yet increasingly, going it alone is a 
luxury companies just don't have. More and more products are built according to 
standards that incorporate bits and pieces of IP owned by many different companies 
- so many companies that getting all the necessary licenses in place can be a difficult 
task. If the task is too difficult, a new technology may never get off the ground, leav-
 
166  Cohen A., “MPEG LA’s First Patent Pool Pulls in Millions of Dollars. Now the Licensing 
Company is wading into the Murky Waters of Digital Rights Management and Making a 
Royalty Splash won’t be Easy”, Intellectual Property Law & Business”, vol. 05, issue 02, 
February 2005, also available at: http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1108389913560 
167  All current information retrieved may be consulted at:  
http://www.mpegla.com/m4v/index.cfm  
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ing IP owners with patents that no one wants to license. That leaves IP owners with 
a tough decision: They can take a chance with a pool, hopefully spurring a market 
for their IP; or they can go it alone and possibly never see that market materialize. 
[…] MPEG LA has bet its whole business that companies won't-or can't-go it 
alone”.168 
 
168  Cohen A., supra, fn. 166, p. 2; For a comprehensive analysis, see also: Hovenkamp H. “IP 
and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law”, As-
pen Publishers, 2002, p. 34 et seq. 
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Chapter 3 Comparative Analysis: US Legal Treatment of Patent 
Pools - Delineating the Modern Archetype 
A. Outlook on the American Model: The Early Years 
I. From the Initial Patent Holders’ Immunity to the Fierce Supreme 
Court’s Antitrust Scrutiny 
Between the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX century, US courts gave 
sweeping deference to the licensing of patents and such activities, in whatever forms 
they came into existence, were in practice considered immune to the application of 
antitrust restraints.169 At the time you could rightly speak of a patent pools’ substan-
tial freedom of any competitive scrutiny. The first organizations mandating the li-
censing of technologies and the establishment of patent pools were indeed entrusted 
by the government of the United States in order to promote the public interest. This 
“green light” for the creation of patent pools has characterized the early history of 
this practice, which has played an important role in the business scene over the last 
one hundred years.  
In 1856, some forty years before the Sherman Act became effective, the sewing 
industry, as mentioned in the preceding section, successfully instituted one of the 
first patent pools. Subsequently, the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 – one hun-
dred years after the first Patent Act of 1790 – set the stage for courts to begin con-
struing how antitrust and patent doctrines should interact. As the Federal Trade 
Commission Report on Innovation pointed out,170 “although both patent and antitrust 
have antecedents dating back farther than the enactment of those two statutes,171 
 
169  Baltes C., “Patent Pools – An Effective Instrument for the High Technology Cooperation?”, 
Spring 2003, available at:  
http://www.jur.lu.se/internet/english/essay/masterth.nsf/0/6C1CE2960E92A1BCC1256D2C0
03F6BEC/$File/xsmall.pdf?OpenElement, p.22 et seq. 
170  US Federal Trade Commission, “To Promote Innovation: the Proper Balance of Competition 
and Patent Law”, Report, October 2003, Chapter I, p. 15 et seq., available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf  
171  As Robert Merges and John Duffy pointed out, tracing the history of the core concepts of pa-
tent law through the present days, Aristotle discussed and rejected a proposal for a patent-like 
system in the fourth century B.C.; See Merges R. and Duffy J., “Patent Law and Policy:  Cas-
es and Materials”, 2002, 3. ed., p. 1-13. Conversely, English courts wrestled with competition 
law early on and, for example, rejected a monopoly granted by Elizabeth I.; See “The Case of 
Monopolies”, 77 England Report, 1260, 1603.  Other competition law issues, such as restraint 
of trade cases, with parties demonstrating cartel behavior, were brought as contract cases.  
Courts in England and the United States refused to uphold such contracts, long before the 
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courts did not give significant attention to the intersection of patents and antitrust 
until the early 1900s”. Early court opinions generally refrained from subjecting pa-
tent-related conducts to antitrust scrutiny,172 most typically because it was consi-
dered that the very object of these patent laws was in fact nothing but a monopoly. 
Therefore Courts often seemed “to immunize from antitrust scrutiny the conduct of 
firms holding patents”,173 which also held true in case of patent pools with outright 
price fixing. 
These were the golden years of patent pooling agreements, which reached their 
apices in 1902, when the Supreme Court, in the case Bement & Sons v. National 
Harrow Co.,174 established the dominance of patent law over federal antitrust provi-
sions. The Supreme Court expressly proclaimed that a patent holder enjoys absolute 
freedom to license his patents under any conditions contractually agreed upon be-
tween the patentee and the licensee. In the Court’s view, the fact that the contract 
created a substantial monopoly, or even fixed prices, did not constitute a violation of 
the Sherman Act.  
This idyllic situation for patent holders ended in 1912 with the United States Su-
preme Court’s decision in Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States,175 
which dissolved a patent pool because of alleged antitrust violations. This case 
marked a milestone, since the courts began to condemn patent pooling as a practise 
that could indeed have antitrust implications. The patent pool at issue related to an 
enamelling process for sanitary ironware. In fact the pool brought together eighty-
five per cent of the enamelware manufactures. Specifically, the pooling agreement 
provided that the participants agree on minimum sales prices, resale prices enforce-
ment, and refusal to sell to unlicensed manufactures. The Supreme Court found that 
this was a clear case of misuse of intellectual property rights and ruled that the pa-
tentees crossed the line on what is necessary to protect the use of a patent, going 
beyond the legal scope of protection.176 
When the United States entered World War I in 1917, they found themselves in 
desperate need of airplanes. As has also been set forth in the preceding section, at 
this time two firms held blocking patents necessary for the airplane manufactures. 
The Wright Company controlled the basic patent, namely the wing-twisting mechan-
ism, while Curtiss Aeroplane & Motors Corporation held the principal patents for a 
 
Sherman Act was written.  See: Lopatka J., “The Case for Legal Enforcement of Price Fixing 
Agreements”, Emory Law Journal, 1989, vol. 1, p. 38 et seq. 
172  Among others, see: Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 US 70, 1902; Heaton-Peninsular 
Button-Fastner Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 6th Cir. 1896; Strait v. National Har-
row Co., 51 F. 819, N.D.N.Y. 1892. 
173  Anthony, 28 AIPLA Q.J., p. 5. 
174  Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902), available at:  
http://supreme.justia.com/us/186/70/case.html  
175  Standard Sanitary v. United States, 226 US 20 (1912), available at: 
http://supreme.justia.com/us/226/20/case.html 
176  For a contextual historical-based approach, already embracing i.a. the decision at issue, see 
supra, Part. I of this contribution. 
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wing-flap mechanism that improved Wright’s basic patent. The two companies, en-
gaged in a long drawn-out dispute in which Wright accused Curtiss of infringement 
on its wing-twisting mechanism, refused to manufacture airplanes. This put the 
American government in a grave situation just before the entry into the war. To exit 
the impasse the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics proposed a cross-
licensing agreement where the aircraft manufactures should each pay a royalty to be 
able to have access to all patents in the pool. The Attorney General concluded that 
the pro-competitive effects of these arrangements outweighed any anti-competitive 
effects. It was the first time that a balance of the overall effects of a pooling agree-
ment was reached, with due account taken of the concrete contextual features of the 
specific situation at issue. This agreement had the pro-competitive benefit of remov-
ing the stranglehold on the aircraft industry and, as the patents did not compete with 
each other or with any others outside of the pool, competition could not be ham-
pered.177 
However, by the 1930s the Supreme Court soon returned to its stricter approach 
towards patent pooling agreements, reflecting in its attitude a newly emerged 
stronger role of antitrust and a corresponding weaker role of patent law. In fact, at 
the time, patent was perceived by some commentators as a legal instrument favour-
ing “the powerful and the unscrupulous” and therefore as being detrimental to com-
petitors.178 This jurisprudential line culminated in 1931 with the decision Standard 
Oil Co. v. United States,179 which is also remembered as “the cracking patents case”, 
where the Supreme Court created and applied the so-called “market power test” for 
the first time, which, based on the actual market power of the participating undertak-
ings, provided the competent authorities with practical guidelines for determining 
whether a patent pool is violating antitrust provisions.  
In 1945 the Supreme Court, applying again its “market power test”, dissolved one 
of the most notorious patent pooling agreements in history with its decision in Hart-
ford-Empire Co. v. United States.180 The patent pool covered over six hundred pa-
tents, allowing its members to sustain glass prices at unreasonably high levels. Judge 
Hugo Black stated in the judgement: “The history of this country has perhaps never 
witnessed a more completely successful economic tyranny over any field of the in-
dustry than that accomplished by the appellants”. As partial remedy the Court man-
dated the participating undertakings to license their patents to all interested third par-
 
177  On the antitrust issues underlying this case, see: Laurence I., “Patents and Antitrust Law”, 
Published by Commerce Clearing House, inc., 1942, p. 148 et seq.; For a panoramic history 
of the rise of the US aerospace industry, retracing also the origin of the Manufacturers Air-
plane Association, see: Wayne B., “Barons of the Sky: from Early Flight to Strategic War-
fare: the Story of the American Aerospace Industry”, Published by Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2002, p. 114 et seq. 
178  Kahn A., “Fundamental Deficiencies of American Patent Law”, American Economic Review, 
1940 (30), 475, p. 485-86 
179  Case, 283 US 163, 1931. 
180  Case, 323 US 386, 1945; for more information see also the opinion of the Court delivered by 
Mr. Justice Roberts, available at: http://www.ripon.edu/faculty/bowenj/antitrust/hart-emp.htm  
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ties without discrimination or restrictions, at the standard royalty level. Three years 
later, in 1948, the Supreme Court ruled that even an agreement, which combines 
blocking patents that could not be otherwise fruitfully exploited without infringing 
on each other’s intellectual property rights, could violate the Sherman Act, as in the 
specific case in United States v. Line Materials,181 if a price-fixing clause is in-
volved.182 
II. The Patent Act of 1952 and the “Nine No-Nos”: Defining the Spheres of 
Interference between Antitrust and Patent Law 
The Congress reacted to this judicial trend by passing the Patent Act of 1952, 
which strengthened the patent system by limiting the interferences of antitrust law 
and the overreaching doctrine of patent misuse.183 In 1957, as a result of the frequent 
overlaps of the patent and the antitrust system,184 a lengthy study was issued on the 
initiative of the Congress on “The Patent System and the Modern Economy”.185 
Within this framework, an important step towards the regulation and a certain 
level of legal certainty of patent pools, although always through a suspicious ap-
proach, occurred in the 1960s, when the US Department of Justice closely evaluated 
all existent patent pools and produced a list of nine stereotyped patent licensing 
practices that would be considered per se antitrust violations. This list was soon 
known as the “Nine No-Nos” and comprised the following prohibited general prac-
tices in the context of patent licensing: “(1) requiring a licensee to buy unpatented 
materials from the licensor; (2) requiring a licensee to assign to the patentee any pa-
tent which may be issued to the licensee after the license agreement is executed; (3) 
attempting to restrict the purchaser of a patented product in the resale of that prod-
uct; (4) restricting the licensee’s freedom to deal in products or services not within 
the scope of the patent; (5) agreeing with the licensee that the licensor will not, 
 
181  United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948), available at:  
http://supreme.justia.com/us/333/287/case.html  
182  For a thorough analysis on the antitrust considerations of price-fixing clauses, particularly 
when applied to patent pools, in the American jurisprudence of the time, see: Dreiss U., “Die 
Unzulässigkeit der Preisbindung bei Gleichzeitiger Lizenzierung und fremder Patente durch 
Patent Pools: United States v- Line Material Co.” in “Die Kartellrechtliche Beurteilung vom 
Lizenzvertragssystemen im Amerikanischen und Deutschen Recht”, Schriftenreihe zum Ge-
werblichen Rechtschutz, 1972, vol. 26, p. 65 et seq. 
183  35 USC. Sect. 1 et seq. 
184  For a critical analysis of the application of the so-called “Misuse Doctrine” as a justification 
for the wide interference of the general protection of antitrust law at the costs of the special 
system of patent rights, see: Strohm G., “Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in Patentlizenzver-
trägen nach Amerikanischem und Deutschem Recht”, Schriftenreihe zum Gewerblichen 
Rechtschutz, 1971, vol. 24, p. 213 et seq. 
185  US Senate Commission, “Study of the Subcommission on Patents, Trademarks and Copy-
rights of the Senate Commission on the Judiciary”, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1957. 
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without the licensee’s consent, grant further licenses to any other person; (6) requir-
ing the licensee to take a package license; (7) requiring the licensee to pay royalties, 
including total sales royalties, in an amount not reasonably related to the licensee’s 
sales of products covered by the patent; (8) attempting to restrict a process patent 
licensee’s sales of products made by the patented process; and (9) requiring a licen-
see to adhere to any specified or minimum price in its sale of licensed product”.186 
This list of prohibited patent licensing practices was perceived as an overzealous an-
titrust enforcement of the Department of Justice and thus heavily criticized by some 
authors.187 In fact, it was conteded that antitrust ascendancy during this period 
lacked both a sound economic foundation and a sufficient appreciation of the incen-
tives for innovation that patents in general and patent licensing in particular can pro-
vide.188 In practice, the Department of Justice’s severe approach generally tended to 
make companies over-cautious about concluding patent pooling agreements. 
Remaining within this restrictive jurisprudence tradition, which in principle 
looked at pooling agreements with disfavour, in 1973 the District Court of Columbia 
decided the case United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd.189 The case dealt with a British 
drug manufacturer, who held an American patent on a fungicide, and another British 
drug manufacturer, who held another American patent on a micro size dosage form 
of fungicide. The two manufacturers signed a patent pool agreement, containing cer-
tain restrictions on the sale of the bulk form of this fungicide. Both firms imposed on 
each other certain restrictions in sublicensing agreements with American chemical 
companies. In the civil antitrust action brought before the District Court, the United 
States Government sought to enjoin enforcement of the bulk sale restrictions on the 
grounds that they had a negative effect on trade. The District Court held that said 
restrictions infringed on the Sherman Act, thus granting the government’s request 
for injunctive relief, but not going further by ordering sales on reasonable, non-
discriminatory terms and fixing reasonable royalties’ terms.  
Even if the courts didn’t condemn a pool formation as such, dissolving the under-
lying agreement as a whole, like in the more glamorous cases of 1931, i.e. the so-
called “cracking patent case”, and of 1945, as mentioned above, respectively, certain 
particularly restrictive clauses, such as restraints on price or output, fell under the 
jurisprudential veto.190 Even if patent pools do not need to be completely open to all 
 
186  For the “Nine No-Nos” list, see: Federal Trade Commission, “To Promote Innovation: the 
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law”, Report, October 2003, p. 18 et seq., availa-
ble at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf  
187  Bruce B., “Remarks before the Michigan State Bar Antitrust Law Section”, September 1972, 
reprinted in Commercial Clearinghouse Trade Regional Rep. 50, p.146. 
188  See i.a.: Hovenkamp H. et al. “IP and Antitrust: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied 
to Intellectual Property Law”Aspen Publishers Online, 2002. 
189  United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973), available at:  
http://supreme.justia.com/us/410/52/case.html  
190  For an outline of the historical jurisprudential developments, see i.a.: Pearlstein D., “Cross-
Licensing and Patent Pools”, “Antitrust Law Developments”, American Bar Association, 5 
ed., 2002, p. 1080 et seq. 
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candidates wanting to join, in the case Northwest Wholesale Stationers Inc. v. Pacif-
ic Stationery and Printing Co191 the Court ruled that exclusion from a pooling 
agreement between parties having gained a dominant position in the relevant market 
may, under some circumstances, harm competition. Specifically, exclusion from a 
patent pool is likely to have anti-competitive effects if, on the one hand, owners of 
the excluded technologies cannot compete with the pool on the relevant market 
based on the quality of their own products, and if, on the other hand, pool members 
benefit from a dominant position on the same market. Another possible anti-
competitive effect of patent pools arrangements, which was mentioned in the case at 
issue, is related to the circumstance that patent pools may require that their members 
grant each other licenses for current and future technology for a reduced or no con-
sideration. This so called “grant-back” clause might tend to hamper innovation due 
to the fact that in that case the members of the pool are under obligation to share 
their successful research and development efforts and consequently other passive 
members can get a “free ride” on their hard-won accomplishments. 
On the whole these restrictive legal conditions, under which patent pools were scru-
tinized through the severe assessment both of the jurisprudence and of the federal 
agencies, reflected the historical contraposition perceived between antitrust law and 
patent policy,192 already analysed in the introduction of this contribution. Quoting 
the Federal Trade Commission’s Innovation Report,193 “broadly speaking, through-
out much of the twentieth century, courts and federal agencies considered patents to 
confer monopoly power and, correspondingly, viewed antitrust as always opposed to 
monopoly power. Some have argued that this perceived conflict led courts to believe 
that, in any given case, they had to find that either patents or antitrust took prece-
dence. In general, when courts were favouring patents, they were usually disfavour-
ing antitrust, and vice versa. A variety of factors appear to have shaped these shifts, 
including perceptions about the power of big business, the competitive significance 
of various patent licensing practices, the nature and role of patents, and the best 
ways to achieve economic and technological growth”. 
 
191  Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationery, 472 U.S. 284 (1985), available at:  
http://supreme.justia.com/us/472/284/case.html  
192  See, i.a., Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 US 24, 37, 1923, citing 
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 US 405, 1908 (patents as monopo-
lies); Pate R., “Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Before the American Intellectual Property 
Association”, 2003 Mid-Winter Institute, Jan. 2003, available at:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200701.pdf 
193  US Federal Trade Commission, “To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition 
and Patent Law and Policy”, Report, October 2003, Chapter I, Sect. 2, p. 14, available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf  
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B. US Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property: The Current View 
I. The Institution of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 
and the 1988 Department of Justice’s Antitrust Guidelines: Advocating 
the “Rule of Reason” 
A change of trend in the public perception of antitrust regulation and patent poli-
cy was already recognizable at the end of the 1970s.194 The main factors converging 
to reverse the scenario of antitrust dominance over the patents’ regime were related 
to the general concerns about the situation of industrial stagnation at the time, con-
nected with a lack of significant technological innovation. The economic stasis led 
to an overall reconsideration of the antitrust doctrine and its traditionally severe ap-
proach to patents. 
In 1978 President Carter appointed an Advisory Committee to perform a domestic 
review of industrial innovation. One year later, the Patent and Information Policy 
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee issued its Report on Patent Policy.195 The 
study aimed at providing an answer to the growing concerns of government officials 
and policymakers about the overall decline of research and development activities, 
on the foreground of a general economic weakening. One question to be answered 
was whether, and to what extent, patent policies contributed to these circumstances, 
with regard to the alarmingly low point of US economy, where investments in basic 
science and in applied research had almost disappeared. The Committee partly attri-
buted this situation to a diminished patent incentive in the United States for which 
effective remedies were to be taken. Among other recommendations of the Report, 
one aimed at the creation of “a centralized national court with exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over patent-related cases as a vehicle for ensuring more uniform inter-
pretation of the patent law”.196 These concerns were taken seriously, and they finally 
led the Congress, in 1982, to institute the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(hereinafter CAFC).197 
 
194  For a review of the main jurisprudential decisions tracing the history of patent pools, as well 
as the underlying antitrust trend, from the beginning of the XX century, see: Gilbert R., “An-
titrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evaluation”, Stanford Technology Law Review, 
2004, available at: http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/gilbert-patent-pools.pdf  
195  Industrial Subcommittee for Patent and Information Policy of the Advisory Committee on 
Industrial Innovation, Report on Patent Policy, 1979, 155. 
196  Id. 
197  28 USC. Sect. 1295. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created 
through the merging of two specialized courts: the US Court of Claims and the US Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals. For an overview, see, i.a.: Schneider M., “Der United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Entstehungsgeschichte, Zuständigkeit, Zusammen-
setzung und Umfang der Patentrechtsprechung”, GRUR International, Gewerblicher Rechts-
schutz und Urheberrecht - Internationaler Teil, Oct. 2000, p. 863 et seq. 
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In the following years, economists and lawyers designed a new economic frame-
work around the antitrust system198 and this updated approach included a closer, 
more positive interaction with patent policy.199 In 1981, Antitrust Division Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General Abbott B. Lipsky Jr. harshly criticized the Nine No-Nos 
list drafted in the 1960s, as mentioned above, by the US Department of Justice for 
banning certain patent licensing practices as considered per se antitrust violations - 
addressing them as “containing more error than accuracy” and therefore calling the 
need to review the possible efficiency justifications, within their concrete business 
context, for each of the practices that the Nine No-Nos had previously automatically 
condemned.200 
Following some critical comments on the prior failure of the courts and the De-
partment of Justice to acknowledge the fundamental nature of intellectual property 
and the beneficial role that technology licensing plays in a healthy, competitive 
economy, in 1988 the same Department of Justice issued the Antitrust Enforcement 
Guidelines for International Operations, elaborated on these reviewed policy state-
ments and containing a section on intellectual property licensing agreements that 
underlined consumer benefits from those transactions201 and explicitly adopted a 
“rule of reason” approach to intellectual property licensing issues, abandoning the 
previous merely legally formalistic method, ultimately embodied in the “Nine No-
Nos”.  
Thus, by the end of the 1980s, as outlined by the recent Federal Trade Commis-
sion’s Innovation Report,202 “congressional and court-driven changes had signifi-
cantly strengthened patents. Antitrust incorporation of updated economic thinking 
led to a generally more favourable view of how to conduct competition with respect 
to the influence of patents. This incorporation of economics held the potential for 
both competition and patent policy to develop a greater integration and balance”. 
  
 
198  Shapiro C. et al., “Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking”, The Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 2000, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 43 et seq. 
199  Demsetz H., “Two Systems of Belief about Monopoly”, in “Industrial Concentration: the 
New Learning”, Boston: Little Brown, 1974, p. 164 et seq. 
200  Lipsky A., “Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing Practices”, Antitrust Law 
Journal, 1981, 50, p. 517-24  
201  1988 International Guidelines, Sect. 3.6, 3.61. 
202  Federal Trade Commission, “To Promote Innovation: the Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law”, Report, October 2003, Chapter I, Sect. 2, p. 23 et seq., available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf  
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II. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s 1995 IP 
Guidelines and their Funding Principles 
Antitrust Policy has continued to implement new economic insights when it 
comes to addressing the intersection of antitrust and patents that gained precedence 
in the 1980s. In 1995, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission jointly issued the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing 
of Intellectual Property (hereinafter IP Guidelines)203.  Similarly to the 1988 De-
partment of Justice’s Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 
the 1995 IP Guidelines identify and discuss potential efficiencies associated with 
many licensing practices and emphasize the need for licensing practices to be ana-
lysed under the “rule of reason”.204 They outline the approach of the federal antitrust 
agencies in this area, and apply the same antitrust principles to patent and copyright 
licenses as are used to analyse conduct relating to any other type of personal proper-
ty. It should be noted that the guidelines are only indicators of the position of the 
federal enforcement agencies and consequently not binding but only persuasive on 
the courts. There are other sources of antitrust challenges in the United States, such 
as private parties and state attorneys general, who may not agree with the approach 
of the guidelines.205 Nonetheless, they provide a good basis for analysis and counsel-
ling.206 
The IP Guidelines embody three general principles:  
1. The first207 is that “for the purpose of antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard in-
tellectual property as being essentially comparable to any other form of proper-
ty”. However, responding to some concerns expressed about this statement, the 
same guidelines undermine this characterization, adding that: “intellectual prop-
 
203  US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Guidelines for the Li-
censing of Intellectual Property”, April 1995, available at:  
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm  
204  The 1995 IP Guidelines superceded the 1988 International Guidelines.  The 1988 Internation-
al Guidelines specified that “because they hold significant pro-competitive potential, unless 
the underlying transfer of technology is a sham, the Department analyzes restrictions in intel-
lectual property licensing arrangements under a rule of reason”, Sec. 3.62. 
The 1995 Guidelines provide for a slightly greater possibility of per se treatment, see IP 
Guidelines, Sec. 3.4, but still make clear that the Agencies use the rule of reason “in the vast 
majority of cases.”  IP Guidelines, Sec. 3.4; See more generally Sect. 4 “General principles 
concerning the Agencies’ evaluation of the rule of reason”. 
205  In particular, while the guidelines are generally consistent with the case precedents, there are 
some areas in which the guidelines take a different view of licenses than the judicial prece-
dents might justify. 
206  Cohn et al., “Antitrust Pitfalls in Licensing: a Practical Guide”, Practicing Law Institute Pa-
tents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook, June, 2004, p. 246 et 
seq. 
207  US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Guidelines for the Li-
censing of Intellectual Property (IP Guidelines)”, Sect. 2.0, “General Principles”, April 1995, 
available at: www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm 
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erty has important characteristics, such as ease of misappropriation, that distin-
guish it from many other forms of property.  These characteristics can be taken 
into account by standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not require the ap-
plication of fundamentally different principles”.208 
2. Secondly, “the Agencies do not presume that intellectual property creates mar-
ket power in the antitrust context”.209 This important remark undermines the au-
tomatic conflict between patents and antitrust traditionally perceived by courts 
by assuming that patents always create monopoly power in the hands of the pa-
tent holder. As noted above, patents may enable the holder to exercise market 
power, but the Antitrust Agencies do not any longer assume that this must be 
necessarily the case. 
3. Thirdly, “the Agencies recognize that intellectual property licensing allows 
firms to combine complementary factors of production and is generally pro-
competitive”. 210 Thereby the IP Guidelines explicitly highlight the potential ef-
ficiencies that firms and undertakings can gain through different forms of intel-
lectual property licensing, including patent pools, which can “benefit consumers 
through the reduction of costs and the introduction of new products”.211 Further, 
the IP Guidelines state that “by potentially increasing the expected returns from 
intellectual property, licensing also can increase the incentive for its creation 
and thus promote greater investment in research and development”.212 Along the 
same lines, the IP Guidelines note that various forms of exclusivity can provide 
a licensee with the incentive to invest in commercialising and distributing prod-
ucts, embodying the intellectual property right at issue, by “protecting the licen-




208  Id., Sect. 2.1, “Standard antitrust analysis applies to intellectual property”. The IP Guidelines 
further note that the power to exclude others from the use of intellectual property may vary 
substantially, and that “the greater or lesser legal power of an owner to exclude others is also 
taken into account by standard antitrust analysis”. 
209  Id., Sect. 2.0, “General Principles”. 
210  Id., Sect. 2.1, “Standard antitrust analysis applies to intellectual property”. 
211  Id., Sect. 2.3, “Pro-competitive effects of Licensing”. 
212  Id. 
213  Id., Sect. 2.3, “Pro-competitive effects of Licensing”. 
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III. Driving Criteria for Patent Pools in the IP Guidelines and Business 
Review Letters: Sanctioning an Overall More Favourable Approach 
When examining patent pools,214 the IP Guidelines state that such cooperative li-
censing agreements “may provide pro-competitive benefits” when they: 
1. Integrate complementary technologies; 
2. Reduce transaction costs; 
3. Clear blocking positions; 
4. Avoid costly litigation;215 
5. Promote the dissemination of technology. 
Conversely, the IP Guidelines call to mind that pooling agreements “can have an-
ti-competitive effects in certain circumstances” if: 
1. The excluded firms cannot effectively compete in the relevant market for the 
good, incorporating the licensed technologies; 
2. The pool participants collectively possess market power in the relevant market; 
3. The limitations on participation are not reasonably related to the efficient devel-
opment and exploitation of the pooled technologies. 
For example, quoting the Guidelines,216 “collective price or output restraints in 
pooling arrangements, such as the joint marketing of pooled intellectual property 
rights with collective price setting or coordinated output restrictions, may be deemed 
unlawful if they do not contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of econom-
ic activity among the participants […]. When cross-licensing or pooling arrange-
ments are mechanisms to accomplish naked price fixing or market division, they are 
subject to challenge under the per se rule.217 […] Settlements involving the cross-
licensing of intellectual property rights can be an efficient means to avoid litigation 
and, in general, courts favour such settlements.  When such cross-licensing involves 
horizontal competitors, however, the Agencies will consider whether the effect of 
the settlement is to diminish competition among entities that would have been actual 
or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the cross-
license. In the absence of offsetting efficiencies, such settlements may be challenged 
as unlawful restraints of trade.218 […] Pooling arrangements generally need not be 
open to all who would like to join. However, exclusion from cross-licensing and 
pooling arrangements among parties that collectively possess market power may, 
 
214  Id., Sect. 5.5, “Cross-licensing and Pooling arrangements”. 
215  For an interesting overview on patent litigation in Europe, see in particular: Schneider M., 
“Die Patentsgerichtbarkeit in Europa: Status Quo und Reform”, Schriftenreihe zum gewerbli-
chen Rechtsschutz, 2005, vol. 136; Straus J., “Patent Litigation in Europe - A Glimmer of 
Hope? Present Status and Future Perspectives”, Washington University Journal of Law and 
Policy, 2000, p. 403 et seq. 
216  IP Guidelines, supra, fn. 207, Sect. 5.5, “Cross-licensing and Pooling arrangements”. 
217  See United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 US 371 (1952) (price fixing). 
218  Cf. United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 US 174 (1963) (cross-license agreement 
was part of broader combination to exclude competitors). 
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under some circumstances, harm competition.219 […] In general, exclusion from a 
pooling or cross-licensing arrangement among competing technologies is unlikely to 
have anticompetitive effects unless (1) excluded firms cannot effectively compete in 
the relevant market for the good incorporating the licensed technologies and (2) the 
pool participants collectively possess market power in the relevant market.  If these 
circumstances exist, the Agencies will evaluate whether the arrangement's limita-
tions on participation are reasonably related to the efficient development and exploi-
tation of the pooled technologies and will assess the net effect of those limitations in 
the relevant market.220 […] Another possible anticompetitive effect of pooling ar-
rangements may occur if the arrangement deters or discourages participants from 
engaging in research and development, thus retarding innovation.  For example, a 
pooling arrangement that requires members to grant licenses to each other for cur-
rent and future technology at minimal cost may reduce the incentives of its members 
to engage in research and development because members of the pool have to share 
their successful research and development and each of the members can free ride on 
the accomplishments of other pool members.221 […] However, such an arrangement 
can have pro-competitive benefits, for example, by exploiting economies of scale 
and integrating complementary capabilities of the pool members, including the 
clearing of blocking positions, and is likely to cause competitive problems only 
when the arrangement includes a large fraction of the potential research and devel-
opment in an innovation market”.222 
Additionally, the IP Guidelines discuss the more general criteria underlying a 
pooling agreement that must be taken into consideration and specifically: 
1. The patents in the pool must be valid and not expired;223 
2. No aggregation of competitive technologies and setting a single price for them; 
3. An independent expert should be used to determine whether a patent is essential 
to complement technologies in the pool; 
4. The pool agreement must not disadvantage competitors in downstream product 
markets; 
5. The pool participants must not collude on prices outside the scope of the pool, 
for example on downstream products. 
 
219  Cf. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 US 284 
(1985) (exclusion of a competitor from a purchasing cooperative not per se unlawful absent a 
showing of market power). 
220  See section 4.2, “General principles concerning the Agencies’ evaluation of licensing ar-
rangements under the rule of reason – Efficiencies and justifications”. 
221  See generally United States v. Mfrs. Aircraft Ass'n, Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,810 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal 
1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 US 248 (1970), 
modified sub nom. United States v. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 1982–83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
65,088 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
222  See Sect. 3.2.3, “Antitrust Concerns and Modes of Analysis – Research and Developments: 
Innovation Markets”. 
223  See Sect. 6, “Enforcement of invalid intellectual property rights”. 
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On the basis of what has been reported above, we can certainly conclude that on 
the whole the 1995 IP Guidelines, as well as the 1988 International Guidelines, sig-
nal a new perspective toward patent licensing that is far more positive than earlier 
antitrust approaches. Thus, with particular reference to patent pools, the US Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have finally recognized that 
those agreements can have significant pro-competitive effects and may improve a 
business’ ability to “survive” this era of rapid technological innovation characterized 
by an increasingly global economy. Accordingly the IP Guidelines recognize that 
“licensing, cross-licensing, or otherwise transferring intellectual property […] can 
facilitate integration of the licensed property with complementary factors of produc-
tion” and that such integration can “benefit consumers through the reduction of costs 
and the introduction of new products”.224 Still the Guidelines also caution, however, 
that “while intellectual property licensing arrangements are typically welfare-
enhancing and pro-competitive, antitrust concerns may nonetheless arise” particular-
ly “when a licensing arrangement harms competition among entities that would have 
been actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the 
license”.225 
In the same vein, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has issued, 
from 1997 until 2002, a total of four Business Review Letters analysing in greater 
depth the antitrust issues raised by the specific patent pools under examination and 
discussing the features that reduce the risks of competitive drawbacks of such 
agreement.226 Each letter explicitly recognizes that patent pools can enhance compe-
tition in the relevant market by promoting the dissemination of new technologies.227 
In each case, based on the descriptions of the patent pools provided by the parties, 
the Antitrust Division declined to initiate enforcement action.228 
 
224  Id. 
225  IP Guidelines, supra, fn. 207, Sect. 3.1, “Antitrust concerns and modes of Analysis – Nature 
of the concerns”. 
226  See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Depart-
ment of Justice, Letter to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., June 26, 1997, available at:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/1170.htm  (hereinafter MPEG Pool Letter); 
 Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Jus-
tice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Dec. 16, 1998, available at:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.htm  (hereinafter Phillips DVD Pool Letter); 
 Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, to Carey R. Ra-
mos, Esq., counsel to Hitachi, Ltd., June 10, 1999, available at:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm  (hereinafter Hitachi DVD Pool Letter); 
 Letter from Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of 
Justice, to Ky P. Ewing, Esq., Nov. 12, 2002, available at:  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/200455.htm  
227  See MPEG Pool Letter, supra, fn. 226, p. 5; Phillips DVD Pool Letter, supra, fn. 226, p. 5; 
Hitachi DVD Pool Letter, supra, fn. 226, p. 5. 
228  See MPEG Pool Letter , supra, fn. 226, p. 9-10; Phillips DVD Pool Letter, supra, fn. 226, p. 
9; Hitachi DVD Pool Letter, supra, fn. 226, p. 10. 
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IV. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s Joint Hearings 
on Competition and IP Law Policy and the Ensuing Innovation Reports: 
Paving the Way for a Sustainable Balance 
In accordance with the new economic approach229 and in order to examine the 
current balance between antitrust and patent law, as well as common intellectual 
property licensing practices, including patent pools, and the implications of those 
activities to the benefit of innovation and consumer welfare, the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Department of Justice held joint hearings on "Competition and 
Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy", which 
took place in 2002 and involved more than 300 panellists: participation included 
business representatives from firms and the independent inventor community; major 
patent and antitrust organizations; leading antitrust and patent practitioners; and 
leading scholars in economics, antitrust and patent law. In addition, the Federal 
Trade Commission received about 100 written submissions. Business representa-
tives were mostly from high-tech industries in the sectors of pharmaceuticals, bio-
technology, computer hardware and software and the Internet Community. 
On February 6, 2002 the Opening Day Comments230 for the Public Hearings 
outlined the reasoning supporting the Business Review Letters, which were address-
ing the targeted patent pools’ proposals to jointly license the protected technologies 
to other companies. Specifically, the addressees were an MPEG patent pool, based 
on an industry standard for video compression technology, and two DVD patent 
pools. In all cases under examination, as anticipated above, the Division concluded 
that the proposed arrangements did not appear to pose antitrust concerns. In particu-
lar, and with reference to the Business Review process, it was stated that “the Divi-
sion’s decisions rested on a number of factors, including the fact that the pools only 
license those patents essential for a manufacturer to comply with an established 
standard. The pools were designed to capture the efficiencies that may come from 
licensing complementary technologies. Concomitantly, they were designed to limit 
the anticompetitive effect that can arise from pooling technologies, such as the eli-
mination of competition or the increase in prices that could arise if substitute tech-
nologies (that is, technologies that could compete against each other) were placed in 
a pool”. 
Anticipating this resolution, just one year before those Public Hearings, in Janu-
ary 2001, the US Patent and Trademark Office issued a White Paper on Patent Pool-
 
229  For a wider, comprehensive debate on the issue, see i.a.: Drexl J., “Is There a 'More Econom-
ic Approach' to Intellectual Property and Competition Law?”, In: Drexl J. ed.: Research 
Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, 
MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2008, p.  27 et seq. 
230  James C., Opening Day Comments for F.T.C/D.O.J. Public Hearings, Feb. 2002, available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/james.htm  
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ing,231 acknowledging that patent pools can indeed be used to create a number of so-
cial and economic benefits. These include, in particular, the elimination of problems 
caused by "blocking" patents or "stacking" licenses,232 reducing licensing transaction 
costs, sharing the risks in research and development, and facilitating the exchange of 
technical information or know-how not covered by patents. 
Lastly, following those joint hearings, in October 2003 the Federal Trade Com-
mission issued a comprehensive report dedicated “To Promote Innovation: The 
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy” (hereinafter Innovation 
Report),233 which gave several recommendations for improvements in the current 
inter-relation between such complementary bodies of law, putting its main focus on 
the patent system and thoroughly considering forms of licensing practices, such as 
patent pools, in view of their pro-competitive potential. 
This study has actually paved the way for the most recent joint report of the US 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission on “Antitrust Enforcement 
and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition”,234 re-
leased in April 2007. This represents the federal antitrust agencies’ current view on 
the matter at issue, in line with the preceding approach outlined. Accordingly, the 
present report discusses a broad range of IP licensing practices, with particular atten-
tion to settings where business endeavours are rapidly evolving, including collabora-
tive standard setting and patent pooling, from a competitive standpoint and in an ul-
timate attempt to strive for innovation. The basic insight the report is based on is that 
preserving incentives for both creative efforts and competition is of paramount im-
portance for the progress of society.235 Hence, the competitive effects of cross-
licensing practices and patent pools236 are evaluated under the “rule of reason” 
framework as articulated in the 1995 Antitrust IP Guidelines, thereby signalling the 
 
231  USPTO, White Paper on Patent Pooling, available at:  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/01-06.htm  
232  On the issue, see Carl Shapiro, University of California at Berkeley, “Navigating the Patent 
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standards-Setting”, March 2001, available at: 
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~shapiro/thicket.pdf   
233  Federal Trade Commission, “To Promote Innovation: the Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law”, Report, October 2003, available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf  
234  US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Enforcement and Intel-




235  Federal Trade Commission’s Press Release, April 17, 2007, available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/04/ipreport.shtm  
236  See in particular: Chapter 3, “Antitrust Analysis of Portfolio Cross-Licensing Agreements 
and Patent Pools”, p. 57 et seq., in: US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 
“Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competi-
tion”, Joint Report, April 2007, also available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/ 
P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf 
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continuation of an enduring trend, in line with the level-headed approach endorsed 
in recent years. 
However, just as antitrust law is catching up with a more mature assessment of 
patent pools in their established forms, alongside with increasingly well-defined an-
titrust norms, such agreements are becoming more complex. In particular, pools are 
increasingly being adopted as devices to better coordinate the implementation of 
technical standards, as initially specified by standard setting organizations.237 In this 
respect, at the intersection of standardization processes and patent pooling, a new 
range of greatly unexplored new issues arises which still need to be fully addressed 
by US courts and antitrust authorities.238 
 
237  For a balanced outline of some of the issues arising in this context, see i.a.: Raymond D., 
“Benefits and Risks of Patent Pooling for Standard-Setting Organizations”, Annual Review of 
Antitrust Law Developments, Summer 2002, p. 41 et seq.; Hovenkamp H., “Standards Own-
ership and Competition Policy”, Boston College Law Review, March 2006, vol. 48, p. 87 et 
seq., also available at: 
 http://bc.edu/schools/law/lawreviews/bclawreview/meta-elements/pdf/48_1/ 
04_hovenkamp.pdf  
238  For a focused and illuminating analysis on this new issue, see: Crane D., “Patent Pools, 
RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price Discrimination”, Cardozo Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 232, April 2008, also available under the Social Science Research Net-
work at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120071  
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Chapter 4 The EU Legal Framework  
A. Art. 81 of the EC Treaty 
I. The Proscription of Art. 81 (1) and Its Legal Consequences, in Particular 
as Set by the 2006 Guidelines on Methods of Setting Fines 
The milestone for the legal assessment of patent pools within the European Un-
ion, and their interface with competition and antitrust provisions, is embodied in Art. 
81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter EC Treaty),239 in 
the opening 1st Chapter, within Title VI, dedicated to the Rules on Competition, 
Section 1, for the Rules Applying to Undertakings. Indeed, both Art. 81 and the fol-
lowing Art. 82 of the EC Treaty, this latter about the abuse of dominant positions, as 
the very same heading suggests, are addressed to undertakings, i.e. any economic 
operator, other than the state, acting in its public capacity and participating in the 
exchange of goods or services on the market.240 These articles complement the pro-
visions on the “free movement of goods and services” contained in the EC Treaty - 
not to be undermined through anti-competitive behaviours by economic operators - 
as they prohibit certain typified practices and agreements to the extent that they are 
deemed to be incompatible with the realization of the Internal Market. In fact, the 
achievement of this goal, at a time, provides the basis of legitimacy for the European 
Commission’s active intervention and traces the borderline of the actual scope of its 
interference with otherwise merely domestic matters.241 
Coming closer to approaching the content of this provision, the first paragraph of 
Art. 81242 sets a general mandatory prohibition and reads:  
“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have 
 
239  As for its scope of application, it shall be reminded that the EC Treaty represents a source of 
“primary” European Community law, thus directly binding for all Member States, as if na-
tional law. 
240  For a clear overview on the main issues in EC competition law and policy in this regard, see 
i.a.: Albors-Llorens A., “EC Competition Law and Policy” – “The Scope of Application of 
Art. 81 and 82 EC”, Willan Publishing, 2002, p. 4 et seq. 
241  For a closer analysis on the aims and objectives of Art. 81 and 82 EC, see i.a.: Fairhurst J., 
“Law of the European Union”, Pearson Education, 2007, p. 637 et seq.; For a broader, gener-
al overview on the criteria guiding the antitrust assessment of the EC authorities, see in par-
ticular: Immenga U. et al,  “Wettbewerbsrecht EG: Kommentar zum Europäischen Kartel-
lrecht”, Beck, 2007. 
242  For the text of the full provision, see:  
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art81_en.html  
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as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the common market, and in particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix pur-
chase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control produc-
tion, markets, technical developments, or investment; (c) share markets or source of 
supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion 
of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations 
which, by their method or according to commercial usage, have no connection with 
the subject of such contracts”.  
It should be borne in mind that the list is not exhaustive, but only typifies some 
agreements and concerted practices among undertakings, which are generally 
deemed to be, in consideration of their object or effect, anti-competitive and to nega-
tively affect trade within the common market. Nevertheless, the inventory of Art. 
81(1) is extremely broad and comprehensive in scope, as can particularly be inferred 
from the first of the named anti-competitive restraints, explicitly encompassing also 
clauses that (lett. a), as literally reported: “directly or indirectly fix […] trading con-
ditions”, which may well apply to practically all commercial contracts, where par-
ties, in the course of their trade, are typically going to be bound by specific, reci-
procal obligations.243 
When confronted with such agreements or practices, Member States “shall” pro-
hibit them “as incompatible with the common market”. As penalty, pursuant to Art. 
81(2)244 it is ruled that: “Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this ar-
ticle shall be automatically void”, therefore neither it can be legally enforced, nor 
shall third parties be considered bound by it. Moreover, antitrust cases falling under 
the proscriptions of Article 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty may also result in the impo-
sition of heavy fines against the contravening undertakings, according to the criteria 
outlined by the recent Commission’s Guidelines,245 which entered into force in Sep-
tember 2006246 (hereinafter 2006 Guidelines).247 
 
243  For a general overview on the issue, see i.a.: Foster N., “EU Law”, “Competition and Merger 
Law”, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 157 et seq. 
by Nigel - Law - 2007 
244  For a legal commentary on the underlying antitrust enforcement measures, see i.a.: Fairhurst 
J., “Law of the European Union”, “Enforcement of Competition Law: Powers and Proce-
dures”, Pearson Education, 2007, 6 ed., p. 685 et seq. 
245  European Commission, “Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003”, Official Journal of the European Union, OJ C 210/2, 
1 September 2006, also available at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_210/c_21020060901en00020005.pdf  
246  The new Commission’s Guidelines were in fact adopted on 28 June 2006, but they only ap-
plied to cases for which a statement of objections was notified after the 1st September 2006, 
which is the date of publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal: OJ C 210/2, 1 Sep-
tember 2006. 
247  These further refined the parameters partly already applied under the preceding Guidelines on 
Methods of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17, issued in 
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The driving principles introduced by the 2006 Guidelines may be reported as fol-
lows:248 
• First of all, by deploying a clear reference to the “value of sales” of each under-
taking, the focus is shifted on the actual economic importance of the infringe-
ment, both as a whole and reflecting the relative weight of each participating 
firm, thus a more pragmatic approach is adopted.249 In fact, the 1998 Guidelines, 
which were based on a lump sum system, were frequently criticized with regard 
to this particular aspect; 
• Second, the duration of the infringement had previously only marginal conse-
quences on the basic amount of the fine, since each additional year in which the 
transgression was perpetuated may merely have led to a maximum 10% increase 
of the starting sum. Instead, the 2006 Guidelines still multiply by 10 the impact 
of the duration on the level of the financial penalty to be determined. Hence, the 
period of the violation eventually becomes a key-factor for sanctioning purpos-
es, as each year of involvement in the infringing activities will be fully reflected 
in the basic amount to be charged;250 
• Finally, the classification of the violations among “minor”, “serious” and “very 
serious”, which appeared in the previous Guidelines, have been abandoned, as 
mostly representing a blurry and unnecessary step, where, in particular, the cat-
egory of minor infringements was indeed quite useless in practice. 
Within the limits set by the Regulation at issue, the Commission enjoys wide dis-
cretional powers on undertakings,251 having regard to the gravity and the duration of 
 
January 1998  (hereinafter 1998 Guidelines), substantially reflecting the Commission’s most 
recent practice in antitrust cases. 
248  For an overview, see, i.a.: Broca H., “The Commission Revises its Guidelines for Setting 
Fines in Antitrust Cases”, Competition Policy Newsletter, Autumn 2006, no. 3, p. 1 et seq., 
also available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2006_3.pdf 
249  See Point 13 of the 2006 Guidelines: “In determining the basic amount of the fine to be im-
posed, the Commission will take the value of the undertaking’s sales of goods or services to 
which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant geographical area within 
the EEA. It will normally take the sales made by the undertaking during the last full business 
year of its participation in the infringement (hereafter ‘value of sales’)”. 
250  See Point 19 of the 2006 Guidelines: “The basic amount of the fine will be related to a pro-
portion of the value of sales, depending on the degree of gravity of the infringement, multip-
lied by the number of years of infringement”. 
251  Specifically, following Art. 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 on the Implementation of the 
Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4 January 
2003, p. 1 et seq., as amended by Regulation No 411/2004, OJ L 68, 6 March 2004, p. 1 et 
seq.), as now also reflected in Point 1 of the 2006 Guidelines, the Commission may decide to 
impose financial sanctions on undertakings or association of undertakings either intentionally 
or negligently violating the above-mentioned antitrust provisions. However, infringements by 
negligence, which along with intentional violations is one of the two kinds of infringements 
covered by Art. 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, may justify the granting of a fee reduction, 
representing one of the mitigating factors to be taken into account following the Commis-
sion’s Guidelines. Nevertheless, such circumstance actually plays a quite marginal role, as it 
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the restrictive practices eventually ascertained. This prerogative does not only entail 
the obligation to investigate and punish individual infringements on a case-by-case 
basis, but also encompasses the more general duty to pursue an overall policy vowed 
to transparently apply the principles laid down by the EC Treaty in competition mat-
ters in order to grant a higher degree of legal predictability and, consequently, steer 
business practices in the light of those propositions.252 Accordingly, fines should 
have a sufficiently broad deterrent effect, in order to also discourage other undertak-
ings from engaging in anti-competitive behaviours, this being the ultimate purpose 
of the Commission’s intervention.253 
With these objectives in view, in order to determine the final amount of the fine, 
it seemed appropriate to refer, on the one hand, to the value of the sales of goods or 
services to which the infringement relates254 and, on the other hand, to the duration 
of the violation, as having a more or less severe impact on the marketplace and, con-
sequently, providing a reliable proxy of adjustment to reflect the economic impor-
tance of the infringement.255 Accordingly, following this two-step methodology, the 
Commission may correct the final amount of the fine to be imposed upwards or 
downwards, according to the respective presence of aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances.256  
On the one hand, examples of the former may be the repetition of the same or 
similar infringements, after the Commission or the competent national competition 
authority has eventually ascertained a given violation; the refusal to cooperate with, 
 
did already under the 1998 Guidelines, as practice shows that the types of conducts that are 
fines by the Commission rarely appear to be characterized by mere negligence. 
252  Indeed such Guidelines shall constitute rules of practice whose implementation shall not de-
part from the underlined principles in an individual case without providing for specific rea-
sons, in compliance with the principle of equal treatment, as affirmed, i.a., in: Case C-189/02 
P, Dansk Rørindustri A/S a.o. v. Commission, ECR, 2005, p. I-5425, para. 209. 
253  See Point 4 of the 2006 Guidelines, last sentence: “Fines should have a sufficiently deterrent 
effect, not only in order to sanction the undertaking concerned (‘specific deterrence’) but also 
in order to deter other undertakings from engaging in, or continuing, behavior that is contrary 
to Art. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (‘general deterrence’)”. 
254  For the reference, see: “Basic Amount of the Fine”, Points 12 to 26 of the 2006 Guidelines: 
specifically, the determination of the basic amount of the fine will be first of all established 
by reference to a proportion of the value of the sales to which the infringement relates, as 
confined, on the one side, in terms of territory, to the relevant geographic region within the 
European Economic Area (EEA), appropriately reflecting the scope of the Commission’s 
sphere of action and, on the other side, in terms of time, to the last full business year in which 
the anti-competitive practice took place. 
255  See: “Adjustment of the Basic Amount”, Points 27 to 31 of the 2006 Guidelines. 
256  No major changes have been introduced to the possible adjustments factors in the 2006 
Guidelines, which mainly draw the conclusions of the Commission’s case law and practice in 
the recent years, reflecting its most crucial developments. 
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or the obstruction of, the Commission’s investigations;257 the role of a particular un-
dertaking as leader in, or instigator of the infringement.  
On the other hand, mitigating circumstances may well occur when the firm con-
cerned supplies evidence that the infringement has been promptly brought to an end 
after the competition authority’s intervention, or when the undertaking has effective-
ly collaborated with the Commission beyond the scope of its legal obligations.  
However, in the former case, the new Guidelines, in line with the current juri-
sprudential practice,258 specify that said mitigating factor does not apply to secret 
agreements,259 since it is apparent that in such circumstances firms could always en-
ter into confidential anti-competitive arrangements trusting that, once discovered - 
where by force the secrecy would subsequently be unveiled and thereby brought to 
an end - they would in any event benefit from a fine reduction, if they just stop their 
conduct once the authorities have tracked it down anyway; in other words, here the 
termination of the infringement at issue is actually induced by the discovery itself, 
and thus cannot be directly credited to the good will of the undertaking alone. 
Anyway, the principles outlined are always to be applied in a flexible manner, 
considering the specific circumstances of each case under scrutiny. Besides, the final 
amount of the fine must not, in any event, exceed 10% of the undertaking’s world-
wide aggregate turnover in the preceding business year, as laid down in Art. 23(2) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 and correspondingly reflected in Point 32 of the 2006 Guide-
lines.260 Moreover, under certain circumstances, those who consider to have been 
harmed by the anti-competitive agreement may also bring up private actions for 
damages before the national competent authorities.261 
II. The Scope of the Individual Exemption under Art. 81 (3) 
The prohibition contained in Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty is not absolute. Re-
strictive agreements will be valid and enforceable if they satisfy the exemption crite-
ria of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty. An exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC 
 
257  See, for instance, Case C-308/04 P: Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 29 June 
2006 — SGL Carbon AG v Commission of the European Communities, Official Journal, C 
212, 2 Sept. 2006, p. 0003 – 0004. 
258  As confirmed in Case C-328/05 P: Appeal brought on 30 August 2005 by SGL Carbon AG 
against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (Second 
Chamber) of 15 June 2005 in Joined Cases T-71/03,T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03 Tokai and 
Others v Commission of the European Communities, in respect of Case T-91/03, Official 
Journal C 281, 12 Nov. 2005, p. 0007 – 0008. 
259  See Point 29, first indent, last sentence, of the 2006 Guidelines. 
260  See for a confirmation of the fine’s level and its underlying mechanism, i.a.: Bradgate R. et 
al., “Commercial Law”, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 378. 
261  Carlin F. et al., “The Last of Its Kind: The Review of The Technology Transfer Block Ex-
emption Regulation”, Symposium on European Competition Law, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, vol. 24, Spring 2004, p. 603 et seq. 
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Treaty will be granted if, broadly speaking, the pro-competitive advantages of an 
agreement outweigh its anti-competitive effects, hence resulting in a positive “net 
balance”.262  
In fact, limiting the general applicability of the mandatory prohibition set by the 
first paragraph of Art. 81, the third paragraph provides for a legal exemption under 
some particular circumstances, stating that: “The provisions of paragraph 1 may, 
however, be declared inapplicable in case of: any agreement or category of agree-
ments between undertakings; any decision or category of decisions by associations 
of undertakings; any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which 
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the result-
ing benefits, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerted restric-
tions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford 
such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substan-
tial part of the product in question”. 
Sorting out the quoted provision in its essential elements, two positive and two 
negative requirements can be identified, respectively. Namely, a “prima facie” anti-
competitive agreement may eventually be exempted under Art. 81(3), should all the 
following circumstances be satisfied:263 
• It contributes to the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or 
(alternatively) the promotion of technical or economic progress (first positive 
condition); 
• It allows consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits (second positive condi-
tion); 
• It does not impose concerted restrictions on the undertakings that are not indis-
pensable to the attainment of these objectives (first negative condition); 
• It does not eliminate competition with respect to a substantial part of the product 
in question (second negative condition); 
Apparently Art. 81 applies a quite frequently used legal technique, which consists 
in the setting of a general rule limited in its scope of application by particular excep-
tions. However, at a closer look some inconsistencies between the first and the third 
paragraph may be questioned. In fact, it cannot be consistently maintained that, on 
the one hand, Art. 81(1) protects competition for one or more reasons whereas, on 
the other hand, Art. 81(3) exceptionally allows some particular anti-competitive 
agreements if they are instrumental to the achievement of other aims.264 
 
262  Along the same line, see i.a.: Ritter L., et al., “European Competition Law: A Practitioner's 
Guide”, “The System of At. 81 (3)”, Kluwer Law International, 2004, p. 137 et seq. 
263  Jones A. et al., “EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials”, Oxford University Press, 
2007, p. 1139 et seq. 
264  Fine F., “The EC Competition Law on Technology Licensing”, Sweet & Maxwell ed., 2006, 
p. 20. 
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Following the “ratio” of the provision endorsed by this contribution, one way to 
reconcile the apparent dichotomy of Art. 81, thereby preserving its overall internal 
consistency, could be to shift its emphasis: 
• From a short-term perspective, which is the starting point for a first evaluation 
of the “prima facie” anti-competitive restraints of an arrangement falling under 
Art. 81(1); 
• To a medium and long-term perspective, which finally represents the decisive 
standpoint, from which the overall positive effects labelled by Art. 81(3) shall 
be evaluated, eventually driving the balance towards a concluding assessment of 
the agreement under consideration, by extracting its “net” value. 
Ultimately, the view is taken that the apparent conflict of Art. 81 could also be 
solved by considering “competition”, preserved by the general prohibition of the 
first paragraph, not as the highest goal, but instead as one among the “means” avail-
able to foster “the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing the consumers a fair share of the resulting bene-
fits”, the latter representing the real, ultimate “aim” justifying the exception con-
tained in the third paragraph.265 Therefore, innovation, coupled with consumers’ 
welfare, represents the real final target to be achieved. This approach is also shared 
by the modern doctrine, where it has been highlighted that: “Competition is not […] 
regarded as an end in itself. It is one of the most important means by which a ge-
nuinely integrated market is achieved”.266 
This vision also appears to be partly supported by the Commission’s Guidelines 
on the Application of Art. 81(3) of the Treaty,267 which states under its general re-
marks: “The objective of Article 81(1) is to protect competition on the market as a 
means of enhancing consumer’s welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of 
resources. Competition and market integration serve these ends since the creation 
and preservation of the common market promotes an efficient allocation of re-
sources throughout the Community for the benefit of consumers”.268 
Following a certain common sense it should be questioned why “competitive-
ness” as such should after all arise as privileged value and, consequently, be entitled 
to a higher rank than other business practices, which are in principle also defensible. 
In fact, our political system, although basically inspired by liberal principles, might 
only be legitimised by the attainment of the general public good, which - while it 
cannot be already concretised by competition itself, being that a mere step in the 
way of promoting innovation - may eventually become tangible for the community 
 
265  In the same sense and with respect to the so-called “efficiency goal” of Art. 81 and 82 EC, the 
complementarity of IP and competition law’s protection has been recently supported also by: 
Kolstad O., “Competition Law and IP Rights – Outline of an Economic-Based Approach”, In: 
Drexl J. ed.: Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Cheltenham, 
UK, Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2008, p.  3 et seq. 
266  Fairhurst J., “Law of the European Union”, Pearson Education, 2007, p. 637. 
267  Guidelines on the Application of Art.81(3) of the Treaty (2004/C 101/08). 
268  Id., para. 12. 
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through improved “production or distribution of goods”, as well as through “tech-
nical or economic progress”, both ultimately benefiting society by generating collec-
tive welfare. It is within this interpretative framework and against the attainment of 
these goals that patent pools should be assessed when confronted with antitrust con-
cerns. 
B. The Way to the TTBER 
I. TTBER 1996 and Commission Evaluation Report 
In March 1965 the issuance of the Council Regulation No 19/65/EEC,269 and in 
particular its Art. 1, empowered the Commission to apply Article 81(3) of the EC 
Treaty by regulation to certain categories of technology transfer agreements and cor-
responding concerted practices that would otherwise fall within the prohibition of 
Article 81(1) and to which only two undertakings were party, thereby excluding the 
exemption of multiparty licensing. Pursuant to such legislative mandate, the Com-
mission had, in particular, adopted Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 
on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of technology 
transfer agreements (hereinafter TTBER 1996).270 In fact, block exemption regula-
tions in the field of technology licensing were adopted for the first time in the mid 
1980s for both patent and know-how licenses,271 the combination of which resulted 
in the TTBER of 1996.272  
Basically, the ultimate scope of the Commission in adopting a “block exemption” 
regulation to the benefits of certain categories of technology transfer agreements was 
to facilitate the dissemination of knowledge, thereby maximizing the benefits of in-
novation, as fostered by licensing and technology exchange. The idea behind the 
block exemption is to automatically exclude certain types of agreements, i.e. as a 
“block”, from the general prohibition of Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty, thus eliminat-
ing the need for an “individual exemption”, requiring the latter a laborious case-by-
case assessment of the anti- and pro-competitive effects of the licensing agreement 
at issue, balancing, on the one hand, the restrictive effects caught by Art. 81(1) with, 
 
269  Council Regulation (EEC) No 19/65, OJ 36, 6.3.1965, p. 533-65. As last amended by Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4 January 2003, p. 1 et 
seq. 
270  Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of Article 85 
(3) [now Art.81 (3)] of the Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ 
L 31, 9.2.1996, p. 2-13, as amended by the 2003 Act of Accession, and available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&n
umdoc=31996R0240&model=guichett  
271  Commissions Regulations (EEC) 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 and 556/89 of 30 November 1989. 
272  For a more extensive legal analysis on the TTBER of 1996, see i.a.: Ullrich H. In: “EG Wett-
bewerbsrecht”, Immenga U. & Mestmaecker E. eds, 1997, n. 33, p. 1241 et seq. 
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on the other hand, the benefits for innovation and consumer welfare that give rise to 
legal exemption under Art. 81(3). 
However, the TTBER of 1996, setting out the overall EU competition policies 
applicable to patent and know-how licensing agreements still did not encompass pa-
tent pools or other multiparty licensing agreements273 and therefore has met with 
some criticism. Demonstratively, Alexander Schaub, former Director General of the 
European Commission's DG Competition, sarcastically described it as a “dinosaur 
awaiting extinction”.274 Specifically, as pointed out during a Symposium on Euro-
pean Competition Law, the TTBER was regarded as “the last of the mainstream EU 
block exemption regulations to apply a formalistic and rigid exemption approach 
according to which all restraints are presumed to be illegal unless expressly permit-
ted by the block exemption or notified to the Commission for individual clear-
ance”.275 Taking into account the voiced criticism, on 20 December 2001 the Com-
mission issued an Evaluation Report on the TTBER 1996,276 where it openly admit-
ted the shortcomings of the Block Exemption Regulation under exam and promised 
a radical, more liberal, economics-based approach to technology transfer, in line 
with the recent revisions of other major block exemptions.277  
In particular, regarding multiparty licenses,278 the evaluation report critically rec-
ognized that: “As the TTBE only covers bilateral license agreements, a significant 
number of more complex arrangements, such as licensing programmes, multilateral 
pools and licence packages fall outside its scope […]. Such arrangements have be-
come increasingly important for industry, given the growing complexity of new 
technologies. As a result, the Commission has frequently received notifications con-
cerning these types of agreements. […] In this respect, it can be observed that multi-
party licensing, including multilateral pools, may be pro-competitive when they in-
 
273  Expressly, Art. 5.1. of the old Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation  provided 
that: “This regulation shall not apply to: (1) agreements between members of a patent or 
know-how pool which relate to the pooled technology”. 
274  Schaub A., “Remarks at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute's 28 th Annual Conference on 
International Antitrust Law and Policy”, Report, Oct. 2001. 
275  Carlin F. et al., “The Last of Its Kind: The Review of The Technology Transfer Block Ex-
emption Regulation”, Symposium on European Competition Law, 24 Northwestern Journal 
of International Law and Business, Spring 2004, p. 601 et seq. 
276  European Commission, “Evaluation Report on the Transfer of Technology Block Exemption 
Regulation No 240/96 of 20 December 2001”, COM(2001) 786 final, available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/technology_transfer/en.pdf   
277  See Commission Regulation 2790/1999 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21; Commis-
sion Regulation 2658/2000 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of 
Specialization Agreements, 2000 O.J. (L 304) 3; Commission Regulation 2659/2000 on the 
Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Research and Development 
Agreements, 2000 O.J. (L 304) p. 7. 
278  Sect.5.1.4, p. 33, “Multiparty licenses” in European Commission, “Evaluation Report on the 
Transfer of Technology Block Exemption Regulation No 240/96 of 20 December 2001”, 
COM(2001) 786 final, available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/technology_transfer/en.pdf  
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volve non-competing undertakings. In particular, they may allow the parties to bring 
together complementary inputs, reduce transaction costs (for instance by creating 
one-stop shopping for a technology package), clear blocking positions and avoid 
costly infringement litigation”.279 Having regard to such perceived efficiency en-
hancing factors, the question raised was whether, and to what extent, multiparty li-
censing should be covered by a revised block exemption. 
The Commission’s Evaluation Report generated a public debate advocating the 
need of a reform and finally resulting in the repeal of the TTBER 1996. The consul-
tation process that followed aimed at the adoption of a new Transfer of Technology 
Block Exemption Regulation, inviting all interested parties to provide their feedback 
on the basis of their practical experience under the TTBER 1996.280 
Finally, quoting from the same Commission’s Review Report: “Most submissions 
that express an opinion on this issue plead for the coverage of multiparty licensing 
by a future block exemption regulation, though often only below a rather low market 
share threshold and/or limited to situations of complementary or blocking IPRs. […] 
The increased importance of these types of agreements is mentioned as the most im-
portant reason”.281 However, as the Review Report also duly revealed: “A number of 
the submissions speak out against coverage. Some because they consider that the 
issues will be too complicated to be handled in a block exemption regulation and are 
better addressed in guidelines, others because they would not like to see a new block 
exemption regulation being delayed […]”. Eventually, time was finally ripe for a 
new regulation. 
II. TTBER’s Review Process 
On the basis of the evaluation report and in consideration of the submitted contri-
butions, nearly two years later, on 1 October 2003, the Commission published a 
formal proposal for a new technology transfer block exemption (hereinafter Draft 
 
279  For an interesting overview on the scenario of patent litigation in Europe, see: Straus J., “Pa-
tent Litigation in Europe - A Glimmer of Hope? Present Status and Future Perspectives”, 
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, 2000, p. 403 et seq. 
280  Finally the consultation resulted in the submission of 33 replies: 11 submissions have come 
from industry and trade associations, 7 from law and IPR societies, 5 from individual law 
firms, 5 from national competition authorities (UK, Italy, France, The Netherlands, Finland), 
2 from individual companies and 3 from consultants and others. All submissions are available 
at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/technology_transfer  
281  Annex 1, “Summary of Submissions on TTBE Review Report”, to the European Commis-
sion, “Evaluation Report on the Transfer of Technology Block Exemption Regulation No 
240/96 of 20 December 2001”, COM(2001) 786 final, p. 2, available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/technology_transfer  
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TTBER)282 together with detailed draft guidelines (hereinafter Draft Guidelines),283 
which explained how the new regulation is to be implemented and how Article 81 of 
the EC Treaty shall be applied to agreements that fall outside the field of application 
of the revised regulation.  
Interestingly, although the TTBER was not due to expire until the 31 March 
2006, this anticipated review process was designed to coincide not only with the ac-
cession date of ten new Member States in the European Union on 1 May 2004, but 
also with the entry into force of the Council Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementa-
tion of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty,284 
also referred to as the Modernization Regulation.285 Indeed, within a wider context, 
the review of the TTBER of 1996 could be regarded as “part of a wider modernisa-
tion process”,286 deemed to bring the latter in line with the “new generation” of Reg-
ulations and Guidelines on related fields, based on economic observation287 and aim-
ing at providing a more flexible framework for the assessment of given business en-
deavours.288 
As from its entry into force on 1 May 2004, the Modernization Regulation radi-
cally reformed the system of competition law enforcement in the EU289 by abandon-
ing the Commission's long-standing monopoly (and at the same time heavy burden) 
in implementing the antitrust rules laid down in Art. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 
 
282  For a critical insight on the Draft TTBER, see i.a.: Drexl J., Hilty R.,et al., “Comments on the 
Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation”, In:  IIC, 2004, Volume  35, p.  187 
et seq. 
283  Draft Commission Regulation on the application of Art.81(3) of the Treaty to categories of 
technology transfer agreements; Draft Guidelines on the application of Art.81(3) of the Treaty 
to technology transfer agreements, OJ 2003 C 235/10, also available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/c_235/c_23520031001en00100054.pdf  
284  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the 
Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4 January 
2003, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 411/2004, OJ L 68, 6 March 2004. 
285  For a critical outlook, see i.a.: Anderman S.,  “The New EC Competition Law Framework for 
Technology Transfer and IP Licensing”, In: Drexl J. ed.: Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 
2008, p.  107 et seq. 
286  Dolmans M., Piilola A., “The Proposed New Technology Transfer Block Exemption: Is Eu-
rope really better off than with the current regulation?”, World Competition 26(4), 2003, p. 
546 et seq. 
287  On the point, for an analysis on the legal implications of the reform in a wider perspective, 
see i.a.: Anderman S., “The New EC Competition Law Framework for Technology Transfer 
and IP Licensing”, In: Drexl J. ed.: Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Compe-
tition Law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2008, p. 107 et seq. 
288  In particular referring to: Commission Regulation 2790/1999 for vertical agreements; Guide-
lines on the applicability of Art.81 EC to horizontal cooperation agreements; Commission 
Regulation 2659/2000 for research and development agreements; Commission Regulation 
2658/2000 for specialization agreements. 
289  Gauer C., et al., “Regulation 1/2003 and the Modernization Package Fully Applicable Since 1 
May 2004”, Competition Policy Newsletter, Summer 2004, no. 2, p. 1 et seq., also available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2004_2.pdf  
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thereby extending the competences of the competition authorities of the EU member 
states (hereinafter also referred to as national competition authorities or NCAs) by 
establishing parallel responsibilities between EU and member states according to 
flexible rules of allocation, each time favouring the best placed authority for inter-
vening. Consequently, the old system of notification was abolished and companies 
could no longer rely on an up to then centrally administered notification procedure. 
Therefore, a judicial decision on the merit may be finally reached only in the event 
of a challenge under Art. 81 EC before a national court or other competent antitrust 
authority. Otherwise the compatibility of the agreement at issue with the criteria set 
out by Art. 81 (3) EC would be left to the individual self-assessment of the undertak-
ings themselves. 
In order to better operate in such a modernized enforcement system, a “European 
Competition Network” (ECN)290 was specifically inaugurated as a vehicle to ensure 
coherent and effective application of Community competition rules within a colla-
borative framework291 for an optimized allocation of antitrust cases among the dif-
ferent NCAs and the European Commission,292 as well as for the establishment of a 
record of best practices.293 
Consequently, as from May 2004 a wide network of national competition authori-
ties and courts - particularly important in an extended European Union of 25 mem-
ber states - was actively encouraged to apply EC competition rules by a direct 
route,294 eventually sanctioning the compatibility of a licensing agreement with EU 
 
290  The basis for the functioning of the ECN are laid down in the “Commission Notice on Coop-
eration within the Network of Competition Authorities” (OJ C 101, 27 April 2004, p. 3.) and 
in the “Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the Net-
work of Competition Authorities”  
(available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/joint_statement_en.pdf ) to which all 
competition authorities in the network have adhered by special statement.  
291  The ECN is the framework for the close cooperation mechanisms of Council Regulation 
1/2003, as well as a discussion forum dealing with a variety of topical issues of interest to its 
member authorities. However, the ECN as such does not have any autonomous powers or 
competences, since it is not an institution and it does not have any legal personality. It is the 
competition authorities of the Member States and the European Commission that have powers 
and competences to apply, in particular, the Community competition rules laid down in Ar-
ticles 81 and 82 EC. Thus, companies and individuals do not enter in contacts with the ECN 
but always with one or more of the competition authorities. 
292  Gauer C., Jaspers M., “The European Commission Network, Achievements and Challenges - 
A case in Point: Leniency”, Competition Policy Newsletter, Spring 2006, no. 1, p. 8 et seq., 
also available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2006_1.pdf  
293  The agreements and practices that are “ECN-relevant”, thus coming under the close coopera-
tion rules and mechanisms thereby put in place, are those capable of having an “appreciable” 
effect on trade between EU Member States. In addition, the authorities meeting within the 
ECN can exchange their experience and views regarding particular sectors of the economy, 
representing this the common competition culture enhancement role of the ECN. For more 
details, see: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ecn/faq.html  
294  In fact, the European Competition Network (ECN) presented an impressive result of antitrust 
enforcement actions during the first two years from its establishment: actually, more than 560 
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antitrust law, and thereby its enforceability, without the need for intervention by a 
central administrative clearance “ad hoc”.295 
Pursuant to the publication of those drafts, there was a second round of consulta-
tions where the Commission, under the lead of Mario Monti, at that time in charge 
as European Commissioner for Competition Policy, once more invited all interested 
parties to send their comments on these texts296. Finally, despite several critical 
voices on the proposed approach,297 the new TTBER298 didn’t change the basic 
structure presented in the Draft Regulation and Guidelines. In particular, the block 
exemption, disregarding some proposals in this direction, still does not include mul-
tiparty licensing agreements, such as patent pools, in which more than two parties 
are involved. Hence, said arrangements would have to be individually exempted un-
der Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty, therefore leaving this important part of licensing 
practices merely covered by the TTBER Guidelines,299 in which one entire section is 
dedicated to patent pools,300 basically applying the principles set out in the TTBER 
by analogy. 
In fact, as regards the extension of the TTBER of 1996, regulating only bilateral 
technology transfer agreements, to multiparty licensing such as patent pools, the 
Commission had initially really taken this strongly supported option into considera-
 
cases were reported in the common ECN case-management system, as reported in: Gauer C., 
Jaspers M., supra, fn. 292, p. 8.  
295  In this sense, see: Gauer C., et al., supra, fn. 289, p. 1.  
296  As a result, beyond 70 contributions from industry, trade associations, intellectual property 
organizations, as well as national authorities, law firms and universities, were submitted and 
can be found at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/technology_transfer_2/en.pdf  
297  Among the critics, see Lind, et al., “The European Commission’s Draft Technology Transfer 
Block Exemption Regulation and Guidelines: A Significant Departure from Accepted Com-
petition Policy Principles”, European Commission Law Review, 2004, vol. 25, p. 168: “The 
TTBER and Guidelines as they stand are not only bad competition policy, but are also un-
workable”; Intellectual Property Lawyers Association, “Reform to the Technology Transfer 
Regulation”, IPLA, p.4, available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/technology_transfer_2/14_17_ipla_en.pdf  
298  Commission regulation (EC) No. 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Art.81(3) 
of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ 2004 L 123/11 (hereinafter 
TTBER), available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&m
odel=guicheti&numdoc=32004R0772  
299  Commission Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technol-





300  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, section 4, “Technology pools”, par. 210 et seq. 
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tion.301 However, as the latter is explicitly merely empowered – by virtue of the 
above-mentioned Council Regulation of 1965,302 as currently amended by Regula-
tion (EC) No 1/2003 – to regulate bilateral technology transfer agreements, the ex-
tension of the block exemption over multiparty arrangements would have required a 
longer procedure, passing through the authorization of the Council. Consequently, 
the idea of bringing patent pools within the scope of the block exemption was finally 
discarded, as it was already clear from the draft TTBER in 2003.  
As for the specific reasons explaining the maintained exclusion of multiparty li-
censes from the TTBER, the following should be in summary accounted: 
• Since the cooperation of both Council and Parliament would be required for a 
Council regulation extending the powers of the Commission beyond bilateral 
technology transfer agreements, that procedure would ultimately delay the adop-
tion of the TTBER; 
• Multiparty licensing rules in the TTBER would be of limited added value, as 
typically patent pools involve high market shares making the licensing agree-
ments fall outside the scope of the block exemption anyway; 
• Patent pools meeting the conditions established by the current case law, i.e. if 
limited to essential and complementary technologies, open, non-exclusive, as 
well as licensed on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (so-called 
“FRAND”) terms, are not caught by Art. 81 (1).303 Therefore, the jurisprudence 
at hand already supplies a certain degree of legal predictability, while, in com-
parison with a traditional legislative source, also offering the additional benefit 
of a more versatile approach; 
• Pooling agreements not meeting the above-mentioned criteria may lead to mar-
ket foreclosure, and consequently an individual analysis is strongly recommend-
ed anyway;304 
• Finally, it has been brought up that an inclusion of multiparty licenses would 
complicate the linear structure of the TTBER where, on the other hand, the 
 
301  Dolmans M., Piilola A., “The Proposed New Technology Transfer Block Exemption: Is Eu-
rope really better off than with the current regulation?”, World Competition 26(4), 2003, p. 
561 et seq. 
302  OJ 36, 6.3.1965, p. 533/65. Regulation as last amended by: Council Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down 
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4 January 2003. 
303  For a legal outline of the “FRAND Exception”, in the context of antitrust assessment of pa-
tent pools, see i.a.:  Nack R. and Von Meibom W., “Patents Without Injunctions? – Trolls, 
Hold-Ups, Ambushes and Other Patent Warfare”, In: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, 
Competition and Tax Law – Patents and Technological Progress in a Globalized World – Li-
ber Amicorum Joseph Straus, 2008, vol. 6, Springer ed., p. 495 et seq.; More in general on 
the application of FRAND for standard-related technology licensing, see: Ullrich H., “Pa-
tente, Wettbewerb und Technische Normung”, GRUR, 2007, p. 826 et seq. 
304  For a legal analysis on the point, see i.a.: Van Bael I., “Clauses Which May Require An Indi-
vidual Exemption Under Art. 81 (3): Agreements Between Members of a Technology Pool”, 
In: “Competition Law of the European Community”, Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 651 
et seq. 
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Guidelines, taking a more flexible approach and applying the TTBER’s prin-
ciples by analogy, may be a more appropriate reference for assessment.305 
C. Current TTBER and Accompanying Guidelines 
I. New TTBER’s Operative Principles 
On 1 May 2004 the new Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation306 be-
came finally effective and therefore directly binding and enforceable in all Member 
States of the European Union.  
However, pursuant to the transitional provision of Art.10,307 the full harmoniza-
tion effect of the TTBER was postponed until 1 April 2006. As for its final term of 
validity, the current TTBER is due to expire on 30 April 2014, after 10 years from 
its coming into force.308 
In the premises,309 it is stated that the new regulation shall meet the two require-
ments of ensuring effective competition and providing adequate legal security for 
undertakings, based on the simplification of the applicable regulatory framework 
and on the adoption of an economic-based approach,310 with regard to the concrete 
impact of the agreements under consideration on the relevant market.  
 
305  For a comparison with the former TTBER on the point of exclusion of patent pools from its 
coverage, see: Van Bael I., “Agreements Specifically Excluded from the Former TTBER”, In: 
“Competition Law of the European Community”, Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 628 et 
seq. 
306  Commission Regulation (EC) No. 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Art.81(3) 
of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements, (TTBER), OJ 2004 L 123/11, 
available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&m
odel=guicheti&numdoc=32004R0772  
307  Id., Art.10 “Transitional period”, stating that: “The prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) of 
the Treaty shall not apply during the period from 1 May 2004 to 31 March 2006 in respect of 
agreements already in force on 30 April 2004 which do not satisfy the conditions for exemp-
tion provided for in this Regulation but which, on 30 April 2004, satisfied the conditions for 
exemption provided for in Regulation (EC) No 240/96”. 
308  Id., Art.11 “Period of validity”. 
309  Id., Premise no. 4. 
310  For a critical assessment on the economic approach promoted by the new TTBER, see i.a.: 
Bishop S., “From Black and White to Enlightenment? An Economic View of the Reform of 
EC Competition Rules on Technology Transfer”, In: “EU Policy Issues: A Critical Examina-
tion of the Block Exemption Regulation and the Corresponding Guidelines”, European Uni-
versity Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, The Annual EU Competi-
tion Law and Policy Workshops, 2005 Session, available at:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2005/200510-CompBishop.pdf 
 A Critical Examination of the Block Exemption Regulation and the Corresponding Guide-
lines 
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Nevertheless, the evident benefits of such modern approach, and its underlying 
flexibility, come with a “toll”, as it has been perceptively observed that: “The price 
to be paid for economic precision is a loss of legal certainty”.311 
1. Systematisation and Definition of Technology Pools 
While patent pools are still excluded from the direct scope of application of the 
TTBER,312 the fourth and last section of the Guidelines313 is entirely dedicated to 
“Technology Pools”, thereby amending for their technical exclusion from the direct 
field of application of the TTBER314 and corroborating the increasing importance 
that these forms of multiparty licensing agreements have assumed in our economy. 
As for the concrete application of the standards set forth in the Guidelines, it shall 
be reminded that they “must be applied in light of the circumstances specific to each 
case.315 This excludes a mechanical implementation. Each case must be assessed on 
its own facts and the guidelines must be applied reasonably and flexibly”.316 This 
brings to mind the “rule of reason”, previously examined when dealing with the 
American approach as set out in the US Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property317 and therefore it represents a point of conjunction with the US 
legal treatment of licensing agreement under the antitrust scrutiny. 
 
311  Drexl J., “Is There a 'More Economic Approach' to Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law?”, In: Drexl J. ed.: Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 
Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2008, p. 31. On the same argu-
ment in the wider context of the TTBER, see: Drexl J., „Die neue Gruppenfreistellungsver-
ordnung über Technologietransfer-Vereinbarungen im Spannungsfeld von Ökonomisierung 
und Rechtssicherheit“, In:  GRUR Int., 2004, p.  716 et seq. 
312  Id., Premise no. 7: “this Regulation should only deal with agreements where the licensor 
permits the licensee to exploit the licensed technology, possibly after further research and de-
velopment by the licensee, for the production of goods or services. It should not deal with li-
censing agreements for the purpose of subcontracting research and development. It should al-
so not deal with licensing agreements to set up technology pools, that is to say, agreements 
for the pooling of technologies with the purpose of licensing the created package of intellec-
tual property rights to third parties”. 
313  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 210 et seq. 
314  Pursuant to Art. 2 TTBER. 
315  For the methodology for the application of Article 81(3) as set out in the Commission Guide-
lines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, see Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-
396/96 P, Compagnie Maritime Belge, [2000] ECR I-1365 
316  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, part I “Introduction”, para. 3. 
317  US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Li-
censing of Intellectual Property (IP Guidelines), April 1995, available at:  
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm, Sec. 4 “General principles concerning the 
Agencies' evaluation of the rule of reason”. 
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Under the general framework for applying Art.81 EC,318 as clarified by the 
Guidelines, “The assessment of whether a licence agreement restricts competition 
must be made within the actual context in which competition would occur in the ab-
sence of the agreement with its alleged restrictions”.319 This also represents the point 
of departure for assessing the pro- and anti-competitive impact of technology pools, 
complementing the pragmatic reference to the state of affairs with the “rule of rea-
son” and, thereby, effectively setting an indelible link to the concrete economic con-
text in which such corporations arise. 
Finally there shall be no “presumption of illegality” outside the safe harbour of 
the block exemption, thus it cannot be automatically assumed that technology trans-
fer agreements falling outside the TTBER are caught by Article 81(1) or fail to satis-
fy the conditions of Article 81(3). Hence, an individual and unbiased assessment of 
the arrangement at issue shall operate on a case-by-case basis,320 keeping in mind 
the ultimate goal of promoting innovation by maintaining the right balance between 
ensuring effective competition, on the one hand, and supporting economic initiatives 
and undertakings with an adequate level of legal certainty, on the other hand. 
Technology pools are defined, for the scope of these Guidelines,321 as “arrange-
ments whereby two or more parties assemble a package of technology which is li-
censed not only to contributors to the pool but also to third parties”. Although the 
statement at hand seems to give equal weight to both terms, the real emphasis is to 
be put on the second one, since the pivotal justification of a patent pool is the licens-
ing of the contributed technologies to third parties in an aggregated form, to which 
the respective grants of rights within the pool is merely instrumental, as a possible 
choice for the internal organizational framework to be adopted, but certainly not es-
sential to the achievement of the core pool’s objectives.  
Arguably, departing from a too formalistic definition, it shall be observed that a 
pool may as well effectively operate towards third parties independently from the 
fact that its members have or have not been granting each other mutual access to all 
pooled technologies, as long as the pool itself, acting as a “super partes”, has been 
invested with the authority to conclude transactions as a legal entity on behalf of its 
associates. Therefore, this contribution rather adheres to the more concise and sub-
stantial definition, describing patent pools as consortia through which multiple pa-
tent owners offer third parties a joint non-exclusive license to access their patented 
technology, which will typically cover given technical applications.322 
 
318  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, part II “General Principles”, Sect. 2 “The general framework for 
applying Art.81”, papa. 11. 
319  , [1966] ECR 337, and Case C-7/95 P, John 
Deere, [1998] ECR I-3111, para.76. 
320  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, part III “Application of the TTBER”, Sect. 1 “The effects of the 
TTBER”, para. 37. 
321  Id., Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 210, first sentence. 
322  See, in this regard, the definition and concept expressed by Haller M. and Palim M. in “The 
Rise and Rise of Patent Pools”, Intellectual Asset Management Magazine, October/November 
2005, Issue 14, p. 9 et seq. 
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2. Questionable Demarcation of the Pool’s Agreements between TTBER 
and Guidelines 
As we have seen, patent pools as such are not covered by the TTBER, but are on-
ly addressed by the Commission Guidelines, which, although applying the same 
TTBER’s principles by analogy, have no binding, but only “persuasive” authority, 
thus providing only a minimum of legal predictability. Consequently, the particular 
pooling agreement under consideration cannot benefit from a block exemption, but 
will keep on being exposed to the individual case-by-case assessment procedure, 
under the general competitions rules set out in Art. 81 of the EC Treaty.   
Indeed, when attempting to respectively define the reach of the TTBER and the 
“residual competence” of the Guidelines, these trace a distinction between:  
• On the one hand, pooling agreements as such, i.e. establishing technology pools 
and setting out the terms and conditions for their operation, which, irrespective-
ly of the number of parties, are not covered by the block exemption. This is al-
legedly justified on the grounds that said arrangements do not directly aim at the 
“production of contract products”,323 namely products incorporating or produced 
with the licensed technology, thus not directly nurturing technological innova-
tion. For these reasons such agreements do not “a priori” fall under the TTBER 
and are, consequently, deemed to be addressed only by the Commission Guide-
lines. The specific issues faced by pooling arrangements324 - and not typically 
arising in the context of other types of licensing - would regard, in particular, (a) 
the selection of the technologies to be included and (b) the structural and func-
tional operation of the pool.  
• On the other hand, individual licences granted by the pool to third-party licen-
sees are treated like other licence agreements, as if the pool was a single entity-
patentee, which are block exempted when the conditions set out in the TTBER 
are fulfilled, with particular regard to the requirements of Article 4 of the 
TTBER containing the list of hardcore restrictions.325 In fact there would be no 
reason to exclude such bilateral agreements just because one of the parties in-
volved is the pool, acting in the quality of its representative, as an independent 
entity. 
Thus, when referring to patent pooling agreements “as such” the Commission is 
deemed to allude to the above-mentioned first set of arrangements, i.e. the regulation 
of the respective rights and obligations inside of the pool, dealt with within the 
Guidelines. Conversely, all relations established towards third-party licensees, al-
though to a certain extent predetermined in the context of the pool, may fall under 
 
323  TTBER, supra, fn. 298, Art. 2 “Exemption”; Guidelines, supra, part III “Application of the 
TTBER”, Sect. 2.2 “Agreements for the production of contract products”, para. 41. 
324  Id., para. 212. 
325  Id. 
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the TTBER, just like any bilateral agreement, here between the entity-pool (paten-
tee) and the third party (licensee). 
The exclusion of pooling arrangements from the Regulation’s direct field of ap-
plication - where the Guidelines explicitly state that: “Agreements establishing tech-
nology pools and setting out the terms and conditions for their operation are not, ir-
respective of the number of parties, covered by the block exemption”326 - shall be 
read in conjunction both with the exemption set forth by Art. 2 of the TTBE. This 
latter dictates that “Art. 81 (1) of the Treaty shall not apply to technology transfer 
agreements entered into between two undertakings [first condition] permitting the 
production of contract products [second condition]” - and with Sect. III.2.2. of the 
Guidelines - further elucidating on what may fall under the definition of “agree-
ments for the production of contract products” for the scope of the block exemption. 
Specifically, such point clarifies that, in order to be covered by the TTBER, the li-
cense must permit the licensee to exploit the licensed technology for the production 
of goods or services. 
Nevertheless - while as far as the first requirement is concerned, it is perspicuous 
that patent pools may be excluded from the block exemption on the basis of the 
number of parties involved, if as is typically the case, more than two undertakings 
participate in the enterprise, and in account of the consequent probability of high 
combined market shares, typically exceeding the thresholds explicitly set forth in the 
TTBER327 - the critical view is shared that the exclusion of a patent consortium on 
the basis of the scope of the agreement not meeting the requirement of the TTBER 
cannot be as easily justified.328 
In fact, it is true that agreements establishing patent pools coincide with and pre-
suppose, in the first place, the setting out of the terms and conditions for their opera-
tion, covering the reciprocal rights and obligations of the parties involved, but never-
theless such stipulations are inherently linked and indeed “instrumental” to the ulti-
mate common goal of the exploitation of the pooled technologies for production of 
the contracted-product, by way of licensing with third parties. Hence, in practice, 
there is no “clear-cut” distinction between the prototype agreement establishing the 
pool and the subsequent bilateral contracts concluded with third parties, where the 
Guidelines shall assumedly strictly confine their scope of application to the former.  
Besides, also wanting to adhere to the literal wording of the provision at issue329 
on the exclusion of “agreements establishing technology pools” from the benefits of 
the block exemption, referring to the setting out of the “terms and conditions for 
their operation” may (unintentionally but inevitably) well also encompass the pre-
 
326  Id. 
327  Being said market-share thresholds set forth in Art. 3 of the TTBER. 
328  For a complementary, but still critical stance on the matter, see i.a.: Ullrich H., “The Interac-
tion between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law: an Overview”, European Uni-
versity Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EU Competition Law and 
Policy Workshop, 2005, Introduction, p. 1 et seq., available at:  
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2005/200612-CompUllrichOVERVIEW.pdf 
329  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 212, first sentence. 
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defined “licensing” terms that are going to be negotiated with third parties, which on 
the contrary may certainly be covered by the TTBER. Indeed, the consortium’s pro-
visions on the contractual terms to be applied to licensees represent the core busi-
ness of the pool, as well as its means of self-subsistence, determining the flow of 
royalties to be respectively allocated to the pool contributors. 
Therefore, the view is taken that a rigid separation, as proposed in the Guidelines, 
between agreements establishing technology pools, excluded by the block exemp-
tion, on the one hand, and the licensing terms to be included in third parties’ nego-
tiations, covered by the TTBER, on the other hand, although necessary for systemat-
ic purposes, in practice represents an artificial and somehow inefficient distinction, 
because the latter may partly overlap with the former, as the content of the transac-
tions to be undertaken with licensees (such as the amount of royalties to be charges, 
the scope and duration of the contract, eventual additional clauses, like the right of 
termination in case of a challenge, and so on) is already substantially predefined in 
the pooling agreement itself. 
In other words, to evaluate the antitrust compliance of a technology pooling ar-
rangement, also individual licenses concluded with third parties - thus possibly fall-
ing under the TTBER - shall not be regarded in isolation, abstracted from their busi-
ness context, but likewise appraised in the light of the overall principles set out in 
the Guidelines, where patent pools are portrayed in a more thorough manner, reflect-
ing their actual economical weight and distinguishing character. 
Besides, as regards other points, the same Guidelines seem to point in this direc-
tion, like for instance when laying out the Commission’s criteria for the assessment 
of the overall competitiveness of a pool if the latter also encompasses complementa-
ry, but non-essential patents.330 Here reference is made, in particular, to whether 
such technologies are available only as part of a single package or whether parties 
interested also have the option to negotiate a license only for part of the package, 
with corresponding reduction of royalties.331 This specific condition, stipulated, 
among others, in the context of the pool, is necessarily also going to be reflected in 
the individual agreements concluded with third parties, which, in their turn, may be 
certainly covered by the block exemption, hence making the assumption of a net se-
paration between the Guidelines and the TTBER’s respective scope of intervention 
redundant. 
 
330  Id., para. 221 et seq. 
331  Id., para. 222, lett. d. 
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II. Antitrust Scrutiny of Technology Pools under the Guidelines 
1. Nature of the Pooled Technologies: Substitutes v. Complements and the 
Concept of Essentiality 
The most recurrently typified negative and positive effects of technology pools on 
competition, as outlined in the Guidelines, are closely linked to the respective rela-
tionships of the pooled technologies and may be summarized as follows: 
• On the one hand, if substitute technologies are involved,332  pooling agreements 
may first of all result in a restriction of internal competition among the pool’s 
contributors because of the joint selling of the pooled patents, mischievously 
taken out from their natural competitive context in the marketplace.333   
Indeed, a pool composed solely or predominantly of substitute, instead of com-
plementary, applications, might dangerously resemble a “price fixing cartel”. More-
over, when a technology pool supports an industry standard or establishes a “de fac-
to” industry standard, in addition to diminishing competition between the parties, 
technology pools may also result in a reduction of external innovation by foreclosing 
alternative technologies, as the existence of the standard and the related technology 
pool may make it more difficult for new and improved technologies to enter the 
market.  
• On the other hand, if constituted of complementary technologies,334 pools may 
certainly also produce pro-competitive effects, in particular by reducing transac-
tion costs and by setting a limit on cumulative royalties, thereby avoiding 
“double marginalisation”.335  
The latter notion typically delineates the double (or, in general, the multiple) 
mark-up, which firms involved in a multi-level production process respectively 
charge as the retail price to the subsequent purchaser in order to get higher “mar-
gins” of profit.336 Therefore, if the distinct production stages are operated by differ-
 
332  For the scope of the TTBER, “substitute technologies” are defined as such “when either tech-
nology allows the holder to produce the product or carry out the process to which the tech-
nologies relate”, Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 216, 2nd sen-
tence. 
333  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 213. 
334  For the scope of the TTBER: “Two technologies are complements as opposed to substitutes 
when they are both required to produce the product or carry out the process to which the 
technologies relate”, Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 216, 1st 
sentence. 
335  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 214. 
336  The phenomenon of “double marginalization” was first discussed in the early 19th Century 
by the French mathematician Cournot A. in: “Recherches sur les Principes de la of the Ri-
chesses”, 1938, English edition: “Research into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of 
Wealth”, Edited by N. Bacon, New York: MacMillan, 1897. A more thorough analysis is to 
be found in Spengler J., “Vertically integration and Antitrust Policy, Journal of Political 
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ent companies, having a certain market monopoly, a renewed surcharge occurs at 
each step, with the consequence that the final product has a higher price than would 
be the case, if a single company could control the entire production process, in 
which case the “marginalization” effect would eventually take place only once.337 In 
other words, “double marginalization” is avoided, because the intent to draw a cer-
tain margin of profit is going to be related to the contributed technologies as a 
whole, thus not resulting from the sum-up of all patents needed to produce the tar-
geted contract-product taken individually.338 
Accordingly, the creation of a consortium, as a collective managing entity, may 
well have an overall positive outcome as to the third parties’ transactions, by simpli-
fying the negotiation procedure and allowing for “one-stop shopping”, covering all 
the pooled technologies. The resulting competitive advantages are particularly evi-
dent in sectors where intellectual property rights are prevalent, i.e. clearing the way 
through so called “patent thickets”,339 where in order to operate on the market li-
cences need to be negotiated from a significant number of patent holders. Moreover, 
joint licensing and servicing can lead to further significant cost reductions, should 
third-party licensees also receive on-going services concerning the application of the 
licensed technology.  
Finally, another main advantage offered by a pool of complementary technologies 
is also the overtaking of the “hold-up” problem, which arises when one of the patent 
holders refuses to grant licenses under reasonable terms, taking unfair advantage of 
being, in hypothesis, the last of a series of contractors needed to get access to a giv-
en package of interdependent technologies, thus abusing his stronger bargaining po-
sition to “hold-up” the prospective licensee.340 
 
Economy, 1950, vol. 58, p. 347 et seq. ; More recently, Motta M, “Competition Policy”, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
337  See also: Hart O. and Tirole J., "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure", Brookings Pa-
pers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1990, p. 205 et seq.; Waterson M., "Price-Cost 
Margins and Successive Market Power." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb. 1980, p. 135 
et seq. 
338  As considered, the phenomenon of “double marginalization” was first discussed in the early 
19th Century by the French mathematician Cournot A. in: “Recherches sur les Principes de la 
of the Richesses”, 1938, English edition: “Research into the Mathematical Principles of the 
Theory of Wealth”, Edited by N. Bacon, New York: MacMillan, 1897. 
339  Shapiro C., “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standards-
Setting”, March 2001, available at http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~shapiro/thicket.pdf 
340  Merges R., “Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations”, 84 California Law Review, 1996, vol. 9, p. 1293 et seq.: “A hold-out 
is someone who refuses to agree to a bargain for strategic reasons.  For example, if a city 
government needs to buy five parcels of land from property owners A, B, C, D, and E, E 
might wait until the other four (A-D) have sold their land.  This puts E in the driver’s seat in 
bargaining with the city:  E can now charge a very high price - in theory, up to the total 
amount the city has to spend on the project, minus what was paid to A-D - for his or her land. 
Since this price will often be more than the average price paid to A-D, and in any event more 
than the price E could have obtained if he or she were not the last to sell, such a holdout strat-
egy will be rational in many cases”. 
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In order to clarify the basic distinction underlying the competitive assessment of 
patent pools, the Guidelines provide the definitions of complementary as opposed to 
substitute technologies, as well as of the concept of essentiality of a technology in-
cluded in the pool, formulating the differentiation as follows:341 
• “Two technologies are complements as opposed to substitutes when they are 
both required to produce the product or carry out the process to which the tech-
nologies relate”.  
• “Conversely, two technologies are substitutes when either technology allows the 
holder to produce the product or carry out the process to which the technologies 
relate”.  
• “A technology is essential as opposed to non-essential if there are no substitutes 
for that technology inside or outside the pool and the technology in question 
constitutes a necessary part of the package of technologies for the purposes of 
producing the product(s) or carrying out the process(es) to which the pool re-
lates. A technology for which there are no substitutes, remains essential as long 
as the technology is covered by at least one valid intellectual property right. 
Technologies that are essential are by necessity also complements”.342  
However, endorsing a critical stance, the definition of essentiality adopted by the 
Guidelines is a rather “strict” one, as it is not deemed sufficient for a technology to 
have no substitute inside the pool and as such to represent a necessary step for the 
production of the contracted product (what we would call “relative essentiality”) in 
order to be regarded as essential, but it is also required that no alternative technolo-
gies exist outside of the pool, which appears to represent a heavy burden to comply 
with, in “absolute” terms.343 
Anyway, the differentiation between complementary and substitute technologies 
is of outmost importance for the assessment of patent pools under the antitrust scru-
tiny of the Commission and it is a determinant for the outcome for the grant of an 
exemption. Indeed this sensible distinction, based on economic and empirical rather 
than speculative observations, is also to be found in the antecedent US Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property,344 representing a retained 
“constant” in the assessment of the competitive impact of patent pools. 
 
341  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 216. 
342  For a legal stance embracing the distinction between complementary and substitute technolo-
gies into a pool, see i.a.: Byrne N. et al., “Licensing Technology”, Jordans Publishers, 2005, 
p. 365 et seq. 
343  On the point, see i.a.: Van Bael I., “Complementary versus Substitute Technologies Com-
prised in a Pool”, In: “Competition Law of the European Community, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional”, 2005, p. 700 et seq. 
344  US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Guidelines for the Li-
censing of Intellectual Property”, April 1995, Sect. 5.5 “Cross-licensing and pooling agree-
ments”, available at: www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm  
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2. Beyond Categorizations: Competitive Efficiencies from a Consumer 
Perspective 
Beyond plain categorizations, it shall be nevertheless observed that the difference 
between complementary and substitute technologies is not “clear-cut” in all cases, 
since technologies may be partly substitutes and partly complements. In these inter-
mediate situations, priority has been eventually given to the consumer perspective, 
which is regarded as a decisive parameter for determining the respective nature of 
two or more given technologies. Concretely expressed, every time that licensees, 
due to efficiencies stemming from the integration of two technologies,345 are likely 
to demand and purchase both technologies, these are treated, for purposes of legal 
assessment,  “as if they were complements”, even if in fact they are partly substitut-
able. In such cases, the more liberal approach adopted by antitrust authorities is 
based on the practical consideration that, even in the absence of the pool, it is likely 
that licensees acquire both technologies anyway, due to the additional economic 
benefit of employing both technologies as opposed to employing only one of 
them.346  
An example may help to clarify the concept: thinking to both a laptop and a flat 
computer screen, nobody would ever seriously consider the technologies underlying 
such two products as “complement” to each other, since they are not both required 
to produce the same, but different products. In fact, they could even be regarded as 
“substitute”, as normally you may choose to purchase one or the other. Nonetheless, 
it follows from empirical observation, that an increasing number of consumers who 
buy a laptop are also likely to purchase an additional external monitor, following 
considerations of convenience (generally a laptop, while it has to be light and easy 
to carry, may have a small screen, thus the benefit of a bigger additional monitor to 
be connected and used in the usual working place). In this respect, hypothetically, if 
two patent owners contribute the respective technologies for a laptop and an external 
screen in a pool, their agreement is likely to fall under a positive legal assessment, 
given the consideration of their technologies as complementary, in accordance with 
the effective market demand. 
3. Different Categories of Technologies and Possible Combined Scenarios 
Eventually, out of the combinations of the different categories of technologies 
which, as outlined above, could be included in a pool, three possible scenarios could 
theoretically be depicted, as duly outlined by the Guidelines for the purposes of as-
 
345  Along the same line, giving primary considerations to actual efficiencies resulting from the 
combination of different technologies in a pool: U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission, “Patent Pools – Efficiencies”, In: “Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition”, April 2007, p. 66 et seq. 
346  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 218. 
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sessment under Art.81 EC, in view of improving the legal predictability and confer a 
certain degree of legal certainty to some typified kinds of agreement.347 
• The worst scenario occurs when the inclusion of substitute technologies in the 
pool restricts inter-technology competition, ensuing into collective bundling,348 
where charged royalties rise above competitive levels. Besides, where the pool 
is solely or predominantly composed of substitute patents, the arrangement is 
deemed to cover a price fixing between competitors. Hence, as a general rule the 
Commission considers the inclusion of substitute technologies into the pool to 
be a severe violation of Article 81(1), where the conditions of Article 81(3) are 
unlikely to be fulfilled in the case of pools, which comprise substitute technolo-
gies to a significant extent. Given that the technologies in question are alterna-
tives, no transaction cost savings accrue from including both technologies in the 
pool, in the absence of which the licensees would not have required both. It is 
not sufficient that the parties remain free to license independently, as in order 
not to undermine the consortium, which allows them to jointly exercise market 
power, the parties are likely to have little incentive to compete with each other.  
• The best scenario, on the other hand, occurs when a pool is composed exclusive-
ly of technologies that are essential and therefore necessarily also complements. 
In the case of such a combination, the creation of the pool as such typically falls 
outside the prohibition of Article 81(1), even irrespective of the market position 
of the parties.349 However, single clauses under which licences are granted may 
still fall under the bar of Article 81(1).350  
Finally a mixed scenario takes place when non-essential but complementary pa-
tents are included in the pool, where caution is advised because of the risk of forec-
losure of third party technologies.351 In fact, it is argued that when a specification, 
for which substitutes exist outside of the pool, is included within the aggregated 
technology package, licensees are likely to have little incentive to acquire a compet-
ing specification, when the overall royalty paid for the package already covers such 
substitute technology.352 In this respect, the Guidelines disputably maintain that: 
“The inclusion of technologies which are not necessary for the purposes of produc-
ing the product(s) or carrying out the process(es) to which the technology pool re-
lates also forces licensees to pay for technology that they may not need”, concluding 
 
347  For an extensive overview of the antitrust assessment of technology licensing agreements 
from a European competitive stanse, see: Korah V., “Introductory Guide to EC Competition 
Law and Practice”, 9th ed., 2007, Hart Publishing, p. 104 et seq. 
348  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, para. 219. 
349  Id., para. 220. 
350  For an analytical outline on the scenarios described in relation to the nature of the pooled 
technologies, see i.a.: Ritter L., et al., “European Competition Law: A Practitioner's Guide”, 
Kluwer Law International, 2004, p. 843 et seq. 
351  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, para. 221. 
352  On the issue of foreclosure of thirs party technologies, see i.a.: Jones A. et al., “EC Competi-
tion Law: Text, Cases and Materials”, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 842. 
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that the inclusion of complementary patents thus amounts to collective bundling. 
“When a pool encompasses non-essential technologies, the agreement is likely to be 
caught by Article 81(1) where the pool has a significant position on any relevant 
market”.353  
Concerning this last point, it should be critically observed that two technologies 
that are complements, according to the same definition of complementarity pre-
viously provided by the Guidelines354 - according to which: “Two technologies are 
complements as opposed to substitutes when they are both required to produce the 
product or carry out the process to which the technologies relate” - must accordingly 
also both be “necessary” for the production of the contracted product at issue. The 
fact that possible alternative specifications exist outside of the pool, meaning that 
strictly speaking the technology in question is not absolutely “essential” because of 
the availability of substitute technologies on the market, does not at the same time 
imply that such a technology becomes unnecessary, as the latter - or alternatively its 
substitute- is still required in the “complementary” chain of steps for the realization 
of the contract product. In other words, essential technologies must necessarily be 
complements, but complements may not be essential, in absolute terms. 
Arguably, the Guidelines misleadingly appear to infer that when complementary 
but non-essential technologies are included in the consortium, licensees have to pay 
for applications that they may not need. In fact, even assuming the non-essentiality 
of a complementary patent within the pool, interested third parties, which do not 
find it convenient to license that particular technology from the pool itself, are any-
way compelled to pursue an alternative solution in order to fill in the complementary 
step, which is still necessary to get access to all specifications underlying the pool’s 
contract product. At the worst, it could be argued that the incentive to pursue even-
tually available substitutes in the marketplace is diminished, when the acquired as-
sembled package already covers a valid alternative specification, as reported in the 
fist part of the Commission’s statement.355 In any event, more far-reaching conclu-
sions, such as those endorsed by the Guidelines - even if tempered by the acknowl-
edgement that there may be other ways to ensure that third party technologies are 
not foreclosed356 - may not be equally sharable for the reasons given. 
Following the reasoning outlined, it is hereby disputed that, in the case outlined, 
the option to be left open should rather be one of:  
• Either a replacement of the pooled technology with the external substitute, if 
convenient conditions can be negotiated, which would consequently be followed 
by the exclusion of the previously contributed patent, this outcome coinciding 
with the solution proposed in the Guidelines; 
• Or a maintenance of the complementary specification within the pool, should 
the patent at issue, despite of having become non-essential for the emergence of 
 
353  Id., para. 221, last sentence. 
354  Id., para. 216, first sentence. 
355  Id., para. 221, first and second sentence. 
356  Id., para. 222, fourth sentence. 
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a concurrent third party’s technology, still prove superior for reasons of compet-
itive convenience.  
In any case, the choice should be based on objectively relevant factors, such as 
quality-price considerations, with regard to the actual situation in the market place. 
Thus, a possible conflict between a pooled and an alternative external technology 
should not automatically be solved by the exclusion of the former, as simply put by 
the Guidelines. 
4. Antitrust Concerns Beyond Merely Technological Systematizations 
While in theory competitive assessments of patent pools are to a great extent 
made on the basis of the interrelations of the pooled technologies, paraphrased into 
the opposition between substitute and complementary specifications, real-life scena-
rios are much more complex, and even the strict exclusion of substitute technologies 
from the assembled package does not completely eliminate the risk of antitrust col-
lusion. In fact, in the moment of negotiating about which patents to include in the 
pool and which to leave out, in the hypothesis of more patentors holding comple-
mentary, but respectively substitute technologies, some other hidden “compensa-
tion” mechanisms may be convened in order to repay the owners of the excluded 
specification, who may nevertheless contribute other technologies to the pool, there-
by also ensuring their final agreement to the collectively adopted solution.357 
Besides, when it comes to patent pooling supporting technical standards, these 
risks of collusions are even compounded. In principle, the purpose of a standard-
setting body should be the selection of the best standard to be implemented in the 
market. In practice, however, the participants in the process are not unbiased techno-
 
357  In this respect, it has been argued that: “Alas, even the commitment not to pool substitutes is 
no guarantee that the pool will not price as a cartel.  Pool negotiations often involve discus-
sion between patentees with suites of patents, some substitute and some complementary.  
Suppose that Acme has patents x1 and y1 and Beta has patents x2, which competes with x1, 
and z1, which does not compete with any other patent proposed for the pool.  Following the 
assumed antitrust principle of ‘complements only’, the pool will not be able to include both 
x1 and x2, so Acme and Beta will have to agree which one comes in and which one stays out.  
Since both firms will want their own patent included, they will look for some quid pro quo for 
agreeing to allow the other’s patent in - perhaps some ‘adjustment’ in the royalty rate of y1 or 
z1.  Further, the negotiated rate of x1 or x2 could easily become a benchmark for the extra-
pool licensing of whichever patent was not included in the pool.  Indeed, even if Acme and 
Beta negotiate over the royalties of only complementary patents, those conversations may fa-
cilitate interdependent pricing by Acme and Beta of their competitive patents”, in: Crane D., 
“Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price Discrimination”, Cardozo 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 232, April 2008, p. 6, also available under the Social 
Science Research Network at:  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120071 
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crats, but mostly patentees, and the standard is likely to pass through a thicket that 
incorporates some of those patents.  
In fact, the very fundamental distinction between “complements” and “substitutes 
“becomes blurred in the context of a standard-setting process. In fact, while in the 
simplest patent pool case demand for the technology package is indeed external to 
the consortium, being influenced by market’s needs, when standardization activities 
are involved it is mostly the patentees themselves who decide which technologies to 
include in the standard, thus creating the demand for the patents to be pooled.358 
5. Particular Obligations upon Standard-Related Technology Owners 
Involved in a Pool: Early Disclosure and Licensing Terms 
a. A Delicate Balance of Interests as Base for the Commission’s 
Recommendations 
As regards the market power that can be acquired by the pool, arising in itself 
special caution before antitrust authorities, as considered particular consideration 
shall be given to the case of patent consortium supporting industry standards. In this 
respect, the Guidelines state that: “Undertakings setting up a technology pool that is 
compatible with Article 81, and any industry standard that it may support, are nor-
mally free to negotiate and fix royalties for the technology package and each tech-
nology's share of the royalties either before or after the standard is set. Such agree-
ment is inherent in the establishment of the standard or pool and cannot in itself be 
considered restrictive of competition and may in certain circumstances lead to more 
efficient outcomes. In certain circumstances it may be more efficient if the royalties 
are agreed before the standard is chosen and not after the standard is decided upon, 
to avoid that the choice of the standard confers a significant degree of market power 
on one or more essential technologies. On the other hand, licensees must remain free 
to determine the price of products produced under the licence. Where the selection 
of technologies to be included in the pool is carried out by an independent expert 
this may further competition between available technological solutions”.359 
In sum, weighing up the cause of the freedom to be conferred upon the right 
holders for fixing their royalties, on the one hand, against the concerns of individual 
 
358  As it has been perceptively observed, by Crane D., supra, fn. 357, p. 7: “There is a concern 
that the SSO process could degenerate into horse-trading between patentees, each willing to 
support gerrymandering in favor of other patentees in exchange for some gerrymandering in 
favor of his own patents.  For example, suppose that the optimal path for the standard is X-Y-
Z, which reads on no patents and employs the best available technology.  One can image that 
three patentees, each with one patent (A, B, or C), could agree to support an A-B-C standard.  
In this scenario, standard-setting collusion is doubly harmful, first because it reads on patents 
when it employs a technologically inferior path”. 
359  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 225. 
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abuse of market power upon the owner of a patent deemed to be essential for the 
implementation of a standard, on the other hand, the Commission chose to follow a 
rather diplomatic approach: in principle, sanctioning the sovereignty of the patentees 
to resolve when and how to set their licensing fees, but in practice recognizing that 
such determination may lead to more efficient results, from a competitive stand-
point, if it occurs before the standard is chosen, thereby also accounting for a more 
transparent, cost-effective choice of the technologies to be eventually included into a 
standard. 
In fact, the Commission already in the past advocated a more general set of rec-
ommendations for standard setting bodies on the ways to manage intellectual prop-
erty rights relating to standards, thereby complying with EU competition rules. Spe-
cifically, pursuant to an officially issued Communication in 1992 on Intellectual 
Property Rights and Standardization360 - more recently complemented also by 
another Commission Communication, released in 2004, on the role of European 
Standardization in the framework of EU policies and legislation361 - many standard-
setting organizations adopted leading principles directed at avoiding antitrust liabili-
ty.362 The ensuing implementations range from mere requirements of ex-ante disclo-
sure, upon owners of technologies considered for inclusion into a given standard, to 
more far-reaching commitments to stipulate licenses on “reasonable and non discri-
minatory” (RAND) terms. 
Nevertheless, it has been perceptively argued that antitrust “ex ante” disclosure 
obligations, as well as contractual enforcement actions by standard-setting organiza-
tions, especially as far as licensing fee commitments are concerned, may well guar-
antee that the royalties and other licensing terms are stipulated up front under 
RAND conditions, thereby counter-balancing the risk of individual abuse of market 
power. However, disputably such measures merely replace, on the one hand, the risk 
of “unilateral” holdouts with, on the other hand, the danger of collusion and price 
fixing, eventually resulting in cartelization and “collective” abuses.363 In this respect, 
the antitrust authorities in the US have instead shown a very diffident approach to 
“ex ante” disclosures through their recent “Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition” of April 2007. There pre-
liminary negotiations over licensing terms are considered to generate a serious po-
tential both for the exercise of market power by standard-related patent owners and 
for naked price-fixing.364 
 
360  Commission Communication on IPRs and Standardization, COM 92/445, October 22, 1992. 
361  Commission Communication on the role of European Standardization in the Framework of 
European Policies and Legislation COM (2004) 674 final. 
362  In the EU, standards bodies are actually recognized under Directive 98/34 of June 22, 1998, 
on Technical Standards and Regulations, published on OJ L 204, July 21, 1998, p. 37. 
363  See in this respect the arguments raised by: Crane D., supra, fn. 357, p. 7. 
364  US Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, “Antitrust Enforcement and Intel-
lectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition” - “Chapter 3: Antitrust 
Analysis of Portfolio Cross-Licensing Agreements and Patent Pools”, Joint Report, April 
2007, p. 50-52. 
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b. The Precedence Set by Standard-Setting Bodies 
Actually, the issue of an early disclosure of proprietary technologies susceptible 
to be incorporated into a standard truly came into the limelight following major de-
velopments set forth by standard-setting bodies dominating the international 
scene.365 Establishing a prominent precedent, the European Telecommunications 
Standardisation Institute (ETSI)366 adopted in March 2007 a new IP Rights Policy,367 
which is premised on a complementary pair of pivotal principles. First, members in-
volved in the standardization process shall be obliged to inform ETSI of relevant es-
sential patents in a timely fashion, hence a precursory disclosure is demanded. 
Second, should pertinent patented technologies be opportunely identified, the right 
owners shall undertake making their relevant licences available on fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Specifically, in this regard the adopted pol-
icy respectively requires that, on the point of disclosure: “[...] each member shall use 
its reasonable endeavours, in particular during the development of a standard or 
technical specification where it participates, to inform ETSI of essential IPRs in a 
timely fashion. In particular, a member submitting a technical proposal for a stan-
dard or technical specification shall, on a bona fide basis, draw the attention of ETSI 
to any of that member's IPR which might be essential if that proposal is adopted”.368 
As a consequence, when it comes to licensing commitments, “when an essential IPR 
relating to a particular standard or technical specification is brought to the attention 
of ETSI, the Director-General of ETSI shall immediately request the owner to give 
within three months an undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable 
licences on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions [...]. The 
 
365  On the point, see: Piesiewicz G. and Schellingerhout R., “Intellectual Property Rights in 
Standard Setting from a Competition Law Perspective”, Competition Policy Newsletter, Au-
tumn 2007, no. 3, p. 36 et seq., also available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2007_3.pdf  
366  The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) is a recognized European 
standardization body, which produces globally-applicable standards for Information and 
Communications Technologies, including fixed, mobile, radio, converged, broadcast and in-
ternet technologies. ETSI operates as a not-for-profit organization with almost 700 ETSI 
member organizations drawn from 60 countries worldwide. For the official website, refer to: 
http://www.etsi.org  
367  The ETSI IPR Policy was first adopted as an interim policy in November 1994, and con-
firmed as a permanent policy in November 1997, after protracted negotiations among the 
membership over many years, and ultimately achieving approval of the competition authori-
ties in Europe, US and Japan. In November 2005 the General Assembly of ETSI approved the 
creation of a new IPR ad hoc group, whose work officially started in January 2006, to review 
the IPR policy and investigate issues like FRAND and cumulative royalties. The ensuing 
March 2007 IPR Policy may be consulted at:  
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_IPR-Policy.pdf  
368  Art. 4.1, ETSI IPR Policy, Annex 6 of ETSI Rules of Procedure, March 29, 2007, available 
at: http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_IPR-Policy.pdf 
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above undertaking may be made subject to the condition that those who seek li-
cences agree to reciprocate”.369 
Proceeding along the same path, the VMEbus International Trade Association 
(VITA),370 a leading US standard-setting organization accredited by the American 
National Standards Institute, adopted new rules in 2007 requiring the disclosure not 
only of possibly relevant patents, but also of pending applications as a precondition 
for participation in standard setting activities.371 Eventually, failure to disclose 
known essential patents on a prompt basis shall lead to a royalty free license encom-
passing the relevant claims of the concealed right acquired.372 Likewise, the Ameri-
can Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-
SA)373 implemented a policy in early 2007, also committing its members to similar 
criteria.374  
Fundamentally, the constant escalation in patenting trends, coupled with the 
number of standards incorporating proprietary technologies, has raised the public 
awareness of the threat to competition that owners of patented specifications essen-
tial to a standard may exercise in lack of appropriate regulations. Because a patent 
required for the implementation of a standard reaches a much higher value once the 
latter is set, the system shall create a counter-incentive for the right holder who 
would attempt to extract the “ex-post” value earned by his technology, exponentially 
related to its “ex-ante” market value. 
In this respect, while the role of competition authorities, such as the European 
Commission, is not to impose a specific IP policy on standard-setting bodies, but 
rather to shed some light on typically encountered antitrust issues,375 the industry, as 
also convening in the framework of standard-setting organizations, has positively 
responded to the need to comply with the competitive parameters outlined. 
 
369  Art. 6.1, ETSI IPR Policy, Annex 6 of ETSI Rules of Procedure, March 29, 2007, available 
at: http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_IPR-Policy.pdf 
370  VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA – VMEbus being a recognized computer-
based standard) is an incorporated, non-profit organization of vendors and users having a 
common market interest in computing systems. Founded in 1984, VITA believes in and 
champions open system architectures as opposed to proprietary system architectures. For the 
official website, see: http://www.vita.com  
371  The policy was adopted on January 17, 2007, following the US Department of Justice Anti-
trust Division’s Business Review Letter providing guidance to VITA on October 30, 2006, 
available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/219380.htm  
372  For an updated outline of VITA’s policies on disclosure and licensing of patents in standards, 
see: http://www.vita.com/disclosure  
373  For the official website, see: http://www.ieee.org/web/standards/home/index.html 
374  The policy adopted with regard to patent may be consulted at:  
http://standards.ieee.org/guides/bylaws/sect6-7.html 
375  This view has also been expressed by Piesiewicz G. and Schellingerhout R., “Intellectual 
Property Rights in Standard Setting from a Competition Law Perspective”, Competition Poli-
cy Newsletter, Autumn 2007, no. 3, p. 38, also available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2007_3.pdf  
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From an antitrust perspective, the rationale behind the requirement of an “ex-
ante” disclosure of patents in the context of a standard-setting process is founded on 
the need to promote competition on the basis of technological and economic conven-
ience, rather than on positions of power retained by the holder of an essential stan-
dard-related technology “ex post”. A different solution would end up into the very 
same “hold-up” deadlock, should the patentee refuse to adhere to reasonable and 
open licensing terms, which the pool is finally committed to avoid. Besides, pur-
suing a policy of transparency as regards possibly relevant patents and the applicable 
licensing terms would enable competition among alternative specifications, eligible 
to be eventually incorporated into a standard, based on technical merits and more 
advantageous licensing conditions, eventually also considering suitable technologies 
freely available in the public domain. Accordingly, companies are going to be en-
couraged to compete more openly by promptly disclosing relevant technical assets 
and by proposing licensing terms likely to make their specifications more attractive 
for inclusion into a standard, where the final selection will finally reflect a thorough-
ly informed choice.   
As far as the licensing terms adopted with regard to third parties to the pool are 
concerned, the Guidelines make a distinction and focus their attention on pools hav-
ing a dominant position on the market, where “royalties and other licensing terms 
should be fair and non-discriminatory and licences should be non-exclusive”.376 The 
Guidelines explain that: “These requirements are necessary to ensure that the pool is 
open and does not lead to foreclosure and other anticompetitive effects on down 
stream markets. These requirements, however, do not preclude different royalties for 
different uses. It is in general not considered restrictive of competition to apply dif-
ferent royalty rates to different product markets, whereas there should be no discrim-
ination within product markets. In particular, the treatment of licensees should not 
depend on whether they are licensors or not. The Commission will therefore take 
into account whether licensors are also subject to royalty obligations”.377 
III. Assessment of Individual Restraints: Non-Compete, Grant-Back and 
Non-Challenge Clauses 
1. General Principles 
There are three main clauses that are likely to be found with a certain frequency 
in the context of pooling agreements and that present a high level risk of distorting 
competition and ultimately hampering innovation:378  
 
376  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 226. 
377  Id., para. 226. 
378  For an overview of the competitive impact of individual restraints most commonly found in 
technology transfer licensing agreement, more in general, see i.a.: Anderman S.,  “The New 
EC Competition Law Framework for Technology Transfer and IP Licensing”, In: Drexl J. 
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• Non-compete clauses are banned by the Guidelines stating that: “licensors and 
licensees must be free to develop competing products and standards and must 
also be free to grant and obtain licences outside the pool. These requirements 
are necessary in order to limit the risk of foreclosure of third party technologies 
and ensure that the pool does not limit innovation and preclude the creation of 
competing technological solutions. Where a pool supports a (de facto) industry 
standard and where the parties are subject to non-compete obligations, the pool 
creates a particular risk of preventing the development of new and improved 
technologies and standards”.379 
• Grant-back obligations380 pursuant to the Guidelines “should be non-exclusive 
and be limited to developments that are essential or important to the use of the 
pooled technology. This allows the pool to feed on and benefit from improve-
ments to the pooled technology. It is legitimate for the parties to ensure that the 
exploitation of the pooled technology cannot be held up by licensees that hold or 
obtain essential patents”. 
• Non-challenge clauses are associated in with the risk that they may shield 
invalid patents within the pool. In this respect, the Guidelines warn that: “pool-
ing raises the costs/risks for a successful challenge, because the challenge fails if 
only one patent in the pool is valid. The shielding of invalid patents in the pool 
may oblige licensees to pay higher royalties and may also prevent innovation in 
the field covered by an invalid patent. In order to limit this risk any right to ter-
minate a licence in the case of a challenge must be limited to the technologies 
owned by the licensor who is the addressee of the challenge and must not extend 
to the technologies owned by the other licensors in the pool”.381  
On this last point, it is necessary to explain that the problem of challenging 
invalid patents and the consequent right of the licensor to terminate the agreement, 
which are and have to stay two separated concepts, are slightly different when aris-
ing in a pooling agreement or in a bilateral license.382 The latter case is dealt with in 
Art.5.1 of the TTBER, which prohibits: “(lett. c) any direct or indirect obligation on 
the licensee not to challenge the validity of intellectual property rights which the li-
censor holds in the common market, without prejudice to the possibility of providing 
for termination of the technology transfer agreement in the event that the licensee 
challenges the validity of one or more of the licensed intellectual property rights”.  
 
ed.: Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Cheltenham, UK, 
Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2008, p.  121 et seq. 
379  Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, para. 227. 
380  Id., para. 228. 
381  Id., para. 229. 
382  On the legal implications of non-challenge clauses in general, see the i.a.: McPeake R., “Eu-
ropean Community Competition Law in Practice”, Oxford University Press, 2004, ed. 5, p. 
215 et seq. 
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This provision is mirrored by paragraphs 112 and 113 of the Guidelines. The first, 
with regard to non-challenge clauses,383 i.e. obligations not to challenge the validity 
of the licensor's intellectual property, specifies that:  
• “The reason for excluding non-challenge clauses from the scope of the block 
exemption is the fact that licensees are normally in the best position to deter-
mine whether or not an intellectual property right is invalid. In the interest of 
undistorted competition and in conformity with the principles underlying the 
protection of intellectual property, invalid intellectual property rights should be 
eliminated. Invalid intellectual property stifles innovation rather than promoting 
it […]”.  
• Conversely, paragraph 113 of the Guidelines covers the possibility for the licen-
sor to terminate the licence agreement in the event of a challenge of the licensed 
technology, stating that: “the licensor is not forced to continue dealing with a li-
censee that challenges the very subject matter of the licence agreement […] The 
provision thereby ensures that the licensee is in the same position as third par-
ties”. What is important here is the wording of the legal provisions and in par-
ticular of Art. 5.1 (c) of the TTBER, providing the licensor with a right of ter-
mination in the event that the licensee challenges the validity of “one or more of 
the licensed intellectual property rights”. Thus, when the licensee challenges 
“any” of the grantor’s licensed patents, the agreement can be terminated as a 
whole and not just with reference to the challenged patent at issue. This is dif-
ferent in the case of patent pools, where it is specifically stated that “any right to 
terminate a licence in the case of a challenge must be limited to the technologies 
owned by the licensor who is the addressee of the challenge and must not extend 
to the technologies owned by the other licensors in the pool”.384 
2. Contextual Implementation 
As outlined by a recent study on the design of patent pools and the determination 
of licensing rules to be adopted,385 typical grant-back or non-compete clauses cannot 
be evaluated in themselves, without considering the nature of the technologies in-
volved. In fact, both non-compete clauses - i.e. prohibiting independent licensing, 
 
383  For a legal outline on such clauses, see i.a.: Van Bael I., “Termination Clauses and Non-
Challenge Obligations “, In: “Competition Law of the European Community”, Kluwer Law 
International, 2005, p. 704. 
384  Id., para. 229. For a comparison and along the same line, see: Joelson  M., “An International 
Antitrust Primer: A Guide to the Operation of United States, European Union and Other Key 
Competition Laws in the Global Economy”, Kluwer Law International, 2006, 3 ed., p. 366 et 
seq. 
385  Lerner J., Strojwas M., Tirole J., “The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing 
Rules”, November 2005, p. 1 et seq., available at:  
http://www.people.hbs.edu/jlerner/PatPoolEmpiricalPaper.pdf 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
123 
where patent owners would otherwise remain free to grant licenses on their inven-
tions, as typically combined with follow-up implementations - and grant-back provi-
sions - i.e. disposing that any innovation deriving from the contributed patent has to 
be mandatorily transferred to the pool - present both costs and benefits, respectively. 
In particular, as supported by empirical evidence:386 
Independent licensing has the disadvantage of potentially creating competition 
between the members and the pool itself, in particular if the patents involved are 
substitutes; on the other hand, not foreclosing the possibility of such licenses 
through non-compete clauses has the benefit of allowing patent holders to develop 
their technologies in directions unrelated to the pool, thus bringing new implementa-
tions into the marketplace for the benefit of consumers.  
Conversely, a non-compete provision would oblige the members of the pool, in 
order to be allowed to license independently to third interested parties, to first secure 
for themselves a license from the pool for the very same technology they initially 
conceived, which within the context of ordinary bilateral negotiations may appear as 
a paradox. In fact, these so called “add-on innovations”, built on a particular patent 
contributed by a member to the pool, enable a new, stand-alone implementation of 
such patent, unrelated to the activities of the pool, as the latter stays unaffected by 
this particular new application. By contrast, the individual right holder could benefit 
from this new implementation, should the possibility of independent licensing and 
marketing be provided to recoup his investment in this research and development. 
Grant-back clauses are normally foreseen to avoid the risk of “hold-up”,387 which 
arises when a pool member, after entering into a pooling agreement, develops a 
technology which turns out to be essential to the pool, thus leading to a “blocking 
patent”, and holds up the whole pool - which is initially formed around a starting, 
agreed-upon set of patents, technically referred to as “kernel” - by detaining exclu-
sive rights on his new patent and denying access to the pool. In this case, it is ex-
tremely difficult to determine whether the “missing piece” of intellectual property 
right that is necessary for an efficient implementation of the pooled technology (i.e. 
the “blocking patent”) was already known to the patentee at the time of entering the 
 
386  Lerner J., Tirole J., “Efficient Patent Pools”, American Economic Review, 2004, p. 691 et 
seq. 
387  Merges R., “Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations”, 84 California Law Review, 1996, vol. 9, p. 1293 et seq.: “A hold-out 
is someone who refuses to agree to a bargain for strategic reasons.  For example, if a city 
government needs to buy five parcels of land from property owners A, B, C, D, and E, E 
might wait until the other four (A-D) have sold their land.  This puts E in the driver’s seat in 
bargaining with the city:  E can now charge a very high price—in theory, up to the total 
amount the city has to spend on the project, minus what was paid to A-D—for his or her land. 
Since this price will often be more than the average price paid to A-D, and in any event more 
than the price E could have obtained if he or she were not the last to sell, such a holdout strat-
egy will be rational in many cases”.  See generally, Calabresi G. et al., “Property Rules, Lia-
bility Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral”, Harvard Law Review, 1972, vol. 
1089, p. 1106 et seq. 
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pool or not.388 This gives courts, in case of litigation, a hard time when they are 
called upon to assess the alleged “bad faith” of the pool member, under which cir-
cumstance only they could legitimately mandate the compulsory transfer of the liti-
gated patent to the pool, at no or low cost. The impasse, which the judiciary may be 
confronted with, is easy to perceive when at the time of entering the pool the pool 
member had the mere “knowledge”, but not yet the “ownership” of the essential pa-
tent at issue.  
However, the situation may be equally complicated when the contributor was un-
aware, at the stage of the pool formation, that one of his patents would turn out to be 
essential, thus acting in “good faith” by not dedicating it to the pool. In the face of 
these deficiencies, such hold-ups can be more easily avoided “a priori”, through ad-
hoc grant-back clauses to be included in the patent pool’s constitutional statute. 
Nonetheless, grant-backs come at a cost, by discouraging pool members from in-
vesting their own resources into new implementations of the contributed technolo-
gies, when they will be forced to license it back to the pool, at no or a low licensing 
rate, according to a pre-determined scheme. In fact, such an automatic grant may 
lead to a “free riding” on the part of passive members of the pool to the detriment of 
innovation, while discouraging individual initiatives. 
The actual balance between costs and benefits of the restrictive clauses at issue is 
greatly influenced by the nature of the pooled technologies.389 The idea is easily 
grasped when considering the polar cases of pools composed, respectively, by either 
perfect substitute or perfect complement technologies: 
• In a pool constituted of substitute technologies, the main restriction derives from 
non-compete clauses, prohibiting independent licensing from individual pool 
members to third parties, outside the constitutional framework of the pool. That 
is comprehensible if you consider that substitute technologies may both be em-
ployed individually for the production of the contract-product developed by the 
pool, so that the patentee, who would license his technology independently pur-
suant to bilateral negotiations with third parties, would directly compete with 
the pool he is part of. On the other hand, the patentee may freely develop further 
implementations of his own technology, normally without being forced to auto-
matically grant them back to the pool. In fact, in pool of substitute grant-back 
clauses do not represent the default solution, but the choice of whether or not in-
cluding them is conducted on a case-by-case basis and depends on the compari-
son of the reduced incentive to innovate and the wish to avoid the threat of a 
hold-up by the owner of a subsequent, potential blocking patent, which would 
paralyze the activity of the whole pool. However, based on the same considera-
tions as to the nature of substitute technologies, the risk of a hold-up situation is 
highly reduced here, since the contract-product may normally be produced with 
the alternative pooled technologies, as well. 
 
388  Lerner J., Strojwas M., Tirole J., supra, fn. 385, p. 1 et seq.  
389  Id., p. 4 et seq.  
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• In a pool constituted of complement technologies, instead, independent licens-
ing is not a problem under normal circumstances, thus non-compete clauses are 
rarely included in such kinds of pools. Here, the key can also be found in the na-
ture of the technologies involved: complements have necessarily to be employed 
together in order to obtain the desired contract-product. For this reason, should a 
patentee market his own individual technology by way of independent licensing 
to third parties, which would not constitute direct competition for the pool, as its 
field of activity is not limited to the pool members’ isolated technologies. Be-
sides, as outlined above, such independent licensing practices offer the benefit 
of enhancing the incentives for the pool contributors to innovate in pool-
unrelated areas. However, these kinds of pools are much more concerned with 
the hold-up problem, should a new implementation of one of the technologies 
involved turn out to be indispensable for the production of the contract-product 
at issue, which could freeze the whole pool’s functioning mechanism in the ab-
sence of grant-back provisions. This policy is implemented at the cost of a re-
duced incentive for pool members to invest into the development of pool-related 
innovations. 
In fact, pools composed of perfect substitute or complement technologies mostly 
represent a mere abstraction of the reality and can rarely be found in their “pure” 
form. Besides, apart from “grey areas” where clear-cut distinctions based on the na-
ture of the technologies involved are not easily discernable, in the real world pools 
do not come  “labelled” as consisting of complementary or substitute patents.  
Indeed, in order to resist a stereotypical assessment of the nature of patent pools 
that often tends to be confined to merely formal grounds, such as the declared in-
tents of the parties entering into the agreements, a deeper consideration of empirical 
evidences should be enhanced. The former, more rigid approach is in fact based on a 
tradition of mistrust towards pooling arrangements,390 which were historically asso-
ciated with horizontal, price-fixing, anti-competitive “cartels”, and thus deemed to 
comprise substitute technologies, unless proven to be “innocent”. On the contrary, 
nowadays we should advocate a more flexible and pragmatic evaluation of such 
business practices, taking into consideration the overall context in which they arise, 
also when examining the individual clauses that contribute to their overall appear-
ance. 
IV. Institutional Framework Governing the Pool 
Finally, a last point to be dealt with concerns the institutional framework govern-
ing the pool, which covers the way in which such consortia are created and orga-
 
390  See in this respect the report traced by Gilbert R., “Antitrust for Patent Pools:  A Century of 
Policy Evolution”, Stanford Technology Law Review, April 2004, available at:  
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/stemcell/articles/gilbert_patent_pools.pdf  
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nised. Indeed, the importance of a good patent pool management should not be un-
derestimated as the way in which those entities are run may consistently reduce the 
incidence of antitrust allegations.391 The most important points may be summarized 
as follows:392 
1. Independent Experts 
Where independent experts are in charge of the assessment and administration of 
essential technologies to be included in a pool, it is more likely that competition au-
thorities will be more indulgent in their legal assessment, since non-aligned adminis-
trators are better guarantors of impartiality, because the selection of the pooled tech-
nologies is likely to be based on price and quality considerations, rather than on per-
sonal convenience of association, as it may occur if the pool is administrated by the 
strongest patent holders themselves.393 
2. Open and Indiscriminate Participation 
When the participation process is open to all interested parties, ideally also 
representing different interests, it is more likely that the pooled technologies will be 
selected on the basis of price or quality considerations, as compared to if the pool is 
set up by a limited group of technology owners, where individual interests may 
eventually prevail over objective factors.394 Accordingly, when persons representing 
different interests are managing the pool, it is more likely that licensing terms and 
conditions will be open and non-discriminatory, thus reflecting the real market value 
of the licensed technologies. 
 
391  Specifically in: Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 230, it is stated 
that the way a patent pool is structured can very well reduce the risk of restricting competition 
and provide assurances to the effect that the arrangement is more favorably seen as pro-
competitive. 
392  For an outline on the point, see i.a.: Van Bael I., “Pool Management and Institutional Ar-
rangements “, In: “Competition Law of the European Community”, Kluwer Law Internation-
al, 2005, p. 704 et seq. 
393  Besides, see also Guidelines, supra, fn. 299, Sect. 4 “Technology pools”, para. 233, stating 
that: “The Commission will take into account how experts are selected and what are the exact 
functions that they are to perform. Experts should be independent from the undertakings that 
have formed the pool. If experts are connected to the licensors or otherwise depend on them, 
the involvement of the expert will be given less weight. Experts must also have the necessary 
technical expertise to perform the various functions with which they have been entrusted. The 
functions of independent experts may include, in particular, an assessment of whether or not 
technologies put forward for inclusion into the pool are valid and whether or not they are es-
sential”. 
394  Id.,  para. 231. 
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3. Overseen Exchange of Sensitive Information 
Another determinant factor is that in oligopolistic markets, as eventually reflected 
within a patent pool, exchanges of sensitive information, such as pricing and output 
data, may facilitate collusion. In such cases the extent to which safeguards have 
been put in place in order to preserve the exchange of confidential data may be 
closely investigated.395 Also in this respect, an independent expert may play an im-
portant role by ensuring that such information, still necessary for the purposes of 
calculating and verifying royalties, is not unduly disclosed to undertakings that 
compete on affected markets. 
4. Neutral Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
Finally, it is important to take into account the dispute resolution mechanism en-
visaged when setting up the pool. Specifically, when this is entrusted to independent 
bodies, it is more likely that contentious processes will also be dealt with in a neu-
tral, unbiased way.396 
In conclusion, the observance of a few, basic sensible principles, as hereby out-
lined, may go a long way in ensuring “green light” for patent pools, establishing a 
record of good practices. 
D. Selected EC Case Law on Patent Pools 
As compared to the long history of intersection between antitrust and patent pools 
in the US, raising a broad range of competition issues with regard to the licensing of 
technologies, the jurisprudence of such cases in the EU is relatively small, although 
similarly instructive.397 In the following, we will attempt to summarize some of the 
most significant proceedings before the European Commission’s Competition Direc-
torate General involving the legal assessment of technology pooling licensing 
agreements: 
 
395  Id., para. 234. 
396  Id., para. 235. 
397  Charles River Associates, “Multiparty Licensing”- Report prepared for the European Com-
mission’s DG for Competition, April 2003, “History of Patent Pools and Competition Poli-
cy”, p. 21 et seq. available at:  
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/multiparty_licensing.pdf  
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I. Videocassette Recorders (VCR) 
Although the number of multiparty licensing cases has been quite limited, it is 
clear that the European Commission has been quite cautious about the potentially 
anti-competitive aspects of certain restrictions in multiparty licensing for a very long 
time. In 1987, an agreement involving cross-licensing of patents was found to nega-
tively affect competition within the European Community.398 Specifically, Philips 
and Sony had entered into an agreement with other videocassette recorders (VCR) 
producers on a uniform application of technical standards for the system at issue. 
The cross-license covered royalty-free patents to ensure the compatibility of cas-
settes with recorders from different vendors.   
However, the agreement provided that only the Philips complete system would be 
allowed, so that, consequently, any modification to the Philips system required the 
consent of all parties.  Despite the improved interoperability of the cassettes with 
video machines of different producers, the Commission refused to grant exemption 
arguing that: “compliance with VCR standards led to the exclusion of other, perhaps 
better, systems. Such an exclusion was particularly serious given the market position 
enjoyed by Philips […] Restrictions were imposed upon the parties which were not 
indispensable to the attainment of these improvements.  The compatibility of VCR 
video cassettes with the VCR video machines made by other manufacturers would 
have been ensured even if the latter had to accept no more than an obligation to ob-
serve the VCR standards when manufacturing VCR equipment”.399 
II. Advanced Photographic System (APS) 
Taking a new approach, from the early 1990s on the Commission has unequivo-
cally demonstrated that it also recognises and prizes the potentially pro-competitive 
effects brought about by technology sharing, such as the establishment of standards 
setting. As in most of the cases, no formal decisions were made on the notified 
agreement reported below, for instance, but the Commission sent the parties a so 
called “comfort letter”, i.e. an administrative letter, thoroughly expressing its opi-
nion.  
Specifically, in July 1993 Canon, Kodak, Minolta, Fuji and Nikon notified the 
European Commission about their accord for the still under way development and 
further exploitation, under the terms of a cross-license, of the Advanced Photograph-
ic System (APS), a new industry standard, which involved the production of new 
types of cameras, films and photo-finish equipment.400 The Commission has twice 
formally invited third parties to submit their observations on the proposed coopera-
 
398  Philips VCR, OJ No L 47, 18.1.1978, p.42 et seq. 
399  Philips VCR, OJ No L47, 18.1.1978. 
400  Notice in OJ C 68/3 of 5 March 1994. 
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tion. The parties to the agreement were all large players in the European and world 
market in cameras, lenses, colour roll films, colour photographic paper and single 
use cameras and as such were keen to ensure wide acceptance of APS as a new stan-
dard, as demonstrated by their commitment to granting licences to competitors. 
Here, the undertakings involved were primarily manufacturers, and their final aim 
was to generate revenues, essentially from their production, rather than from the li-
censing of their IP. The APS was commercially launched in April 1996, involving 
features that were improved to such extent that the parties expected it to effectively 
replace, at least to a substantial extent, the existing industry standard within the pho-
tographic industry in the long run.  
Eventually, the Commission reviewed some aspects of the third party licensing in 
1997, mainly as far as it related to the technical assistance given to licensees.401 Dur-
ing the proceedings the parties complied with the Commission’s requirements to en-
sure full competition, in particular by securing a fair and transparent licensing sys-
tem, together with technical assistance to the benefit of prospective licensees. Be-
sides, the co-operating parties agreed to change their initially notified agreements by 
granting licenses to third parties already two years before the date of the introduc-
tion of the APS into commerce, in order to ensure that the upcoming licensors would 
also be able to market licensed products in time to effectively compete with the 
named notifying parties. Following the outlined compromises, the Commission ex-
pressed its confidence that the conditions were “securing a transparent and fair li-
censing system”.402  
III. Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) 
Similarly, in May 1999 an agreement involving the joint licensing of the newly 
developed Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) technology was submitted to the Commis-
sion’s Competition Directorate General by Hitachi Ltd., Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co. Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Co., Time Warner Inc. and Toshiba Co. Practical-
ly, by way of compression, a DVD disc can generally store seven times as many 
video and audio signals as a compact disc, thus having evident advantages for users. 
The arrangement at issue covered the establishment of a patent pool embracing di-
verse applications of DVD technology, whereby patents are to be diffusely granted 
by way of a non-exclusive, fair and non-discriminatory license program to be unita-
rily administered by Toshiba.  
The investigations lead by the Commission’s competition services403 indeed 
found that the patent pool under examination would likely promote economic and 
technical progress by allowing an efficient introduction and distribution of DVD 
 
401  Notice in OJ 330/10 of 1 November 1997. 
402  Press release IP/98/353 of 15 April 1998. 
403  Press release IP/00/1135 of 9 October 2000. 
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technology. Most importantly, it was ascertained that the agreement did not contain 
unnecessary or excessive restrictions on competition. Finally, the Commission ap-
proved the pool, considering its overall beneficial effects on the consumers, thus 
granting a “comfort letter” under Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty and thereby clearing 
the underlying agreement.404 
IV. Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) 
Other relatively recent notifications include the previously mentioned MPEG-2 
pool, eventually cleared in 1998,405 and the subsequent MPEG LA +5 pool, cleared 
in 2001.406 As previously mentioned,407 the MPEG-2 (Moving Pictures Experts 
Group) is an open standard for transmitting and storing video signals, providing a 
technique for eliminating redundant information and, consequently, saving transmis-
sion resources and space in storage media, such as optical discs. Both above-
mentioned pooling agreements offered a single non-exclusive licence program and 
were unitarily administered by an independent entity, MPEG LA, based in the US 
city of Denver, Colorado. Furthermore, patent holders could offer licences for their 
patents outside the pool.  
By clearing these agreements, the European Commission maintained that the pool 
had overall beneficial effects for the consumers and did not impose excessive or un-
necessary restrictions on competition, therefore ultimately complying with the ex-
emption criteria of Art. 81(3) of the EC Treaty. 
V. Third Generation Patent Platform Partnership (3G3P) 
Relatively recently, in November 2002, the European Commission’s competition 
services, following the same balanced approach, eventually cleared the agreement 
among the so called Third Generation (3G) mobile equipment manufacturers (who 
refer to themselves as the “3G Patent Platform Partnership” or “3G3P”), involving a 
world-wide mechanism for evaluating, certifying and licensing essential patents for 
3G mobile communications systems.408 A positive administrative “comfort letter” 
was then issued in favour of the newly established 3G3P consortium, covering the 
creation of five 3G technology-specific platforms, fundamentally intended to deter-
mine and attest the essentiality of 3G patents, streamline licensing administration 
 
404  Further details of the notification of the DVD Licensing Program were published in the Offi-
cial Journal of the European Communities, 27 August 1999, vol. 242, p. 5 et seq. 
405  Press release IP/98/1155 of 18 December 1998; Notice in OJ No 98/C 229/6 of 22 July 1998. 
406  Notice in OJ 174/6 of 19 June 2001. 
407  See Part I / B / 2 of this contribution, dedicated to The “MPEG LA” Case. 
408  Press release IP/02/1651 of 12 November 2002. 
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and applying a price cap mechanism aimed at moderating the effects of high cumu-
lative royalties.  
The initiated antitrust proceedings go back to July 2000, when the newly estab-
lished 3G3P and its eighteen members, consisting of both big manufacturers and 
major mobile operators,409 notified the Commission about their agreements to pool 
their technologies together in order to create a consortium operating world-wide and 
designed to provide an open, voluntary and cost-effective framework for 3G mobile 
communication licensing services, ultimately intended to facilitate market entry and 
access to 3G technologies, thereby reducing the delays, costs and uncertainties inva-
riably associated with the licensing of multiple patents. 
In order to obtain antitrust clearance, pools should merely include essential pa-
tents, i.e. those that are indispensable for complying with a given technological spe-
cification. Consequently, as is implied by the very same concept of “essentiality”, 
there should not be any substitute patents related to a given standard, hence all tech-
nologies should be reciprocally complementary, and the respective patent holders 
should not be competitors in the relevant market.  
However, in the context of 3G standard setting, which took place under the guid-
ance of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a certain degree of 
competitive concerns could not be avoided: in fact, the five families of standards 
that were eventually included under the 3G3P umbrella - encompassing separate air 
interface technologies410 regrouped under the name of IMT-2000 (IMT standing for 
International Mobile Telecommunications and 2000 being the year when concerted 
acceptance of the main specifications to be incorporated into the 3G systems was 
eventually reached ) - all represent alternative, i.e. substitute, technical solutions, 
thus potentially competing with each other, since consensus on a single global air 
interface standard could not be reached, and finally a compromise was opted for, the 
ultimate goal being attaining interoperability among the five separate air interface 
technologies and thereby allowing for global roaming and compatible 3G services.  
Nevertheless, the alleged competition among the five substitute technologies en-
compassed by the IMT-2000 was in practice less compelling than in theory: in fact, 
it was undeniable that within certain regions one of the five technologies was widely 
prevailing, either due to consumers’ dependencies on the already existing 2G legacy 
systems or to regulatory choice.411 Anyway, given the potential or actual competi-
tion, among the five 3G technologies at issue, the 3G3P in its initial pattern seemed 
at least to some extent to form a prohibited, restrictive arrangement among market 
 
409  Namely Alcatel, Cegetel, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute Korea, 
France Telecom, Fujitsi, Royal KPNN.V., LG Information and Communications, Matsushita, 
Mitsubishi Electric, NEC, NTTDoCoMo, Robert Bosch GmbH, Samsung Electronics, Sie-
mens AG, SK Telecom, Sonera Corporation, Sony and Telecom Italia Mobile. 
410  Respectively known as W-CDMA, CDMA2000, TD-CDMA, TDMA-EDGE and DECT. 
411  On the point, see: Choumelova D., “Competition Law Analysis of Patent Licensing Ar-
rangements - The Particular Case of 3G3P”, Competition Policy Newsletter, Spring 2003, no. 
1, p. 42, also available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2003_1.pdf 
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contenders, where their joint agreement on licensing conditions and royalty rates 
could have been marked as a price fixing attempt, as such caught by Art. 81 of the 
EC Treaty. This raised pressing concerns about the antitrust consequences of said 
practice, and in the course of 2001 and 2002 several amendments were introduced in 
the notified accord before the Commission. Indeed, the most crucial change was the 
establishment of five distinguished technology-specific platforms, each relating to 
the corresponding 3G interface, instead of one single platform for all selected inter-
faces, where the relevant patents were pooled together, as initially conceived.  
Considerations related to the allegedly anti-competitive price setting mechanism 
in place were also overcome by the introduced amendments. In fact, the modified 
agreements eventually provided a default five percent maximum cumulative royalty 
rate, i.e. a “price cap”, to be applied on each licensee and for each specific single 3G 
technology included under the IMT-2000. Besides, patent holders and third parties 
also left open the option between the standard pre-defined licensing conditions and 
the choice of entering into individual bilateral negotiations, according to their best 
convenience. 
Now, taking into account its overall peculiarities and despite the quite significant 
resemblances, we should point out that interestingly there is a number of significant 
features distinguishing the 3G Patent Platform Partnership from a pure patent pool, 
which may be briefly highlighted as follows: 
• The 3G3P patents are not exactly “bundled” together, because of the concurrent 
existence of the five separate technology platforms in place. Thus, there is no 
real comprehensive pooling of patents. Instead, licensees have the option, as we 
have just seen, to choose among the different technologies and, consequently, 
transactions can be concluded also on a bilateral basis, if the standard pre-
defined licensing terms do not meet the parties’ convenience within the particu-
lar setting determined on a case-to-case basis. 
• Whereas in a patent pool a licensee typically enters into an agreement with the 
consortium itself, here there is no single licence between the platform, as such, 
and a given third party, since the 3G3P is technically divided into five distin-
guished units and, alternatively, bilateral arrangements can also be negotiated on 
an individual basis, according to the concrete circumstances in place. 
• In the 3G3P the licensors do not assign their patents to the platform, as it is typi-
cally the case within a pool, which in this case rather has the function of an in-
termediary between patent holders and third parties, than of a truly representa-
tive entity acting on behalf of, and therefore substituting itself to, its associates; 
besides, here members always retain their rights to also conclude non-exclusive 
licensing agreements outside the 3G3P framework, an option which in a patent 
pool may or may not be inserted into an elective, additional clause, irrespective 
of its undeniable desirability for eventually overcoming competition concerns. 
In conclusion, while assessing the compliance of 3G3P patent licensing arrange-
ments with antitrust rules, the Commission finally had to ascertain that no unfair re-
striction of competition occurs among the different 3G technology-specific  
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platforms; that only essential patents are encompassed by each single platform in 
consideration; that no biased tying of patents occurs and that competition in related 
or downstream markets is not foreclosed; that further R&D is not discouraged by the 
arrangement under scrutiny.412 
Nonetheless, the scope of the administrative comfort that has been conceded, and 
the ensuing clearance, is inherently limited to the notified agreements, as applying to 
the 3G3P membership at that time, and in no way it encompasses any other industry 
initiatives, such as decisions of 3G standard setting organisms and working groups, 
taking into particular account the novelty of 3G technologies at the time they were 
developed and introduced into the marketplace and the subsequent unpredictability 
of related 3G downstream product markets. 
VI. Philips and Sony’s CD Disc Licensing Program 
In August 2003, after years of heated debates, the European Commission finally 
cleared a set of bilateral arrangements between Philips and Sony, establishing the 
worldwide CD Disc Licensing Program and regulating the firms’ reciprocal rights 
and obligations.413 Moreover, the related third parties’ Standard License Agreement 
(the SLA 2003), covering essential patents to manufacture different specifications of 
pre-recorded CD discs, also eventually got antitrust clearance, pursuing from the 
recommended adoption of amendments to make it fully compliant with EU competi-
tion rules. This clearance marks the end of the Commission’s rigorous inspection of 
the Philips and Sony CD Disc Licensing Program.414  
In fact, the two companies had already been closely involved in cooperative re-
search and development on the cutting edge of optical data storage technology since 
the 1970s, which resulted in joint patented inventions, eventually reaching a global 
dimension. At a time when magnetic tapes and vinyl discs were the dominating au-
dio storage media on the marketplace, in the early 1980s, both firms commonly im-
plemented the CD system standard specification, as part of an innovation program 
concerning digital audio recording, which was actually launched by the Electronic 
Industry Association of Japan.415  
Actually, the close cooperation between Philips and Sony was first institutiona-
lized in 1979, when the two undertakings concluded a cross-licence agreement to 
collaborate in the design and development of optical audio disc players and their 
 
412  Choumelova D., supra, fn. 411, p. 43. 
413  Press release IP/03/1152 of 7 August 2003. 
414  Pena Castellot M., “Commission Settles Allegations of Abuse and Clears Patent Pools in the 
CD Market”, Competition Policy Newsletter, Autumn 2003, no. 3, p. 56 et seq., also available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2003_3.pdf 
415  At that time the CD system was just one among several different alternative solutions ad-
vanced by other participants in the program, even if eventually the former prevailed over 
time. Pena Castellot M., supra, fn. 414, p. 58. 
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connected record media. That initial arrangement was then extended in scope and 
superseded by a series of subsequent more comprehensive arrangements, widening 
the sphere of collaboration quite beyond the original CD field. Pursuant to the 
above-mentioned concerted practices, in 1982 the to firms launched their worldwide 
CD Disc Licensing Program, to be primarily managed by Philips. As anticipated in 
the premises, a Standard License Agreement (SLA) was set up, containing the con-
ventional contractual terms for prospective licensees.416 Over the years, many differ-
ent versions of the SLA followed.417 
The first format introduced by Philips and Sony was the highly fortunate CD-
Audio, which was launched in 1982 and soon replaced the analogue sound reproduc-
tion system thanks to its higher audio standards, as well as higher storage capacity 
and durability. 418 Subsequently, in 1984, the two companies developed the CD-
ROM disc, basically a read-only storage medium for personal computers, eventually 
substituting the floppy disk. The CD standards and the ensuing licences were conse-
quently extended to newly developed formats, which nevertheless didn’t share the 
same enormous success of the first two. Ultimately, the adoption of the newly intro-
duced specifications by music companies and consumer electronic producers was 
greatly encouraged by the broad availability of Philips and Sony’s combined patents, 
both under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, thereby avoiding the additional 
burden of multiple and time-costly negotiations. 
Now, considering that Philips and Sony enjoyed a dominant position in the CD 
technology market, the geographical scope of which would encompass at least the 
European Union, we should analyse the possible instances of abusive behaviour un-
der Art. 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. In fact, against the background of such provi-
sions, a number of doubtful practices in the management of the joint licensing pro-
gram were identified. In particular, at least until 2000, when a major revision of the 
agreement at issue finally took place, the inventory of patents annexed to the SLA 
curiously neither comprised a list of countries for which each patent was awarded, 
nor their respective expiry dates. It has emerged, nevertheless, that a far more ex-
haustive patent inventory was already internally available well before 2000, but had 
still not been made publicly accessible. Moreover, expired or non-essential patents 
had not been systematically deleted from external inventories; consequently, since 
the same document was left unchanged for several years, without consideration to 
the validity or relevance of the embedded patents, third party licensees were accor-
dingly still paying their respective royalties even for IP rights that had eventually 
expired years before.419 In fact, pursuant to a rigorous assessment of essentiality of 
 
416  For an overview on the licensing terms under consideration, see i.a.: Smith G., “Internet Law 
and Regulation”, Business & Economics, 2007, p. 1198. 
417  Pena Castellot M., supra, fn. 414, p. 56-57. 
418  Pena Castellot M., supra, fn. 414, p. 56. A CD-Audio is a disc comprising audio information 
encoded in digital form, which is optically readable y a CD-Audio player.  
419  This situation lasted until June 2001, when finally, following the expiration of the two main 
patents for that format in most of the countries where rights were granted, Philips and Sony 
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patents annexed to the SLA, that was finally conduced by an independent expert, it 
was found that merely four patents for CD-Audio, out of 44 included in the 1996 
list, for example, were actually essential for the production of those discs.420  
At last, an inquiry was launched after the European Commission received several 
complaints from manufactures of pre-recorded CD discs421 asserting that both the 
bilateral arrangement between Philips and Sony and the various versions in use of 
the standard licence agreement (SLA) addressing third party licensees were in 
breach of Art.81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, having allegedly set up a patent pool that 
encompassed non-essential and expired IP rights and, consequently, fixed royalties 
at an unfair level. Actually, three complaints were raised, bringing together a total of 
twenty charging firms, representing a non-negligible quote close to 20% of all licen-
sees within the territory of the European Union; nevertheless, the Commission’s 
Competition Directorate General carried out a common assessment of all claims un-
der examination.422 
After discussing available options with the two firms’ representatives and taking 
into consideration the cooperative attitude of the parties, a two-step solution was 
eventually contemplated: as a first stage, a limited window of opportunity for a satis-
factory settlement was left open for both sides; then, once an acceptable bargain 
could be reached, subsequently to which complaints were withdrawn in June 2003, 
the second, final stage involved the removal of any unfair restriction contained in the 
SLA. Accordingly, Philips and Sony officially announced their new joint CD Disc 
Licensing Program, together with the amended “SLA 2003” to be offered to third 
parties for the remaining enforceable portions of Philips and Sony’s patents.423 
The content of the SLA 2003 may be summarized as follows: 
• Licensees shall be left free to choose between the different kinds of CD discs 
available under the SLA and the essential patents required for the manufacture 
of each single type shall be specified; 
• Only essential technologies, in respect to each sort of CD discs, shall be in-
cluded in the patent lists annexed to the SLA, following a rigorous assessment 
to be carried out by an independent expert; any patents that can not pass the es-
sentiality-test shall be promptly deleted from the relevant list of reference; 
• Under the terms of the grant-back provision, licensees shall be only required to 
license back exclusively such patents that are deemed to be essential for the 
sorts of CD discs they have selected, both to the benefit of the consortium and 
the other licensees having opted for the same type of CD disc; 
 
ceased charging royalties in respect of any remaining CD-Audio patents for those territories. 
Pena Castellot M., supra, fn. 414, p. 57. 
420  Pena Castellot M., supra, fn. 414, p. 57-58. 
421  Which are discs that include already content, such as music or software, provided by content-
owners. Said manufacturers are in fact known in the business under the generic term of “rep-
licators”. 
422  Pena Castellot M., supra, fn. 414, p. 58. 
423  Pena Castellot M., supra, fn. 414, p. 56.  
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• Royalty payment obligations shall properly reflect both the territorial scope and 
duration of the patented technologies; 
• All existing licensees shall be able to enter into the SLA 2003, which shall con-
sequently govern all their forthcoming rights and obligations towards the pool, 
while substituting their prior standard license agreement; such switching shall 
not entail any further costs for the concerned licensees;  
• The SLA 2003 shall terminate at the date of expiration of the last essential pa-
tent in the territory of reference and for the types of CD discs selected by the li-
censee. 
Pursuant to the stipulation of the SLA 2003, Philips, which as already mentioned, 
is officially managing the joint licensing program, communicated to the Commis-
sion its intention to inform each licensee in the European Union in writing about the 
content of the new standard agreement; besides, as part of the same letter, the same 
licensees will be granted a one-time credit of 10.000 USD each for due royalties 
due.424 
The Commission’s competition services reviewed these new drafted agreements 
and finally reached the following conclusions:  
• First, as far as the formal side is concerned, not only the SLA 2003, which is 
eventually concluded with each licensee in the form of an ordinary, although 
partly pre-defined, bilateral arrangement, but also Sony and Philips’ joint CD 
Disc Licensing Program were deemed to be covered by the Block Exemption 
Regulation Concerning Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements 
(TTBER 1996)425 that was in force at that time before the advent of the new 
TTBER on May 2004.426 In fact, the same conclusions would have been reached 
under the current TTBER, since, as rightly observed by the Commission, al-
though agreements between the members of a patent pool are typically excluded 
from the block exemption, arrangements that have the pooling of technologies 
as their object, but are concluded between no more than two parties, on the con-
trary, may well be covered by the Regulation, as in the case under consideration; 
• Second, as far as the substantial side is concerned, the SLA 2003, in the form 
that we have just analysed, was not regarded as appreciably restricting competi-
tion within the meaning of Art.81 (1) of the EC Treaty.  
 
424  The points raised are outlined in: Press release IP/03/1152 of 7 August 2003. 
425  Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of Article 85 
(3) [now Art.81 (3)] of the Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer agreements 
(TTBER 1996), OJ L 31, 9.2.1996, p. 2-13, as amended by the 2003 Act of Accession, and 
available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&n
umdoc=31996R0240&model=guichett 
426  Commission regulation (EC) No. 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Art.81(3) 
of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements, (TTBER), OJ 2004 L 123/11, 
available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&m
odel=guicheti&numdoc=32004R0772  
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Consequently, a comfort letter was sent to Philips and Sony by the end of July 
2003 definitely clearing their submitted agreements in view of the improvements 
introduced to the structure, administration and overall transparency of the program 
under consideration.  
The case at issue illustrates how the Commission proved able to maintain an open 
and even proactive attitude towards the parties involved, being ready to accept and 
propose pragmatic solutions, as long as the final outcome can be regarded as equiva-
lent to the likely result of a formal proceeding. Certainly, the chances of success of 
such an approach greatly depend on the nature of the infringement in question, on 
the respective positions of the firms involved and, ultimately, on the parties’ cooper-
ative attitude, adding to the European Commission’s significant corpus of inquiries 
conducted in respect of patent pools.427 
Interestingly, Philips’ rights related to the CD’s pool, as its consequent dominant 
position in the relevant market, have been recently challenged from an antitrust 
perspective, i.a. under Art. 82 EC, pursuant to an infringement lawsuit eventually 
brought up to the German Federal Supreme Court.428 On the 6 of May 2009 a final 
judgement was rendered429 upholding the decision of the lower instances430 and 
eventually dismissing the defendant’s “antitrust objections”, which is basically the 
defence against a patent infringement allegation based on the asserted right holder’s 
refusal to grant a license under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) 
terms.431  
In fact, while in principle the Court reaffirmed the admissibility of an antitrust de-
fence for abuse of dominant position in case the holder of a standard-related patent 
refused to grant access to its technology under FRAND conditions432, in the case at 
 
427  Press release IP/03/1152 of 7 August 2003. 
428  See: Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) – Mitteilung der Pressestelle, “Zwangslizenzeinwand im Pa-
tentverletzungsprozess grundsaetzlich zulaessig”, Pressestelle des Bundesgerichtshof, 6 May 
2009, n. 95, also available at: 
 http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en
&Datum=2009&Sort=3&Seite=8&nr=47897&linked=pm&Blank=1  
429  Bundesgerichtshof, Decision of 6 May 2009, full text of the judgement available at: 
 http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en
&Datum=2009&Sort=3&Seite=8&nr=48134&pos=269&anz=1424&Blank=1.pdf    
430  The case at issue was discussed at first instance in Mannheim, on 12 September 2002 (7 O 
35/02), and in appeal in Karlsruhe, on 13 December 2006 (6 U 174/02).  
431  For a legal analysis of said “antitrust objection” or “competion law defence” see i.a.: Schoeler 
K., “Patents and Standards: The Antitrust Objection as a Defense in Patent Infringement Pro-
ceeding”, In: MPI Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law – Patents and 
Technological Progress in a Globalized World – Liber Amicorum Joseph Straus, 2008, vol. 6, 
Springer ed., p. 177 et seq. 
432  Thereby the German Federal Supreme Court is also reaffirming its earlier approach in its 
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instance said defence was declined on the ground that the applying licensee shall 
make an unconditional offer to the patent holder, to which the former shall feel 
bound, thereby acting as a “true licensee”.433  
Therefore, the patents encompassed by Sony and Philips’ CD Disc Licensing 
Program, related to the CD technology that after the German Federal Supreme 
Court’s decision became more widely known as “Orange-Book Standard”,434 were 
finally upheld, provided that licenses shall be granted under FRAND terms, a notion 
that nevertheless, still missing a clear statement of the courts as of its actual content, 
is still grossly left at the reasonable discretion of the right holder.  
 
 For an analysis of the legal implications of the decision, i.a.: Conde Gallego B., “Die Anwen-
dung des kartellrechtlichen Missbrauchsverbots auf ‚unerlässliche’ Immaterialgüterrechte im 
Lichte der IMS Health- und Standard-Spundfass-Urteile”. In:  GRUR Int., 2006, p. 16 et seq. 
For a wider, general approach on the issue see i.a.: Conde Gallego B., Mackenrodt M., 
Enchelmeier S. (Ed.), “Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement 
Mechanisms?”, Berlin, Springer, 2008. 
433  Bundesgerichtshof, Decision of 6 May 2009, supra, fn. 429, para. 29. 
434  For a clear definition and a contextual analysis, see i.a.: Harrison R., “The Orange Book: The 
Relationship Between Patents and Standards”, Tangible IP, Online Magazine, 11 June 2009, 
available at:  
http://www.tangible-ip.com/2009/the-orange-book-the-relationship-between-patents-and-
standards.htm  
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Chapter 5 Collaborative IP Mechanisms’ Applications: Exploring 
New Frontiers of Life Sciences 
A. Patent Pools and Biotechnology: Legal and Business Considerations 
A growing number of concerns have been raised about the impact of intellectual 
property rights on biomedical innovation.435 Even if there are no systematic empiri-
cal studies on this point, there is a certain anecdotal evidence of fragmented patent 
landscapes,436 echoing from highly focused public health cases such as malaria vac-
cine development.437 Indeed, it has often been suggested that cooperative agree-
ments, as patent pools, where right holders agree to license their IP as a package, 
may well be an expedient to overcome the outlined problem.438 The rationale for 
such collaborative arrangements is quite simple: by clearing the way to freedom to 
operate in a given technological field and by reducing the number of necessary ne-
gotiations to be undertaken by prospective third party licensees, transaction costs 
can be lowered and technology transfers facilitated. Yet, despite their attractive po-
tential and the success of patent pools in other sectors, notably consumer electronics, 
they remain largely untested in biotechnology. Therefore, this last part of our contri-
bution will be dedicated to the understanding and evaluation of the actual feasibility 
and convenience of the implementation of patent pooling mechanisms in life 
sciences. 
The motivations for cooperation lay at hand: as IP portfolios of flourishing bio-
technology industries are taking shape, transactional costs of increasing technology 
transfer can begin to account for a non-affordable portion of an average company’s 
precious research and development expenditures. In fact, expensive negotiations, 
and the threatening exposure to even higher potential litigation’s fees, constitute a 
 
435  For a valuable contribution to the debated issue of patentability of biotechnological inven-
tions, see i.a.: Drexl J., “La Brevettabilità delle Biotecnologie”, In: Sciso, Elena  ed.: L'OMC 
1995-2005 - Bilanci e prospettive. Rom, LUISS University Press, 2006, p.  37 et seq.; Straus 
J., “Stellungnahme zu den vom Rechtsausschuss gestellten Fragen zu dem Entwurf eines Ge-
setzes zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über den rechtlichen Schutz biotechnologischer Erfin-
dungen”, In:  BT-Drucksache 15/1024, Deutscher Bundestag, 15. Wahlperiode, Rechtsaus-
schuss, Protokoll der 57. Sitzung am 29. September, 2004, p. 214 et seq. 
436  Garlappi et al., “Public Sector Science and the Strategy of the Commons”, Best Paper Pro-
ceedings, Academy of Management, 2002. 
437  Fedson D., “Preparing for Pandemic Vaccination: An International Policy Agenda for Vac-
cine Development”, Journal of Public Health Policy, 2005, vol. 26, p. 4 et seq. 
438  Grassler F. et al., “Patent Pooling: Uncorking a Technology Transfer Bottleneck and Creating 
Value in the Biomedical Research Field”, Journal of Commercial Biotechnology, 2003, vol. 
9, p. 111 et seq. 
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serious economic inefficiency that may dislocate fundamental resources from the 
“core-business” of biotechnology.  
Given the complex and evolving dynamics of biotechnology research and devel-
opment, operating within an area of particularly dense patent production, the indus-
try’s reliance on cooperative market-based technology transfer mechanisms, as em-
bodied by patent pools or other private collective rights organizations, may be in-
evitable in the medium and long term. Having scrutinized the actual patent land-
scape as well as the prospective solutions, as diffusely outlined herein, the opportun-
ities for future success may depend on the prompt acceptance and calibrated imple-
mentation of such collaborative IP strategies.  
However, the successful stereotype that has emerged in the electronic and com-
munication industries439 cannot be blindly transposed as “successful receipt” and 
implemented on a one-to-one basis in the biotechnology sector, because we ought to 
take into due consideration the specific peculiarities that distinguish the latter from 
the former. Indeed, a new, distinctive patent pool model may likely arise within the 
life sciences domain showing particular features that are reflecting the different 
business context. Hence, the question that remains to be answered is how the struc-
ture and organization of a biotechnology patent pool should differ from the general 
model.  
B. Pilot Experiences 
I. Cases at Hand 
In an attempt to provide a satisfactorily answer to the questions as to what extent 
the patent pool mechanism can be applied to genetic inventions and whether such a 
model may lead to the expected benefits, some illustrative “first hand” experiences 
of patent pools, as recently undertaken - and have proven viable - in the field of life 
sciences, will be reported. 
1. Golden Rice 
A seemingly instructive case on collaborative IP patterns of protection and on 
successful negotiation through patent thickets emerged in the field of agricultural 
biotechnology.440 The Golden Rice Project was born out of an initiative of the Rock-
 
439  Aoki R. et al., “Coalition Formation for a Consortium Standard through a Standard Body and 
a Patent Pool: Theory and Evidence from MPEG2, DVD and 3G”, Institute of Innovation Re-
search Working Paper, 2005. 
440  Stanley P. et al., “Intellectual and Technical Property Components of Pro-Vitamin A Rice 
(Golden Rice): a Preliminary Freedom to Operate Review”, ISAAA Briefs No. 20, Ithaca, 
2000, also available at: http://www.isaaa.org. For a more general discussion, see: Graff G. et 
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efeller Foundation, based on a widely recognised need for a sustainable bio-
fortification program to solve the scourge of micronutrient deficiencies world-
wide.441 It was this project that brought together Prof. Ingo Potrykus, from the Insti-
tute of Plant Sciences at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH-Zurich), 
and Prof. Peter Beyer, from the University of Freiburg, who in an exemplary colla-
boration created “Golden Rice” to help mitigate the problem of vitamin A deficiency 
in the world.442 
In fact, they succeeded in genetically enriching rice grains with ß-carotene, the 
actual precursor of vitamin A, giving them the characteristic yellow colour that in-
deed lead to the name “Golden Rice”.443 Carotenoids (including beta-carotene) are 
natural plant pigments and are widely found in coloured fruits, carrots, and green 
vegetables. Plants do not contain Vitamin A, but only its precursor, pro-vitamin A 
(beta-carotene). Animals, including man, synthesise Vitamin A from carotenoids 
ingested through their diet. Hence, animal meat products contain Vitamin A. People 
living on a poor diet are at risk of becoming vitamin A deficient, which can lead to 
life-threatening illnesses. Indeed, only some carotenoids have pro-vitamin A activity 
and beta-carotene is the most common and important among them. Rice is the most 
important staple food for hundreds of millions of people in developing countries. 
Hence, delivery of beta-carotene with the help of Golden Rice could contribute to 
the reduction of chronic health problems caused by vitamin A deficiency (VAD). 
VAD is widely recognized to cause blindness, but more importantly, VAD exacer-
bates infections, including HIV-AIDS, measles, and other childhood diseases. This 
leads to an increased mortality rate, especially among children. UNICEF has esti-
mated that 124 million children in the world are deficient in vitamin A.444 
 
al., “Towards an Intellectual Property Clearinghouse for Agricultural Biotechnology”, Agri-
cultural Biodiversity and Biotechnology in Economic Development”, May 2006, vol. 27, p. 
387 et seq. 
441  The project at issue has been followed by a big publicity and Golden Rice’s properties were 
highly praised by: Time Magazine, “This Rice Could Save a Million Kids a Year”, July 2000, 
vol. 156, no. 5 
The Rockefeller Foundation has been widely acknowledge for its efforts of promoting access 
to key patented technologies, i.a., ultimately in a report for the ICTSD (The International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development) by: Barton J., “New Trends in Technology 
Transfer: Implications for National and International Policy”, ICTSD Program on IPRs and 
Sustainable Development, February 2007, Issue Paper no. 18, p. 15, also available at:  
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Barton%20-%20New%20Trends%20Technology%
20Transfer%200207.pdf  
442  Beyer P. et al., “Golden Rice: Introducing the Pro-vitamin A Biosynthesis Pathway into Rice 
Endosperm”, Science, vol. 287, p. 303 et seq.  
443  Beyer P., et al., “Why is Golden Rice Golden (Yellow) Instead of Red?”, Plant Physiology, 
2005, vol. 138, p. 441 et seq. 
444  UNICEF Statistics, “Vitamin A Deficiency”, available at: http://childinfo.org/areas/vitamina; 
For more information about the issue, see:  
http://www.goldenrice.org/Content3-Why/why3_FAQ.html  
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The process applied in Golden Rice production has become technically possible 
since the 1980s, when the techniques required to introduce, by means of transforma-
tion, and express genes in plants were developed. Regeneration of monocots, i.e. the 
group of plants that includes cereals, grasses, lilies etc, was harder to obtain than 
that of their dicot counterparts and was achieved by the end of the decade. However 
most of the science required to engineer the carotenoid pathway in the rice grain was 
developed only later in the 1990s.445 Finally in 1999 the project entered into the 
operative phase of product development and the procedure for regulatory approval, 
required for the release of genetically modified plants into the environment, was un-
dertaken. At the time when the scientific details of the rice were first published in 
2000,446 Golden Rice was considered a real breakthrough in biotechnology, as the 
researchers had engineered an entire biosynthetic pathway. 
The fundamental step the promoters of the “Golden Rice” project had in mind 
was to transfer the product obtained for the benefit of developing countries for fur-
ther breeding,447 so that the new trait could be eventually introduced into the local 
varieties consumed. However, a “freedom to operate” survey, appropriately underta-
ken in order to get hold of the “status quo” of the technology market concerned un-
der an IP perspective, already initially unveiled as many as approximately seventy 
patents, belonging to thirty-two different companies and research institutions, which 
could be embedded in the Golden Rice’s technique.448 Indeed, the promoters of the 
project found themselves facing a typical “patent thicket” situation, where overlap-
ping IP rights are a common ground and multiple technology owners need to be ad-
dressed to obtain licenses. 
In this case, the six key-patent holders were eventually approached to enter into a 
“sui generis”,449 i.e. non profit, technology pooling agreement, involving the crea-
 
445  For the history of the Golden Rice project see:  
http://www.goldenrice.org/Content1-Who/who2_history.html  
446  Ye et al., “Engineering the Provitamin A (beta-carotene) Biosynthetic Pathway into (carote-
noid-free) Rice Endosperm”, Science, 2000, vol. 287, p. 303 et seq. 
447  For a wider, comparative perspective on the problem of breeder’s access to protected bioma-
terial, see i.a.: Straus J., “Access to Patented Plant Material for Plant Breeders - The Problem 
and the German Solution, Recent Development of the Academic Disputes on the Intellectual 
Property Laws and the Competition Law”, In: Japan Institute of Invention and Innovation, 
(Eds.): Publication of Articles in Commemoration of the 70th Birthday of Professor Dr. 
Monya, 2006, p. 1310 et seq.; Straus J., “Measures Necessary for the Balanced Co-Existence 
of Patents and Plants Breeders’ Rights - A Predominantly European View”, In: WIPO, UPOV  
(Eds.): Compilation of the 2002&2003 Joint Symposia Documents of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) and the International Union for the Protection of New Varie-
ties of Plants (UPOV), Gen. 2005, p.  77 et seq. 
448  Stanley P. et al., “Intellectual and Technical Property Components of Pro-Vitamin A Rice 
(Golden Ricee): a Preliminary Freedom to Operate Review”, ISAAA Briefs No. 20, Ithaca, 
2000, also available at: http://www.isaaa.org  
449  See: Parish R. and Jargons R., “Using the industry model to create physical science patent 
pools among academic institutions”, Journal of the Association of University Technology 
Managers, 2003, p. 65 et seq. 
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tion of a private-public partnership between the inventors and the company Syngen-
ta Seeds AG,450 thereby allowing the “Golden Rice” promoters to grant licenses, free 
of charge, to the benefit of the targeted developing countries, even including the 
right of sub-license for the latter, in order to promote economic growth in those re-
gions.451  
In other words, Syngenta Seeds AG was able to negotiate access to all involved 
essential technologies for humanitarian purposes, consequently providing the Gol-
den Rice Humanitarian Board with the right to sub-license breeding institutions in 
developing countries free of charge.452 While the key technology for Golden Rice 
production was donated by the inventors, Prof. Potrykus and Prof. Beyer, the pack-
age of ancillary technologies licensed from Syngenta and required to engineer the 
trait into rice came from humanitarian donations by companies such as Bayer AG, 
Monsanto Co, Orynova BV, and Zeneca Mogen BV. 
A humanitarian board, composed of internationally recognised experts from re-
puted institutions,453 was established in the form of a voluntary association. The 
Humanitarian Project was sponsored by HarvestPlus (which in turn was funded by 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the World Bank), the Swiss Development 
and Collaboration Agency and the Syngenta Foundation, together with local re-
search institutes and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) including the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). This 
consulting body took over the strategic guidance of the project, with the purpose of 
assisting in the associated governance and decision-making process, as well as of 
helping the Golden Rice association to fulfil its major aim, namely reaching small 
farmers in the targeted developing countries. So far, approximately twenty master 
licenses have been granted to institutions mainly in developing Asian countries.  
In practice, breeding institutions in developing countries may obtain a licence 
from the Humanitarian Board (so called “Humanitarian Use Licenses”). The consor-
tium, in fact, had to define a cut-off between what is to fall under “humanitarian” 
versus “commercial” use: this figure was set at $10.000. Therefore, royalties shall be 
paid only in so far as a farmer or subsequent user of Golden Rice genetics makes 
more than $10.000 per year. Conversely, there is no fee demanded for the humanita-
 
450  Graff G. et al., “The Public–Private Structure of Intellectual Property Ownership in Agricul-
tural Biotechnology”, Nat. Biotechnol., 2003, vol. 21, p. 989 et seq. 
451  The initial research of Potrykus and Beyer was financially supported by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, together with the EU, the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science (1996-
2000), and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. Syngenta (formerly Zeneca) scientists 
contributed to the EU carotenoid research programme of which Golden Rice had been a part 
since 1996. Syngenta itself has supported the project with research and facilities since 2000. 
More recently funds also have also come from USAID, the Syngenta Foundation, Har-
vestPlus, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. 
452  Syngenta Media Release, “Syngenta to Donate Golden Rice to Humanitarian Board”, Oct. 
2004, available at: www.syngenta.com  
453  For a short biography of the Humanitarian Board’s members, see:  
http://www.goldenrice.org/Content1-Who/who1_humbo.html  
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rian use of Golden Rice, where farmers are permitted to keep and replant seed.454 
Applications should be based on a breeding program as part of which the Golden 
trait is to be crossed in with conventional breeding into local varieties. Should no 
bio-safety regulations be in place in the target country, consideration must be given 
to an implementation strategy of a regulatory framework that would allow release of 
Golden Rice varieties in due time. In such a situation, it may be observed that even 
in the face of human misery that could be alleviated with a transgenic plant,455 de-
veloping countries are still struggling with a political situation, which makes access 
to the needed technology very burdensome.456 
For actual reference, access to IP rights was achieved for Golden Rice in the year 
2000 and involved approximately six months of negotiations.457 Subsequently, the 
required material transfer agreements (MTAs) were signed in 2001. The first Golden 
Rice field trial in the world was harvested in September 2004 and was carried out in 
collaboration with Louisiana State University,458 as the USA is one of the few coun-
tries where field trials with transgenic plants can in principle be carried out if com-
plying with an acceptable, well-defined amount of regulatory requirements. Prelimi-
nary results from the field tests, allowing a more accurate measurement of the nutri-
tional value, have shown that field grown Golden rice produces three to four times 
more beta-carotene than Golden rice grown under greenhouse conditions.459 Never-
theless, since targeted developing countries did not have bio-safety regulations in 
place, many years went by before Golden Rice could be finally planted in a field 
plot. In fact, a necessary condition attached to the main agreement with Golden 
Rice460 licensees was that no field releases should take place in the absence of such a 
regulatory framework, causing a substantial delay for developing countries in most 
of the cases.  
 
454  Golden Rice Project’s details are available at: http://www.goldenrice.org  
455  For a broader, deeper discussion on the legal protection accorded to transgenic plants from a 
European perspective, see i.a.: Straus J., “The Scope of Protection Conferred By European 
Patents on Transgenic Plants and on Methods for Their Production”, In: Bakardjieva-
Engelbrekt, A. / P.J. Nordell  (Eds.): Festskrift in Honour of Marianne Levin, Stockholm, 
2007, p.  639 et seq. 
456  For a discussion on the policy implications, see: Lubbock A.C., “Public goods and public pol-
icy for agricultural biotechnology”, 7th ICABR International Conference, Ravalli (Italy), 
June 29 to July 3, 2003. 
457  Press releases on 16 May 2000; 22 January 2001; and 14 October 2004; also available at: 
http://www.syngentia.com  
458  LSU Agricultural Center Communications, “Golden Rice Could Help Reduce Malnutrition”, 
October 2004, available at:  
http://www.lsuagcenter.com/news_archive/2004/October/Headline+News/Golden+Rice+Cou
ld+Help+Malnutrition.htm  
459  Reference available at: http://www.goldenrice.org/Content2-How/how8_tests.html  
460  For more information about licensing Golden Rice, see:  
http://www.goldenrice.org/Content1-Who/who4_IP.html  
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In fact, critics of genetically modified crops, such as Greenpeace,461 as well as 
environmental and anti-globalization activists, raised various concerns, objecting 
both to the general suitability and effectiveness of Golden Rice.462  
In particular, one of the critical points raised in connection with Golden Rice was 
its inherent deception: it was indeed argued that Golden Rice is a “Trojan horse”463 
that would eventually open the door to more widespread use of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs),464 by exploiting a public health issue, ultimately to gain wider 
acceptance for the latter. In this respect, it has been claimed that Golden Rice is 
merely a marketing event serving the needs of profit-driven biotechnology firms at-
tempting to consolidate their hegemony in the food market, providing for a much 
needed public relations boost at a time when genetic engineering is apparently under 
siege in Europe, Japan, Brazil and various developing countries.465 
Here we ought to distinguish primarily between two quite closely connected, but 
different issues: the first regards the ownership of new biotechnologies in the hands 
of dominant firms, which could eventually create dependencies on the part of far-
mers or small, medium sized companies cultivating their lands; the second, on the 
contrary, involves the science of genetic engineering itself. However, with the ad-
vancement of knowledge and the development of new applications comes the danger 
of exploitation, as history may remind us. Nevertheless, this persistent problem, 
which certainly needs serious consideration with view to a resolution, also beyond 
the case of biotechnology, has to remain separate from the underlying science, as the 
implementation of genetic engineering, in our instance, does not necessarily imply 
the emergence of market monopolies.466  
Therefore, blind anti-science propaganda might eventually divert the focus from 
the truly important task of ensuring that the effective advantages of genetically mod-
ified crops in adverse agricultural areas are not diminished by a neo-colonial exploi-
tation of those in most urgent need of the technology, which shall instead represent 
 
461  For the official website, see: http://www.greenpeace.org/international  
462  See for all: Greenpeace, “All that Glitters is not Gold: The False Hope of Golden Rice”, May 
2005, also available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/reports/all-
that-glitters-is-not-gold.pdf  
463  Erosion, Technology and Concentration Group (ECT, formerly RAFI), “Golden Rice and 
Trojan Trade Reps: A Case Study in the Public Sector’s Mismanagement of Intellectual 
Property”, RAFI Communiqué, September/October 2000, no. 65.  
464  Shiva V., “The Golden Rice Hoax - When Public Relations Replaces Science”, Norfolk Ge-
netic Information Network, October 2000, available at: http://ngin.tripod.com/11.htm  
465  The environmental risks reportedly inherent to genetically modified organisms and applying 
to Golden Rice relate to out-crossing and are described in: Chen L. J., et al., “Gene Flow 
from Cultivated Rice to its Weedy and Wild Relatives”, Annals of Botany, 2004, vol. 93, p. 
67 et seq.; Chen J., et al., “ Can Transgenic Rice Cause Ecological Risks through Transgene 
Escape?”, Progress in Natural Science, 2003, vol. 13, p. 17 et seq.; Kleter G., et al., “Assess-
ment of the Food Safety Issues Related to Genetically Modified Foods”, Plant Journal, 2001, 
vol. 27, p. 503 et seq. 
466  Social Issues Research Centre (SIRC), “A Rice Dilemma”, February 2001, available at:  
http://www.sirc.org/articles/rice_dilemma.shtml 
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the main issue of concern.467 Consequently, the view is taken that the moral crusade 
against genetically modified organisms shall not override primary public policy con-
siderations. Indeed, it is the Greenpeace international coordinator on genetic engi-
neering himself, Mr. Benedikt Haerlin, to have pointed to a distinct change of direc-
tion by stating that: “Golden Rice is a moral challenge to our position. It is true there 
is a different moral context, whether you have an insecticidal or pesticide-resistant 
GM, or whether you have a GM product that serves a good purpose”.468 Although 
this may not reflect the views of some of the most persistent Greenpeace’s activ-
ists,469 it is significant to note that this was actually the first time that the organiza-
tion has publicly recognized that GM crops can indeed also serve a constructive 
cause. 
Finally, it is believed that the balance to be drawn is a positive one, as the Golden 
Rice project may ultimately be regarded as a quite promising example of how both 
private and public organizations, in a combined effort, may find a constructive way 
out of the “patent thicket”, overcoming the legal and operative uncertainty of over-
lapping IP rights, in order to attain a scope that goes beyond the economically 
oriented interests of the participating companies,470 thus making further steps in the 
direction of addressing compelling nutritional shortages in developing countries.  
Although it is still too early to assess the practical benefits of Golden Rice - since, 
as has been recalled, through the delays of the proper nutritional testing, the crop is 
not yet available for human consumption - this case definitely represents an out-
standing illustration of a how a non-profit, humanitarian, and therefore “atypical” 
patent pool, acting through a single licensing authority in the framework of a colla-
borative IP mechanism, is pursuing, as we have considered, the main objective of 
ensuring and promoting free technological access to a quite promising product ad-
 
467  For a thorough legal discussion on the broader issue of patent protection of biomaterial and 
its actual global impact, see i.a.: Straus J., “Patents on Biomaterial - A New Colonialism or a 
Means for Technology Transfer and Benefit-Sharing?”, In: Thiele, F. and Ashcroft R. (Eds.): 
“Bioethics in a Small World”, Heidelberg, Springer ed., 2005, p.  45 et seq. 
468  Steve C., “Greenpeace Promises Not to Halt Trials of GM Vitamin Rice” - Letter to the Edi-
tor by Harlein B., The Independent, February 2001, p. 2 et seq., also available at:  
http://environment.independent.co.uk/article252062.ece  
469  Although Greenpeace has never been comfortable with the charge that its food campaigns, 
led primarily by relatively well-fed people in the West, represent an elitist disregard for ge-
nuine suffering and malnutrition in less fortunate parts of the world. It has tried to fend off 
such challenges by describing them as nothing more than cynical PR for the multinational 
biotech companies – those who stand to profit very substantially from widespread acceptance 
of the GM crops, which they have developed. But the Golden Rice issue has always been dif-
ferent, primarily because it has arisen out of research by a charitable foundation, which has 
placed the technology at issue to the free disposal of poorer farmers. For the reference, see: 
Social Issues Research Centre (SIRC), “A Rice Dilemma”, February 2001, available at:  
http://www.sirc.org/articles/rice_dilemma.shtml  
470  Reminding that Golden Rice can still be licensed for a consideration to firms and individuals 
making commercial use of it raising above the defined threshold of USD $10.000 turnover 
per year. 
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dressing the needs of those regions where the economical and social conditions are 
more critical. Certainly, the Golden Rice case has been surrounded by a significant, 
even though to some extent controversial, deep public interest, which, in any event, 
may ultimately raise just the much-needed publicity that such types of collaborative 
mechanisms deserve. 
2. SNPs 
The acronym SNPs stands for single nucleotide polymorphisms,471 which are 
DNA sequence variations that occur when a single nucleotide in the genome is al-
tered.472 SNPs are evolutionarily stable, i.e. not changing much from generation to 
generation, making them easier to track in population studies.473 In fact, it is interest-
ing to note that any two unrelated persons are the same to about 99,9% of their DNA 
sequences, where accordingly only the remaining 0,1% is important because it con-
tains the genetic variants, which may eventually influence how people differ in their 
risk of disease, as well as their response to drugs474 or other therapies.475 Indeed, 
SNPs do not cause disease, but they can help determine the “likelihood” that some-
one will develop a particular disease, without wanting to minimize the concurrent 
role eventually played by environmental factors.  
This makes SNPs of great value for biomedical research and for developing 
pharmaceutical products or medical diagnostics, as scientists believe that tracking 
SNPs maps will help them identify the multiple genes associated with such complex 
diseases as cancer, diabetes and some forms of mental illness such as depression. 
For instance, it is considered that said variations in the human genome can help cata-
logue the unique sets of changes involved in different cancers, making SNPs valua-
ble research tools for improving cancer diagnostic and treatment planning.476 
For this reason, several groups worked on finding SNPs sequences and ultimately 
created various SNP maps of the human genome. Among these were the US Human 
Genome Project (HGP)477 and a large group of pharmaceutical companies, which 
 
471  For reference, see the “SNP Fact Sheet”, available at:  
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/faq/snps.shtml  
472  For example a SNP might change the DNA sequence AAGGCTAA to ATGGCTAA. 
473  However, for a variation to be considered SNP relevant, it shall occur in at least 1% of the 
population. 
474  Bentley D. et al., “The HapMap Project and its Application to Genetic Studies of Drug Re-
sponse”, Pharmacogenomics Journal, vol. 4 (2), p. 88 et seq. 
475  Even if scientists believe that others could predispose people to diseases or influence their 
response to a drug, it is known that many SNPs have no effect on cell function. 
476  For more related information, see: US National Institutes of Health - National Cancer Insti-
tute, “Understanding Cancer Series: Genetic Variation (SNPs)”, available at:  
http://nci.nih.gov/cancertopics/understandingcancer/geneticvariation  
477  The National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) led the National Institutes of 
Health's (NIH's) contribution to the International Human Genome Project. The first phase of 
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eventually established the so-called SNP Consortium.478 In fact, it is not surprising 
that companies invested concurrent efforts in the tracking of SNPs because, on the 
one hand, the potential payoff for further research was high, and, on the other hand, 
the actual likelihood of duplication among the groups was small because of the great 
estimated number of about 3 million SNPs.479 Indeed, these endeavours often took 
place within a collaborative setting, given the frequent interaction and the overall 
common goals of the institutions and research centres involved.480 Some key syste-
matic steps towards the attainment of the defined SNPs mapping goals may be 
summarized as follows: 
• The Human Genome Project:481 in 1998, as part of their five-year political plan, 
the US Department of Energy (DOE)482 and the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH)483 Human Genome Program established the first major institutional set-
ting to identify and map SNPs human sequences, fundamentally aiming at cata-
loguing common variants in the coding regions of the most identified genes in 
order to create public resources of DNA samples and cell lines. 
• The SNP Consortium:484 in April 1999, ten large pharmaceutical companies and 
the U.K. Welcome Trust philanthropy announced the establishment of a consor-
tium,485 headed by Arthur L. Holden, to find and map approximately 300.000 
common SNPs. The goal was to generate an extensive, publicly available map 
using SNPs as markers evenly distributed throughout the human genome. Two 
years later, a total number of 1,4 million SNPs, much more than originally 
planned, were discovered and released in the public domain at the end of 
 
this project, which had as its primary goal the sequencing of the three thousand million base 
pairs that make up human genome, was successfully completed in April 2003. For more in-
formation, refer to the NHGRI official website at: http://www.genome.gov  
478  These efforts have ultimately converged into the so called International HapMap Project, 
whose official website is available at: http://www.hapmap.org  
479  International HapMap Consortium, “A Haplotype Map of the Human Genome”, Nature, 
2005, vol. 27, p. 1299 et seq. 
480  See, for instance: Human Genome Project (HGP), “SNP Consortium Collaborates with HGP, 
Publishes First Progress Reports”, Human Genome News, November 2000, vol. 11, n. 1-2, 
also available at:  
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/publicat/hgn/v11n1/10snp.shtml  
481  International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, “Initial Sequencing and Analysis of 
the Human Genome”, Nature, 2001, vol. 409, p. 860 et seq.; For more information, “All 
About The Human Genome Project (HGP)” is available at:  
http://www.genome.gov/10001772  
482  For the official Department of Energy (DOE) website, see: http://www.energy.gov  
483  For the official National Institutes of Health (NIH) website, see: http://www.nih.gov  
484  For the SNP Consortium official website, see: http://snp.cshl.org (which precisely corres-
ponds to the HapMap Project’s website, which eventually took over the latter’s goals, availa-
ble at: http://www.hapmap.org ) 
485  The international member companies, which together committed at least $30 million, are 
APBiotech, AstraZeneca Group PLC, Aventis, Bayer Group AG, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Glaxo Wellcome PLC, IBM, Motorola, Novartis AG, Pfizer Inc., 
Searle, and SmithKline Beecham PLC. The Welcome Trust contributed at least $14 million. 
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2001.486 As the initial SNP discovery phase of the TSC project was completed, 
the emphasis shifted to studying SNPs in populations to determine shared va-
riants. Ultimately, the SNP consortium views its map as a way to make available 
an essential research tool that will spark innovative work throughout the re-
search and industrial communities by enhancing the understanding of disease 
processes, thus facilitating the development of more effective medications. 
• The HapMap Project:487 in October 2002 endeavours to carry on SNP mapping 
goals were revivified and resumed by the inception of the newly named Hap-
Map Project.  Thanks to support provided by public funding a hundred million 
dollars of public-private international research effort were also built up accumu-
lated.488 The new venture aimed at speeding up the discovery of genes related to 
common diseases, such as asthma, cancer or diabetes, by comparing genetic dif-
ferences between individuals. In particular, consortium members intend to com-
pare groups of people with the targeted disease to groups of people without that 
disease in order to identify chromosome regions where the two groups differ in 
their haplotypes489 that might contain genes affecting the personal predisposition 
for a given disease, by eventually developing a “haplotype map” of the human 
genome490 (from which the name “HapMap Project” actually derives) describing 
 
486  The International SNP Map Working Group, “A Map of Human Genome Sequence Variation 
Containing 1,42 million Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNP)”, Nature, 2001, 409, p. 928 
et seq. 
487  International HapMap Consortium, “The International HapMap Project”, Nature, 2003, vol. 
18, p. 789 et seq.; For the official HapMap project website, see: http://www.hapmap.org  
488  Public funding for the effort will be provided by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology in Tokyo; Genome Canada in Ottawa and Genome Quebec 
in Montreal; the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology, and the Natural Science Foundation of China, all in Beijing. For the reference, see: 
National Institutes of Health News Advisory, “International Consortium Launches Genetic 
Variation Mapping Project - HapMap Will Help Identify Genetic Contributions to Common 
Diseases”, Washington, October 2002, available at: http://genome.gov/10005336 
489  A haplotype is a series of consecutive alleles on a particular region of a chromosome. Haplo-
types are broken down every generation by a mechanism called recombination. However, it 
was observed that haplotypes in a population are longer than expected because recombination 
occurs preferentially in specific regions, thus creating “recombination hotspots” and “recom-
bination cold spots”, better known as haplotype blocks. Because alleles are correlated with 
each other in a haplotype block, knowing these structures in a population would enable re-
searchers to infer unknown alleles without genotyping all of the SNPs. On the point see: Far-
kas D., “DNA from A to Z”, American Association for Clinical Chemistry (AACC) Press, 
2004, p. 58. 
490  To create the HapMap, DNA will be taken from blood samples collected by researchers by 
regions of different population, i.e. in Nigeria, Japan China and the United States. The sam-
ples will be processed and then stored at the Coriell Institute for Medical Research in Cam-
den, N.J., a non-profit biomedical research center that specializes in storing living cells and 
making them available to scientists for further study. See on the point: Sio-Iong Ao, “Data 
Mining and Applications in Genomics”, Springer ed., 2008, p. 43. 
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relevant DNA sequence variations.491 All data and relevant scientific informa-
tion generated by the project will be released in the public domain, soon after 
they have been produced, without IP restrictions,492 so that any researcher can 
access and freely use them for their scientific endeavours. 
On balance, on the one side, it has been objected that, in general, SNPs mapping 
projects may raise some ethical issues that shall not be undermined.493 Although the 
collected samples include no personal identifiers and the privacy risks connected to 
individual donors are minimal,494 the fact that each sample is labelled by population 
and characterized based on respective haplotype frequencies, in order to allow com-
parisons, could raise risks of group stigmatization and consequent discrimination, 
should a higher frequency of a disease-associated variant be found in a population 
over-generalized to all or most of its members.495 However, it is argued that the 
same statement might in fact be invoked for all statistical studies and should be no 
reason for refraining from pursuing research efforts, but rather for inducing to better 
regulate their actual implementation. 
On the other side, SNPs mapping projects and data collection provide the scientif-
ic community with an effective “shortcut” to a great wealth of information, 
representing their prompt availability a huge saving in the studies of complex dis-
eases. Besides, the collaborative endeavours catalyzed by the undertaking have fos-
tered an open exchange of valuable research tools among scientists and institutions, 
ultimately providing the foundations and institutional support on which further in-
novation is based.496  
In fact, although biotechnology companies have the reputation of being quite 
fiercely competitive, SNP mapping efforts represent a praiseworthy example of the 
 
491  For more details, see: Altshuler D., “The Structure of Haplotype Blocks in the Human Ge-
nome”, Science. 2002, 296, p. 2225 et seq. 
492  Except that users have to agree on their turn not to reduce others’ access to the data and to 
eventually share it only with interested parties agreeing on the same term, to preserve the 
project data remain within the public domain. For the terms of the HapMap project, see: 
http://hapmap.org/abouthapmap.html  
493  International HapMap Consortium, “Integrating Ethics and Science in the International Hap-
Map Project”, Nature Reviews Genetics, vol. 5 (6), p. 467 et seq. 
494  OECD, “Creation and Governance of Human Genetic Research Databases”, OECD - Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006, p. 43. 
495  For supporting, see i.a.: Donovan A. et al., “The Human Genome Project in College Curricu-
lum: Ethical Issues and Practical Strategies”, Science, 2008, p. 71 et seq.; Knoppers B., 
“Populations and Genetics: Legal and Socio-Ethical Perspectives”, Medical Genetics, Marti-
nus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003, p. 92 et seq. 
496  In this regard, TSC chairman Arthur Holden has publicly stated that: “We are very positive 
about the chance to work collaboratively with the HapMap effort to support the informatics 
aspects of the program, as well as to ensure that the resulting HapMap will be useful in both 
disease and pharmaco-genomic research”, In: Press Release, “International Consortium 
Launches Genetic Variation Mapping Project - HapMap Will Help Identify Genetic Contribu-
tions to Common Diseases”, NIH News Advisory, October 2002, available at:  
http://www.genome.gov/10005336  
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existing cooperative spirit typically preceding the formation of a patent pool.497 In-
deed, all parties working with SNPs for research, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes 
understood that they would all need access to a considerable number of said DNA 
sequence variations, as they represent essential research tools for their scientific en-
deavours. Thus, in order to avoid licensing problems related to acquiring rights to 
thousands of SNPs, firms and institutions involved decided to work together to form 
a consortium, thereby foregoing exclusive rights on human SNPs and placing all of 
their data in a public database, eventually undercutting future patenting efforts.498  
On these grounds, it has been objected that the established SNPs Consortium, as 
well as its succeeding International HapMap Project,499 could not be properly de-
fined as a patent pool, but might be better characterized as an “anti-patent pool”.500 
Nevertheless, independently of legal systematizations, the very fact that the consor-
tium exists and that it is well established certainly indicates that also private firms 
from the field of biotechnology can work together to overcome licensing problems, 
pointing to positive chances for a mutually beneficial collaboration, showing in the 
case at issue that substantial economic benefits can be reaped from a cooperative 
strategy. 
Anyway, we shall admit that even if the SNP Consortium is an outstanding evi-
dence of the benefits of cooperation in life sciences, it cannot be generalized as a 
typical appropriate model for biotechnology patent pools.  In fact, SNP patents - un-
like patents on genes that code for useful proteins or genes that can be used in diag-
nosis - have very little practical value on their own, since said DNA sequence varia-
tions derive most of their value and usefulness from their ability to serve as research 
tools.  Indeed, scientists need to use a quite big number of SNPs to make meaningful 
comparisons between genomes, thus requiring access to hundreds or even thousands 
of them.501 The companies that formed the SNP consortium realized that they would 
benefit very little from exclusive control over a few SNPs, while they might reap far 
greater advantages from having non-exclusive access to thousands of DNA se-
quences.502 Thus, the SNP consortium shows how self-interest and cooperation may 
 
497  For supporting the point, see: Resnik D., “A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An Idea Whose 
Time Has Come?”, Journal of Philosophy, Science and Law, January 2003, vol 3, p. 12-13. 
498  Marshall E., “Drug Firms to Create Database of Genetic Mutations”, Science, 1999, 284, p. 
406 et seq. 
499  For the official website, see: http://www.hapmap.org (previously: http://snp.cshl.org). 
500  The assertion comes from: Resnik D., “A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An Idea Whose Time 
Has Come?”, Journal of Philosophy, Science and Law, January 2003, vol 3, p. 12. 
501  For an overview, see: Straus J., “Intellectual Property Rights in Human Genome Research 
Results - The US and European Approach - Common Problems, Different Solutions?”, Ger-
man-American Academic Council Foundation (GAAC) (Ed.), GAAC 4th Public Symposium 
“The Changing Character, Use and Protection of Intellectual Property”, Washington, DC, 
December 3-4, 1998, Washington, D.C. 1999, pp. 85 et seq. 
502  International HapMap Consortium, “A Haplotype Map of the Human Genome”, Nature, 
2005, vol. 27, p. 1299 et seq.; Venter J.C. et al., “The Sequence of the Human Genome”, 
Science, 2001, vol. 291, p. 1304 et seq. 
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well coexist under mutually advantageous terms, also within the traditionally highly 
competitive biotechnology sector. 
Indeed, analysing the collective efforts developed around SNPs from a strategic 
perspective, it may be observed that the choice of joining a biotechnology patent 
pool might be compared to a business decision made in the context of a cooperative 
game:503 right holders would enter into a consortium, if they think that the benefits 
of belonging to the pool will outweigh the risks in the long run. Still, some objective 
considerations may keep the candidate parties from taking that step: for instance, a 
company with patents related to a valuable protein is not likely to place it into the 
pool, because it would find it more economically convenient to exert its exclusive 
rights to gain more edge on the marketplace and, eventually, to cut out competitors, 
than to license it together with other patent holders retaining rights on complementa-
ry technologies. Therefore, it may be predictable that companies and universities 
might place some of their less worthy patents into the pool, while maintaining con-
trol over their more valuable IP assets.  
Nonetheless, these factors are not automatically going to make the pool idea ob-
solete, because even under the given circumstances, the consortium could still play a 
beneficial role as long as the participating parties still contribute enough patents to 
serve a well-defined, comprehensive scope - possibly aiming at a particular niche of 
the market at issue or, more in general, like in the given case, enabling “freedom to 
operate”, thus clearing the way to further innovations in a certain scientific field - 
while providing enough cooperative advantages, so as to maximize technology 
access and minimize transaction costs, as a means of self-sustainment or, eventually, 
for attracting prospective licensees.504 In practice, if there are many patent holders 
that do not find it convenient to join together, the pool cannot represent a one-stop 
shopping entity with the related savings; therefore it may not constitute a particular-
ly efficient licensing solution, because third parties may still need to negotiate with 
individual patent holders outside of the pool. For the considerations exposed, we 
may argue that the biggest challenge to forming and keeping a biotechnology patent 
pool going is in the first place economic, rather than legal, as the parties, when con-
fronted with the choice of whether joining into a consortium, should be able to as-
certain and foresee their long-term financial interests. 
 
503  Harsanyi J., “Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situa-
tions”, Cambridge University Press, 1977. 
504  Resnik D., supra, fn. 497, p. 13. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
153 
3. SARS 
Another area in which the emergence of a “patent thicket” has been recently ob-
served,505 causing a certain level of alert, and in which the a patent pool solution has 
been advanced, relates to the biomedical field and, more specifically, to the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) corona virus, where overlapping IP rights may 
dangerously lead to a “dead-end” situation.506 
In the late months of 2002 an outbreak of severe atypical pneumonia was reported 
in patients from China’s Guangdong province. Soon after that the disease, later 
known as the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), spread to other Asian 
countries, Europe and North America, having a notoriously dramatic impact on 
people and economies worldwide.507 
In March 2003, in response to the threatening outbreak of SARS, the World 
Health Organization (WHO)508 invested its resources in setting up a network of la-
boratories and research institutions in order to contain the worldwide spreading of 
the feared disease by identifying its etiological agent. The undertaken efforts finally 
led to the isolation of the causative virus,509 as well as the sequencing of its ge-
nome.510  
The containment of SARS is a good example of the effectiveness of active scien-
tific collaboration in isolating and containing such a disease outbreak. The WHO 
deserves much credit for achieving this, as it played a fundamental role in organiz-
ing the SARS network, as well as in disseminating clinical samples and ultimately 
defeating the outbreak.511 As a result of these combined efforts, in July 2003 they 
announced that SARS had been finally dominated; in the following just a few iso-
lated cases occurred, which in fact could be traced back to the exposure of laborato-
ry personnel to the virus.  
However, the potential grounds for a conflict arose following the contextual ac-
creditation to two different research groups for respectively discovering the SARS 
genome independently from each other.512 Besides, raising the likelihood of disputes 
about the respective IP legal boundaries even more, several of the contributing la-
 
505  Simon J. et al., “Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Intellectual Property 
Rights: The Possible Role of Patent Pooling”, Bulletin of the World Health Oranization, 
2005, vol. 83, p. 707 et seq. 
506  Gold R., “SARS Genome Patent: Sympton or Disease”, The Lancet, 2003, vol. 361. 
507  World Health Organization, “Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)”, Weekly Epidemio-
logical record, 78, 2003, p. 81 et seq. 
508  For the official website, see: http://www.who.int/en  
509  Peiris J., et al., “Coronavirus as a Possible Cause of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome”, 
Lancet, 361, 2003, p. 1319 et seq. 
510  Marra M., et al., “The Genome Sequence of the SARS-Associated Coronavirus”, Science, 
300, 2003, p. 1399 et seq.  
511  Simon J., et al., supra, fn. 505, p. 707. 
512  Rota P.A., et al., “Characterization of a Novel Corona Virus Associated with Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome”, Science, 300, 2003, p. 1394 et seq. 
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boratories also filed patent applications embedding SARS genomic sequence data. 
Ultimately, further research led to the consequent filing of additional patent applica-
tions by a multitude of private and public sector entities operating in that biomedical 
field.  
In particular, among the institutions, which were simultaneously involved in the 
research, we find the Bernhardt-Nocht institute (BNI), the British Columbia Cancer 
Agency (BCCA), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Eras-
mus Medical Centre (EMC) and the Hong Kong University (HKU). The involve-
ment of multiple parties resulted in a fragmentation of patent rights incorporating the 
SARS genomic sequence across the different groups, creating a complex situation 
when it comes to sorting out the confines of the different contributions, which may 
eventually require the costly and time consuming intervention of the law courts. Just 
to give an idea of the dimension of the phenomenon, more than 160 hits have been 
displayed in a recent research database after feeding it with a request for SARS pa-
tent applications.513 
To make the point: here numerous patent applications incorporating the genomic 
sequence of the severe acute respiratory syndrome, resulting in a fragmentation of IP 
rights, are in turn likely to adversely affect the development of products, in primis 
vaccines, to combat the disease.514 Placing these patent rights in a pool to be li-
censed on a non-exclusive basis may be the way to overcome this impasse and set a 
good precedent for employing this type of collaborative IP mechanisms in other 
areas of health care, which is likely to lead to consistent benefits for the public 
health. 
The economic conclusions that may be drawn from the legal uncertainty that re-
sults from the interface of overlapping IP rights do not leave much space for optim-
ism: potential licensees of the SARS patents, who may wish to develop vaccines to 
protect the population against the disease, are likely to be discouraged from invest-
ing resources in that field. In fact, blurry legal boundaries concerning patent rights 
make investments risky, because in such a situation it is neither possible to pre-
determine the future cost of licensing the patent rights nor to make out whether there 
is going to be the effective possibility of licensing, as all necessary patents may not 
be available, if a subsequently identified right holder refuses to collaborate or grant a 
licence at a reasonable royalty rate.  
In the case at issue, should for instance a single essential patent for vaccines 
against SARS be licensed only on an exclusive basis, the licensee with the right of 
exclusivity would be able to exclude other parties from selling their SARS vaccines, 
thus not only hampering competition, but also putting public health at risk. There-
 
513  Simon J., et al., “Managing Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Intellectual Proper-
ty Rights: the Possible Role of Patent Pooling”- “Impact of Patent Applications on Stake-
holders”, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 83, 2005, p. 708 et seq., also available at: 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/83/9/707.pdf 
514  Fedson D., “Preparing for Pandemic Vaccination: An International Policy Agenda for Vac-
cine Development”, Journal of Public Health Policy, 2005, vol. 26, p. 4 et seq. 
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fore, the counter-incentive for SARS vaccines producers is to postpone the decision 
on whether to invest in that domain, at least until the nebulous legal situation sur-
rounding the patent rights concerned is cleared.515  
Facing the problem, the World Health Organization set up a SARS consultation 
group in charge of identifying all relevant parties to be targeted, mostly institutions 
and research entities owning the essential patents, and of developing a strategy, in 
close collaboration with stakeholders, to address potential SARS related IP issues.516  
Currently, the relevant parties to be involved in the IP collaborative scheme have 
been all identified and a gross agreement on the main issues at stake has been 
reached. At present, signing “letters of intent” has finally formalized the ongoing 
cooperation with highly qualified technical and legal experts assisting the parties 
during the chain of negotiations. Recalling the above-mentioned steps in the forma-
tion of a patent pool, at this point we may go back to the time immediately preced-
ing the more thorough evaluation of patents - when the pre-set portions of royalties 
to be re-distributed within the pool are determined - on which the consensus of all 
parties has to be met, leading to the signing of the final patent pool consortium 
agreement. If the parties finally conclude a full agreement,517 the resulting pool will 
be set up in the USA, possibly followed by attempts to also set up similar consortia 
elsewhere. 
A pool comprising patents incorporating the genomic sequence of SARS, licensed 
out on a non-exclusive basis, would enable wide access to the development of vac-
cines and safeguard public health from possible future outbreaks of the disease. In 
fact, ensuring broad access under a given technology is one of the characterizing 
traits of a patent pool,518 distinguishing it from bilateral negotiations, which are tra-
ditionally more limited in scope. 
Indeed, the health care sector is not the only one facing fragmentation of IP 
rights, and lessons may certainly be learned from observing how other industries 
have solved similar problems, as positive experiences may be transposed into the 
field of biotechnology. In fact, patent pools have been dealing with such fragmenta-
tions, i.e. “patent thickets”, for the past century and a half, offering a more flexible 
and voluntary mechanism, based on collaboration, as opposed to compulsory licens-
ing, or similar “public use” provisions, ensuring access through government inter-
vention. Practical examples of this latter are not unknown in the domain of life 
sciences: in October 2001 the US government publicly considered use of its powers 
 
515  Gold R., “SARS genome patent: symptom or disease?”, Lancet, 2003, p. 423 et seq. 
516  Friedman Y., “Best Practices in Biotechnology Business Development”, Logos Press, 2008, 
p. 134-135. 
517  Takenaka T., “Patent Law: A Handbook of Contemporary Research Patent Law: A Handbook 
of Contemporary Research” -“Preemptive Pools” Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008, p. 715-716. 
518  Clark J. et al., “Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Pa-
tents?”, White Paper commissioned by Q. Todd Dickinson, the Under Secretary of Com-
merce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, December 2000, also available at:  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patent- pool.pdf 
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in the wake of the anthrax attacks. In the end drastic solutions could be avoided, as 
an agreement with Bayer for the use of its antibiotic Cipro was reached through co-
operative negotiations.519  
In the case at issue, the formation of a patent pool - as the next step in the cooper-
ation reached through the signing of letters of intent - would send a powerful signal 
to potential licensees, i.e. vaccines manufacturers, that patent owners intend to make 
their IP rights available at reasonable, standard rates, reducing IP risks and in turn 
encouraging earlier investments in the patented technology in the field of product 
development. 
The “net effect” generated by such a patent pool would be of great value for pub-
lic health, not only for the diffusion of vaccines against SARS, but also for setting 
an influential precedent that may encourage the formation of analogous collabora-
tive IP models in other big areas of life sciences which face similar issues of public 
concerns, such as avian influenza, malaria or tuberculosis, thus leading to increased 
dissemination of key technologies to combat these diseases. 
In fact, the SARS case is an ideal one to set a precedent, also because of its rela-
tive simplicity. In particular, the characteristic traits of such cooperation may be cur-
rently highlighted as follows: 520 
• The technologies involved are at a similar, early stage of realization, i.e. patent 
applications, so that the prospective formation of a pool would not be compli-
cated by old issued IP rights that are already entangled in parallel third-party 
agreements. 
• Among the current patent applications, only a few are known to incorporate es-
sential technologies for the purpose of the pool, thus leading to a relatively li-
mited, contained and easily identifiable number of parties to be eventually in-
volved in the cooperative scheme. The major parties to be addressed would in 
fact be four: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); Health 
Canada - holding the British Columbia Cancer Agency (BCCA)’s application; 
Versitech Ltd. - the technology transfer office of the Hong Kong University 
(HKU); CoroNovative BV - a spun out company of Erasmus Medical Centre 
(EMC). 
• The identified parties are either public organizations or institutions with strong 
public vocations, i.e. pursuing general collective interests, therefore public 
health implications of SARS certainly give them a strong incentive to move 
forward.  
It is noteworthy that collaborative steps actually undertaken in the SARS case 
have gained considerable public support. In particular, both the World Health Or-
 
519  Resnik D., “Bioterrorism and patent rights: compulsory licensure and the case of Cipro”, The 
American Journal of Bioethics, 2002, p. 2 et seq. 
520  Simon J., et al., “Managing severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) intellectual property 
rights: the possible role of patent pooling”- “The case for using acute respiratory syndrome as 
a key precedent in health care”, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 83, 2005, p. 709 et 
seq., also available at: http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/83/9/707.pdf 
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ganization and the National Institutes of Health Office of Technology Transfer in the 
U.S521 have positively assisted such cooperation: the former has issued a formal rec-
ommendation522 for developing the SARS collaborative model further, the latter is 
backing the formation of such consortium and helping to develop an operative plat-
form for the establishment of a pool.  
Furthermore, two major law firms523 expressed their support for the creation of 
such patent pool and, most importantly, are providing a pro bono service to evaluate 
the suitability of each patent application for incorporation into the consortium, as 
well as engaging into discussions with antitrust authorities and regulatory agencies 
to test the viability of such pooling agreement from a legal perspective. 
4. HNPCC 
Another peculiar case, which has raised great interest as to the possibility of 
adopting a collaborative IP scheme and in which the establishment of a patent pool 
is deemed to introduce considerable benefits for life sciences, is the one of the ge-
netic disease known as hereditary non-polyposis colorectal cancer (HNPCC).524 For 
this reason - although concrete steps for entering into an operative phases have not 
yet been undertaken - we will now turn our attention to this specific genetic disease 
and to the characteristics that make it particularly eligible for patent pool considera-
tions, as they may be well applied by analogy when confronting similar diseases. 
As we have already considered for the SNP525 case in a more general way, genetic 
diseases are due to mutations in genes: in particular, such diseases can be either 
caused by a variety of mutations in one single gene, which is actually the case with 
 
521  For the National Institutes of Health Office of Technology Transfer, see: http://ott.od.nih.gov/  
522  For the whole text of the WHO SARS Consultation Group’s Recommendation, see:  
http://www.who.int/vaccine_research/diseases/sars/events/2003/11/recommendations/en/  
Note in particular under Point 6, Intellectual Property (IP) Considerations: 
“Given the successful worldwide collaboration initiated by the WHO on the identification and con-
trol of the SARS CoV, the SARS consultation group has addressed the possible impact of 
SARS CoV-related IP issues on the further progress of this process. The SARS consultation 
group proposed that a strategy be developed, in consultation with stakeholders, to address po-
tential SARS CoV-related IP issues and thus enhance development of intervention approach-
es. This strategy should aim to achieve consensus on SARS CoV IP issues for the benefit of 
public health”. 
523  The law firms involved are: Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP and Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP. 
See: Simon J., et al., supra, fn. 520, p. 710, also available at:  
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/83/9/707.pdf 
524  Van Overwalle G., et al., “Patent Pools and Diagnostic Testing”, “HNPCC Patent Pool: A 
Test for Diagnostic Testing?”, TRENDS in Biotechnology, vol. 24, no. 3, 2006, p. 118 et seq. 
525  Acronym for Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNP). See the official website at:  
http://www.hapmap.org. The case, which presents significant similarities with the one now at 
issue, is dealt in greater depth is previous n. (2) of the hereby-reported pilot experiences for 
biotechnology patent pool. 
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HNPCC, or by one or more mutations in several genes. As far as HNPCC is con-
cerned, its diagnosis in a particular family is partly based on molecular genetic test-
ing for germline mutations in one of the mismatch-repair (MMR) genes; typically, 
patients are being tested for mutations in two or more out of some candidate genes. 
Nevertheless, other genes involved in the MMR pathway have been reported to be 
associated with HNPCC, and, most importantly, the number of genes identified as 
being involved in familiar colorectal cancer is expected to grow.526  
The point here is that some of these newly identified genes might soon be in-
cluded on the shortlist for routine testing;527 consequently, as various patents have 
been filed, it is likely that genetic data necessary for testing HNPCC will be hin-
dered by the presence of overlapping IP rights,528 where legal boundaries are increa-
singly difficult to ascertain. As a patent thicket is manifestly arising, an HNPCC pa-
tent pool encompassing essential genomic patents may certainly help to overcome 
this impasse, thus making proprietary genomic data more accessible for clinical use.  
The considerations introduced hereby, strongly advocating the creation of an 
HNPCC patent pool, may suggest that such a cooperation takes the form of a “dy-
namic model”, with regard to both size and operating purpose, i.e. content of the 
pool, differing and remaining flexible over time: to be more specific, additional es-
sential patents - e.g. relating to other genes with a role in the same pathology and on 
particular mutations of those genes - are to be included in the pool as they are 
granted; on the contrary, other expired or no longer essential patent rights shall not 
be maintained within the consortium. 
Furthermore, the granting of licenses to a subset of patents is also recommenda-
ble: while some genetic laboratories offering testing for the clinical condition as a 
whole may be interested in the entire set of technologies offered by the pool, other 
more specialized research units may only desire to acquire a license to a subset of 
patents in the pool, typically corresponding to a specific subset of disease genes or 
mutations, which may be of particular interest in view of the geographical hetero-
geneity related to the distribution of different mutations. Besides, some smaller la-
boratories may want specifically to license only a particular gene or even a particular 
mutation for the purpose of the development of an antibody or another therapeutic or 
research tool, thus further restricting the field of operative interest to those delimited 
patent applications.529 
 
526  For more details on the HNPCC disease, see:  
http://www.genetests.org/servlet/access?db=geneclinics&site=gt&id=8888891&key=Q4npyE
NdaTo2B&gry=&fcn=y&fw=S9X0&filename=/profiles/hnpcc/index.html  
 527  Knoppers B. et al., “Human DNA: Law and Policy : International and Comparative 
Perspectives”- “Predictive Genetic Testing in HNPCC”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 
183 et seq. 
528  Van Overwalle G., et al., “Patent Pools and Diagnostic Testing”, “HNPCC Patent Pool: A 
Test for Diagnostic Testing?”, TRENDS in Biotechnology, vol. 24, no. 3, 2006, p. 118-119. 
529  For an overview or the clinical laboratories involved in HNPCC testing and their different 
roles, see:  
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In fact, the ability of patent pooling agreements to adapt themselves to different 
circumstances on a case-by-case basis may prove extremely valuable. Actually, as 
patent pools are characterized as voluntary IP mechanisms based on ongoing colla-
boration both among their members and with third licensees, they are typically ame-
nable to any kind of arrangement, following the convenience and the peculiarity of 
the targeted market for the contracted product. Thus here, too, a patent pool solution 
is likely to prove very resourceful, if the business operators concerned seize the high 
potential benefits of such a collaborative approach. 
II. Some Common Remarks 
1. General Considerations 
To draw some conclusions in the light of the “pilot experiences” that have been 
presented here, some fundamental issues have to be attentively addressed when fur-
ther exploring whether the patent pool model, as we know it, may be amenable with-
in the sphere of life sciences. In fact, a realistic implementation of such paradigm in 
life sciences should take into account the distinguishing features of the new econom-
ic environment in which a prospective consortium is to be shaped. 
In this respect, the most noticeable traits characterizing the establishment of a bio-
technology patent pool may be briefly outlined as follows: 
• First of all, the life sciences industry is not as strongly conformed to technical 
standards,530 as those, most notably, defining the electronic and communication 
sectors.  For some authors this point represents an obstacle to the inception of a 
patent pool in the first place,531 although it has also been compellingly argued 
that “standards” might just need to be re-defined bearing in mind the scopes of 
the industry at issue, for example as a pre-determined set of genetic mutations 
recognized by the international community. 
• Secondly, universities and public institutions, rather than for-profit firms, may 
well represent the typical licensors, often holding key biotechnology patents, 




530  For a critical discussion on the interface between patent pools and standards in biotechnology, 
see: Eversible T., “Patent Pools and Standard Setting in Diagnostic Genetics”, National Bio-
technology, 2005, 23, p. 937 et seq. 
531  Aoki R. et al., “The Consortium Standard and Patent Pools”, The Economic Review, 2004, 
vol. 55, p. 346 et seq. 
532  This phenomenon is particularly visible in the American system, where the commercializa-
tion of knowledge is frequently nurtured by the input of universities and research institutions, 
where the start-up process takes place before finding its way in the business.  In this sense 
and more specifically on the emergence of the so-called “triple helix” model, linking univer-
sities, industries and governments for the purpose of fostering innovation, see: Etzkowitz H., 
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fore, a biotechnology patent pool should promote public-private collaboration 
and eventually also encourage said institutions to participate in the consor-
tium.533 In this context, although more influential companies and government 
agencies may play a key role in launching and, possibly, partly financing the 
setting up of the initiative, it is important that the patent pool maintains its own 
character and independence, in terms of trustees and management. For this rea-
son, it is fundamental that the consortium, once operating, may in the medium-
long run rely on its own sources of auto-sustainment: concretely, the pool could 
be supported by contributions of its members, as consideration for the services 
provided, including an annual fee or, eventually, even a percentage of royalties 
received from the undertaken licensing activities - conceivably with an advan-
taged, discounted rate in order to facilitate the involvement of universities and 
public institutions that will likely play a minor role in the marketing and com-
mercialization of the invention at issue. 
• Finally, the end product incorporating the technologies contributed to the pool, 
characterized by a longer maturation cycle, may often not yet exist at the time of 
the consortium’s creation, and rather be developed by the participating parties as 
a result of collaborative research and development’s efforts.534  
This last point is likely to make pool members more susceptible to the fear of a 
prospective antitrust scrutiny, because said longer product development phase, 
which is typically not yet initiated at the time of the pool establishment, renders the 
pre-assessment of the highly recommended “complementary” nature of the still to be 
patented technologies, which are to be eventually assembled, even more uncer-
tain.535 
As far as the premises for the establishment of a biotechnology pool are con-
cerned, the necessary points to be checked may be summarized as follows: 
• Multiple patent holders: pooling agreements are typically concluded to remove 
the “stacking” problem caused by a multitude of patents being owned by a va-
riety of holders. Intuitively, the model therefore seems inappropriate when a 
 
“The Triple Helix: University-Industry-Government - Innovation in Action”, Business & 
Economics, 2008. For a wide assessment of public-private partnerships in a broad range of 
policy areas, see: Vaillancourt Rosenau P., “Public-Private Policy Partnerships”, MIT Press, 
2000. 
533  For a legal and economic analysis of IP collaborative models in the context of life sciences, 
see i.a.: Schimmelpfennig D. et al., “Public-Private Collaboration in Agricultural Research: 
New Institutional Arrangements and Economic Implications”, Wiley-Blackwell, 2000; Zil-
berman D. et al., “The Public-Private Structure of Intellectual Property Ownership in Agricul-
tural Biotechnology”, Nature Biotechnology, 2003, vol. 21, p. 989 et seq. 
534  Gaulé P., “Towards Patent Pools in Biotechnology?”, Innovation Strategy Today, April 2006, 
vol. 2, p. 123 et seq.  
535  The need to avoid to pool “substitute” – as opposed to “complementary” – technologies is 
thoroughly analyzed when outlining the fundamental requirements prescribed by the patent 
pools guidelines in the different jurisdictions (i.e. EU, US and Japan) dealt with within the 
scope of this contribution. 
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single person or entity owns all the rights under a given technology, as for in-
stance when one holder controls all patents relevant for the genetic testing for a 
particular disease.536 Coherently, the biotech cases discussed here all involve 
multiple patents in the hands of a plurality of owners.   
In this perspective, given their high potential for solving stacking licenses, patent 
pools may prove particularly helpful in those areas of genetic testing characterized 
by diseases caused either by multiple defects in a single gene or by one or more de-
fects in a multitude of genes, for which complex genetic associations have been dis-
covered, thus a larger thicket is likely to take shape. 
• Collaborative attitude: patent pools strongly rely on the voluntary commitment 
of all patent owners; therefore they cannot offer a viable solution in all those 
cases where the technology holders are not open to grant licenses on RAND 
terms or, even, they do not wish to grant any license at all in virtue of their sta-
tutory exclusive rights.537 Illustratively, in both the Golden Rice and the SARS 
instances, voluntary negotiations have been effectively undertaken and proven 
successful. Conversely, a “compulsory patent pool” - in which an administering 
body would seek a compulsory license for the essential technologies from all 
patent holders that do not voluntary engage in the pool - is in contradictions 
with the collaborative mechanisms that have emerged in the practice of those 
consortia.  
In order to foster collaboration among different patent holders, a valuable incen-
tive could be effectively provided by the emergence of standards for good practices 
in medical and laboratory genetics, which should be strongly encouraged. These 
standards are not the same as those conventionally defined within the electronic or 
the telecommunication sectors, but have instead to be understood, for instance when 
applied within the scope of genetic testing, either as a “set of mutations publicly 
recognized by the international scientific community” or “reflecting national and 
international best practice guidelines for genetic testing for a particular disease”.538 
• Financial coverage: finally the ultimate incentive for attracting all parties into a 
patent pool is the likelihood of making profit; in fact, in order for a consortium 
to prove effective, the right balance has to be achieved between the costs for fi-
nancing the establishment of the pool - which may be very high, especially in 
the initial phases -on the one hand and, on the other hand, the prospects of gene-
rating an overall adequate revenue by collecting royalties on the contracted 
 
536  Mars J., et al., “Diagnostic testing fails the test”, Nature, 2002, vol. 415, p. 577 et seq. 
537  On the problem of deficient participation in patent pools, where it has been empirically dem-
onstrated that between half and two-thirds of the eligible firms decide not to join the consor-
tium, as conclusive founding, see more generally: Lerner J. et al., “To Join or Not to Join: 
Examining Patent Pool Participation and Rent Sharing Rules”, January 2008, available 
through the Social Science Research Network at:  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=945189  
538  Ebersole J., et al., “Patent Pools and Standard Setting in Diagnostic Genetics”, National Bio-
technology, 2005, 23, p. 937 et seq. 
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product. Under this aspect, it remains to be seen whether, for instance, diagnos-
tic-gene consortia covering only one particular disease syndrome will reach 
such a balance. Ultimately, while, on the one hand, patent pools might constitute 
the ideal means for raising the visibility and accessibility of smaller genetic la-
boratories, thus increasing the amount of collected license fees and consequently 
bridging the gap between potential and actual revenue, on the other hand, it re-
mains to be seen up to which extent small size patent pools will prove viable in 
the first place. 
2. The Issue of Funding 
This last point deserves particular consideration, as the perspective of gaining an 
economic and competitive edge is finally the drive for setting the whole pooling me-
chanism in going.539 However, while commercial solvency is at a time a prerequisite 
and, for good times, also an incentive for a patent pool to stay viable, this is not the 
only and primary goal pursued by such collaborative entities.  
Indeed, good tailored patent pools in the biotechnology field could well serve so-
cietal public health purposes, as well. This is well illustrated by the Golden Rice 
case, where the end product, duly enriched with ß-carotene, was transferred to de-
veloping countries at no cost in order to obviate nutritional deficiencies in those re-
gions. That agreement was a superlative example of how private and public organi-
zations dealt in a combined effort with the relevant patents by creating a non-profit 
humanitarian patent pool under a single licensing authority.540 The possible public 
goal beyond the creation of a consortium is, in fact, the reason why, besides the pa-
tent holders typically involved as shareholders and financiers of the pool, various 
governmental and non-governmental institutions - such as the already frequently 
mentioned WHO,541 the OECD542 or the HUGO,543 as well as professional entities, 
such as both the European and the American Society for Human Genetics544 - might 
eventually act to promote, by means of substantial support, the effective establish-
ment of patent pools in the life sciences domain. In this respect, the need for public 
subsidies for comprehensive biotechnology projects, serving also the cause of de-
 
539  For a discussion on the issue, see: Krattinger A., “Financing the Bioindustry and Facilitating 
Technology Transfer”, IP Strategy Today, 2004, vol. 8, p. 1 et seq. 
540  On the topic, see: Graff G., et al., “The Public-Private Structure of Intellectual Property 
Ownership in Agricultural Biotechnology”, National Biotechnology, 2003, 21, p. 989 et seq.; 
and Parish R., “Using the Industry Model to Create Physical Science Patent Pools among 
Academic Institutions”, Journal of the Association of University Technology Managers, 
2003, 15, p. 65 et seq. 
541  The World Health Organization: http://www.who.int/en/  
542  The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: http://www.oecd.org  
543  The Human Genome Organization: http://www.hugo-international.org  
544  See respectively: http://www.eshg.org and http://www.ashg.org/genetics/ashg/ashgmenu.htm 
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veloping nations, was ultimately advocated in a report for the ICTSD545 on intellec-
tual property and sustainable development issued in February 2007.546 
From a practical angle, in order to fulfil the named public goals and to prevent the 
establishment of patent pools to become prohibitively expensive - especially for 
smaller and highly specialized entities and mainly as a result of the costly expertise 
required for the setting-up process - an appeal may be addressed to such public-
profile and professional institutions to aid the creation of “key-patent pools”, en-
compassing essential innovations for a given biotechnological domain, to overcome 
patent access barriers which may impair “vital” innovation. In fact, funding from 
such organization, while typically remaining within the scopes of their institutional 
goals, would reward IP collaborative efforts and at the same time provide a substan-
tial platform for the establishment of such practices, thus supporting and effectively 
encouraging collaboration in this delicate scientific field at the crossroad between 
life and technology. 
Indeed, already in the context of the above-mentioned STS Forum,547 attention 
has been drawn on the fact that the benefits of science and technology are not reach-
ing a major part of people in the world, where barriers to seizing the opportunities 
for using innovative solutions to solve global problems need to be removed. As it 
has been properly highlighted, because today problems are becoming increasingly 
complex against the backdrop of globalisation and international competition, they 
are beyond the control of any single country or of the scientific community alone, 
since for many issues an actual solution can only be found through changes in the 
social systems and mutual cooperation. Within this composite setting, the view is 
taken that funding by socially committed institutions, such as governmental agencies 
or non-profit foundations, may well represent an important catalyser for collabora-
tive IP approaches, backing the establishment of said consortia particularly in those 
technological domains where public concerns priorities may become an issue.  
In fact, whereas research and development itself is already a traditional area for 
investments, patent pooling mechanisms involved in the realization of innovative 
solutions still do not receive the same kind of consideration. Nevertheless, science, 
as a branch of knowledge, is inherently linked to its practical implementation in the 
marketplace, thus, in order to remove barriers to technology access, investments 
should also cover collaborative frameworks established to foster dialogue and ex-
change between firms and research institutions concurrently involved in specific 
technological endeavours.  
 
545  The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development: http://www.ictsd.org  
546  Barton J., “New Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for National and International 
Policy”, ICTSD Program on IPRs and Sustainable Development, February 2007, Issue Paper 
no. 18, p. 16, also available at:  
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Barton%20-%20New%20Trends%20Technology%
20Transfer%200207.pdf  
547  Science and Technology in Society Forum, “Lights and Shadows - Fundamental Concepts”, 
available at: http://www.stsforum.org/fp.htm  
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This is a less explored area for funding that, all the same, seems to present a great 
potential not only to encourage a more constructive cooperative spirit among patent 
holders, but also to promote the dissemination of scientific applications to ultimately 
benefit the public at large, through centrally managed collaborative IP mechanisms 
providing for standardized, fair and non-discriminatory conditions of access to the 
pooled technologies. Seemingly in accordance with these views, the STS Forum has 
expressed the need for “major investment in infrastructure”,548 as a concrete, institu-
tional premise for effective, international cooperation. Therefore, investments for the 
progress of sciences should extend to embrace the operative, managerial framework, 
as constituted by the establishment of consortia, needed to optimise and spread tech-
nological achievements, eventually making innovative solutions not only possible, 
but also widely accessible.  
From a wider perspective, the concrete prospects of implementing collaborative 
IP mechanisms have eventually brought into the limelight the potential for new re-
warding opportunities. In fact, overcoming some traditional hostility549 and ac-
knowledging the economic and strategic importance won by collaborative IP licens-
ing models, nowadays patent pools and collective rights management mechanisms 
have been attracting more and more interest also within the international arena, be-
ing addressed as possible solutions to the problem of highly fragmented patent 
rights, characterizing vast areas of the actual biotechnology landscape.  
Indeed, the patent pool formula was explicitly mentioned as offering viable solu-
tions also within the domain of life sciences, as affirmed at different formal occur-
rences by high-profile institutions such as the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) in 2000,550 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2003551 and the 
World Health Organization (WHO) both in 2005552 and 2006.553 On this latter occa-
sion, in particular, the WHO suggestively concluded that: “patent pools of upstream 
technologies may be useful in some circumstances to promote innovation relevant to 
developing countries. WHO and WIPO should consider playing a bigger role in 
promoting such arrangements”. Thereby, the opportunity of committing public funds 
 
548  Atlas R., Speech at the Plenary Session “Emerging Infectious Diseases Requiring Global So-
lutions”, Third Annual Meeting of the STS Forum, September 11, 2006, Kyoto, Japan, avail-
able at: http://www.stsforum.org/session_pdf/PL204-RonaldAtlas.pdf 
549  In particular, referring to the old antitrust suspicion of arising anti-competitive concerns as a 
consequence of the aggregation of multiple rights, as examined more in general in the Intro-
duction, when dealing with the interface between IP rights and antitrust law. 
550  USPTO, “Patent Pools: a Solution to the Problem of Access to Biotechnology Patents?”, 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, December 2000. 
551  Federal Trade Commission, “To Promote Innovation: the Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law”, Report, October 2003, Executive Summary, available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf 
552  WHO, “Genetics, Genomics and the Patenting of DNA: Review of Potential Implications for 
Health in Developing Countries”, World Health Organization, Genetic Program, 2005. 
553  WHO, “Public Health, Innovation and IP Rights”, Report of the Commission on IP Rights, 
Innovation and Public Health, World Health Organization, 2006. 
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for promoting access to key-technologies, namely by setting up collaborative IP 
models, was also called upon. 
In fact, obstacles to the freedom to operate within the delicate sphere of life 
science, and the consequent drag on vital innovations, need a quick response, espe-
cially when involving major public health cases, i.a. pandemics such as SARS554 or 
swine influenza555. In this respect, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)556 provides an influential forum to deal with such issues: in 
fact, within the OECD the governments of the leading market democracies work to-
gether to address the economic, social and governance challenges of globalisation, 
as well as to exploit its opportunities, by offering a setting to compare policy expe-
riences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and co-ordinate 
domestic and international policies.557  
In such setting, a workshop dedicated to “Genetic Inventions, IP rights and Li-
censing Practices” was hosted in Berlin at the beginning of 2002: here substantial 
consideration was given to whether clearing house-type mechanisms may be an ap-
propriate solution to facilitate patent access and whether they may be also success-
fully applied to the life sciences field, with a view to the feasibility and challenges of 
such an undertaking.558 Indeed, the central question addressed was whether and to 
which extent patent pool and similar models could be applied to genetic inventions, 
and subsequently whether such collaborative IP schemes may lead to the expected 
benefits, in view of optimising the resources available within a particular industry.  
In an attempt to fully address the issue, the OECD subsequently hosted a work-
shop specifically dedicated to collaborative models to ensure IP access, with a par-
ticular focus on the role of patent pools, patent clearinghouses and other collabora-
tive schemes in the field of biotechnology and human health.559 Taking steps from 
 
554  Simon J., et al., “Managing severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) intellectual property 
rights: the possible role of patent pooling”, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 83, 
2005, p. 707 et seq., also available at: http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/83/9/707.pdf 
555  For an outline of the recent outbreak, see i.a.: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
“CDC Health Update: Swine Influenza A (H1N1) Update: New Interim Recommendations 
and Guidance for Health Directors about Strategic National Stockpile Materiel”, Health Alert 
Network, April 2009, also available at: http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/HAN/042609.htm; for 
an overview, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swine_influenza  
556  For the OECD homepage see: http://www.oecd.org  
557  Twenty countries originally signed the Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development on 14 December 1960. Since then a further ten countries have 
become members of the Organization. The Member countries of the Organization and the 
dates on which they deposited their instruments of ratification can be found at:  
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html 
558  Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), “Genetic Inventions, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices”, Report of a workshop organized by the 
OECD Working Party on Biotechnology, Berlin, January 24-25, 2002, available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf 
559  International Workshop on “Collaborative Mechanisms: Ensuring Access”, Washington D.C., 
December 8-9, 2005. For an outline of the discussions arisen, see:  
http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649_34537_39406921_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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the experience of patent pools in fields other than life sciences, the convening parties 
closely focused on the potential of establishing positive technology pooling practices 
in the field of biotechnology, particularly for genomic and genetic applications. In 
this respect, in order to ultimately ascertain how access to biotechnological innova-
tions may be facilitated, the viability of collaborative IP models in life sciences has 
been closely scrutinized and their positive potential for implementation has been 
eventually acknowledged.560  
Finally, in alignment with the view expressed by such internationally representa-
tive institutions, the belief is shared that companies positioned at the forefront of this 
rising collaborative IP trend, shall they prove able to strategically implement said 
cooperative strategies in compliance with the expected competitive standards, are 
going to shape the next era of commercial developments, hence paving the way to-
wards new, inspiring opportunities. Undoubtedly, opportunities also come along 
with challenges, but based on the learning and good practices established in this do-
main, as partly outlined through this contribution, this shall be a path worthy to fol-
low. 
 
560  The conclusions endorsed by the OECD about the positive potential of such collaborative IP 
mechanisms may be placed on the same line with those already reached through a previous 
workshop: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), “Genetic 
Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices”, Report of a workshop or-
ganized by the OECD Working Party on Biotechnology, Berlin, January 24-25, 2002, availa-
ble at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf 
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Chapter 6 The Alternative Approach of Clearinghouses: Distinctive 
Features and Applications in Biotechnology 
A. Defining Characteristics 
Clearinghouse mechanisms might constitute another approach to facilitate access 
to technological domains characterized by a high density of patent rights.561 Actual-
ly, the concept of a “clearing house” has gained more popularity in the entertainment 
industries, notoriously for the distribution of music, movies, software and similar 
products, as well as for the subsequent collection of the royalties connected with 
copyrights, from which the conventional term of “collecting societies” derives.562  
In a more general IP context, clearinghouses are basically administering facilities 
for the management of rights on behalf of their owners.563 Specifically relating to 
patent rights, the term might effectively bring to mind the underlying target of 
“clearing” the way through the “patent thicket” of overlapping IP rights, where such 
entities may act as intermediate agents between the multiple patent owners and the 
prospective licensees in the marketplace.564  
Drawing a consequent parallel with “tangible goods”, a clearinghouse may re-
semble a real estate agency: in fact here, other than in a patent pool, the right owners 
are not contractually bound to each other, but only by way of respective mandates to 
 
561  For a comprehensive review and comparison of patent pools and intellectual property clea-
ringhouses, as systems for promoting efficient access to licensable IP, thereby enhancing a 
market for technology, see: Aoki R., “Promoting Access to Intellectual Property: Patent 
Pools, Copyright Collectives, and Clearinghouses”, R&D Management, March 2008, vol. 38, 
issue 2, p. 189 et seq.  
562  In fact, the term “clearing house” originally comes from banking practices and refers to the 
mechanism by which cheques and bills are exchanged amongst members of the bank in order 
to finally transfer only the net balance in cash. Nowadays, the concept has gained a wider 
meaning as relating to any mechanism whereby providers and users of goods, services or in-
formation are suitably matched. See in this respect: Krattinger A., “Financing the Bioindustry 
and Facilitating Biotechnology Transfer”, Ithaca NY, USA, BioDevelopments-International 
Institute Inc., IP Strategy Today, 2004, vol. 8, p. 1 et seq. 
563  IP clearinghouses have made the object of attention of several recent studies, such as:  
Van Overwalle G. et al., “A Clearinghouse for Diagnostic Testing: the Solution to Ensure 
Access to and the Use of Patented Genetic Inventions?”, Bulletin of the World Trade Organi-
zation, 2006, vol. 84, issue 5, p. 352 et seq.; OECD, “Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Proper-
ty Rights and Licensing Practices: Evidence and Policies”, 2002, available at:  
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf; Graff G. and Zilberman D., “Towards an Intel-
lectual Property Clearinghouse for Ag-biotechnology”, IP Strategy Today, 2001, vol. 3, p. 1 
et seq. 
564  In fact, the idea of a clearinghouse as “a middleman in the market for technology that facili-
tates exchanges between IP owners and IP users” has been also expressed by: Aoki R., supra, 
fn. 561, p. 195.  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
168 
the administering entity. Accordingly, the distinct technology holders, only indepen-
dently from each other and pursuant to different patterns and level of commitment, 
entrust the management of their rights to the clearinghouse, this latter serving as sole 
unitary point of reference towards third parties and potential licensees willing to en-
gage in negotiations to eventually purchase one or more licenses, choosing from the 
clearinghouse’s “catalogue” of available offers.  
Therefore, it would not be completely correct, and somehow misleading, to refer 
to “members” of a clearinghouse - in the same way as you are normally not consi-
dered a “member” of a real estate agency for the mere fact that you put your house 
on sale or renting it out by entrusting it to such administering facility. Indeed, the 
concept of a membership normally presupposes a certain “communion of intent” 
among the participants, as is for instance the case when entering a patent pooling 
agreement. In this respect, although some high-profile academics that closely stu-
died such licensing schemes have expressly referred to both patent pools and clea-
ringhouses as “collaborative models for facilitating access to gene patents”,565 the 
latter attribute does not seem appropriate in this context. In fact, if on the one hand it 
is true that the patent owners represented by a clearinghouse have entrusted it with 
some competences in relation to their individual IP rights, certainly on a voluntary 
basis, on the other hand the alleged “collaboration”, if we may call it that way, 
would be eventually limited to the particular relationship between the single paten-
tee and the clearinghouse, within the scope of the respective administering mandate. 
Thus it would rather appear that a proper collaboration, which embraces an active 
and cooperative inter-connection among the patent holders involved, is not given 
here. 
Nonetheless, clearinghouses remain a potentially valuable mechanism for promot-
ing and facilitating access to key patented technologies - and are on this ground ac-
cordingly included within the scope of the present contribution. In fact, facilitating 
and promoting access to a patented technology is a honourable goal in itself, particu-
larly within an inevitably “imperfect” market. As has also been pointed out in a re-
cent academic report,566 it is to be expected that so called “information asymmetries” 
and uncertainties over the value, breath and validity of patents represent factual 
“trade barriers” and can ultimately represent obstacles to the actual conclusion of 
agreements between patent owners and potential licensees, thereby impairing poten-
tially successful technology transactions.  
Such “market imperfections” - impairing the communication between different 
market players, for instance on the availability and request of given technologies, 
 
565  See the Presentation held by Van Overwalle G., “Collaborative Models for Facilitating 
Access to Gene Patents: Patent Pools and Clearing Houses”, Centre for Intellectual Property 
Rights of the University of Leuven, Utrecht, CIER-lectures, February 2006, also available at: 
http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/cier/nl/documentatie/ 
CIER%20lezing%2015-02-2006%20Utrecht.pdf  
566  Gaulé P., “Towards Patent Pools in Biotechnology?”, CEMI Report, April 2006, p. 12. Also 
available at: http://infoscience.epfl.ch/getfile.py?recid=85505&mode=best  
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respectively, i.e. in terms of “offers” and “demands” - interfere with potentially 
gainful negotiations that would otherwise occur in an ideal, perfectly functional and 
transparent marketplace. Because this situation is eventually detrimental to innova-
tion and technological advancements, hindering the well functioning of economic 
transactions, this contribution values mechanisms and common practices, such as 
patent pools and clearinghouses, that may in different ways facilitate the conclusion 
of such transactions, by conveniently “matching” market’s offers and demands, by 
ensuring non-discriminatory access to available key technologies.567 
In this context and in order to explore the viability and convenience of such mod-
els, concrete examples of clearinghouses, particularly dealing with patented technol-
ogies in the field of life sciences,568 will be provided in the following sections of this 
contribution. 
B. Models and Applications 
In the following section this contribution will explore and distinguish a certain 
number of IP collecting society models. Accordingly, we will provide some selected 
instances of actual or considered applications of such models dealing with patented 
technologies, as established in the field of life sciences.569 The current different tem-
plates identified in the next paragraphs will be subsequently complemented by some 
concrete instances of how these have been implemented in practice.570 
 
567  In this respect, clearinghouses have been effectively accredited for providing a “matching 
service” of varying degrees of sophistications between IP owners and users, ultimately by: 
Aoki R., supra, fn. 561, p. 202.  
568  For a broad overview and analytical assessment on the matter, see i.a.: Hope J. et al., “Coop-
erative Strategies for Facilitating the Use of Patented Inventions in Biotechnology”, In: Rim-
mer M., “Patent Law and Biological Inventions”, Federation Press, 2006, Law in Context, 
vol. 24, p. 85 et seq. 
569  For an overview, see i.a.: Rimmer M., “Patent Law and Biological Inventions” – “Clearing 
House Mechanisms”, Science, The Federation Press, 2006, p. 93 et seq.: Graff G. et al., “To-
wards an Intellectual Property Clearinghouse for Agricultural Biotechnology”, Agricultural 
Biodiversity and Biotechnology in Economic Development, May 2006, vol. 27, p. 387 et seq. 
570  For a detailed systematization of clearinghouses, refer to: Van Overwalle G., et al., “Models 
for Facilitating Access to Patents on Genetic Inventions”, Nature Reviews - Genetics, Nature 
Publishing Group, February 2006, vol. 7, p. 143 et seq. Moreover, for a complementary view, 
mainly distinguishing two bigger functional types of clearinghouses, namely “Informational 
Clearinghouses” and “Licensing Clearinghouses”, depending on whether or not they provide 
licenses to IP users directly, see: Aoki R., “Promoting Access to Intellectual Property: Patent 
Pools, Copyright Collectives, and Clearinghouses”, R&D Management, March 2008, vol. 38, 
issue 2, p. 196 et seq. 
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I. Information Clearinghouse 
The first and simplest model we ought to take into consideration is the informa-
tion clearinghouse, which provides a common platform for exchanging technical in-
formation and mostly includes data related to the IP status of the technologies in-
volved, if they are covered by a patent or even a published patent application. Whe-
reas said information mechanisms are relatively easy to set up, they require constant 
maintenance and updating, as is notoriously the case for all sorts of databases in or-
der for them to be a truly valuable source of current information.  
Although this type of clearinghouse represents the simplest form of IP administra-
tion and is quite limited in its purpose - mainly providing convenient access to a big 
variety of patent data, while leaving further contractual deals and business ap-
proaches to the free initiative of interested parties – in principle the value of its ba-
sic, fundamental role, namely enhancing the “visibility” of related data, shall not be 
undermined.571 Nevertheless, taking a pragmatic approach, given the very defined 
scope of the model in consideration, its effective usefulness will greatly depend both 
on an extensive coverage of patent-related data and on the reliability of the status of 
the information provided. 
1. Biosafety Clearing-House 
Within the framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),572 
signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and entered into force on 29 
December 1993,573 whose main objective is to promote national strategies for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, a noteworthy initiative was 
the establishment of a so-called “Clearing-House Mechanism” (CHM)574 to ensure 
that governments world-wide are granted access to the information and technologies 
they need for their work on biodiversity.575 Indeed, pursuant to Art. 18 of the Con-
 
571  On information clearinghouses, see i.a.: Skorohod O., “Biotechnology Transfers and Models 
Facilitate Access to Biotechnological Inventions”, In: Friedman Y. “Best Practices in Bio-
technology Business Development”, Logos Press, 2008, p. 129. 
572  Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, complete text available at:  
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf ; for an overview of the articles, see:  
http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml  
573  For the reference, see: http://www.cbd.int/history  
574  For a complete introduction to the Clearing House Mechanism, see:  
http://www.cbd.int/chm/intro  
575  On the issue of biodiversity from an IP perspective, see i.a.: Straus J., “Biodiversity and Intel-
lectual Property”, in: Hill K.M., Takenaka T. and Takeuchi K. (Eds.), Rethinking Internation-
al Intellectual Property -Biodiversity & Developing Countries, Extraterritorial Enforcement, 
the Grace Period and other Issues, CASRIP Publication Series No. 6, Seattle, 2001, p. 141 et 
seq.; Straus J., “Biodiversity and Intellectual Property”, Yearbook of AIPPI, 1998, IX, p. 99 
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vention,576 its mission shall be the promotion and facilitation of technical and scien-
tific cooperation within and between countries, also encouraging the participation of 
indigenous communities, by developing a global mechanism for exchanging and in-
tegrating information on biodiversity.577  
In this context, an important step has been the creation of a central portal in order 
to support the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, adopted on January 2000 and en-
tered into force on 11 September 2003, which integrates the CBD578 by supplement-
ing it with some special precautionary provisions about living modified organisms 
(LMOs) resulting from modern biotechnology.579  
Accordingly, Article 20 of the Biosafety Protocol580 established a Biosafety 
Clearing-House (BCH) as part of the Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM) of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), in order to:   
• Facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal informa-
tion on, and experience with, living modified organisms; and 
• Assist parties to implement the Protocol, taking into account the special needs of 
developing country Parties, in particular the least developed and small island 
developing States among them, and countries with economies in transition as 
well as countries that are centres of origin and centres of genetic diversity. 
The BCH fulfils its mandate by providing a dynamic platform where information 
is registered through the Management Centre and where it can be easily searched 
and retrieved.581 
Therefore, the BCH well fits the role-model of an information exchange organ-
ism, providing for a “one-stop shop” where users can readily access or contribute 
relevant biosafety-related data. Nevertheless, a peculiarity is that BCH is organized 
in the form of a decentralized system, as the users themselves may effectively up-
date information through an authenticated, online system to ensure timeliness and 
accuracy.582 
 
et seq., also available at:  
http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Symposium/Number6/Straus.pdf  
576  For the full text of Article 18, see: http://www.cbd.int/convention/articles.shtml?a=cbd-18  
577  For more information, see: http://www.biodiv.org/chm/default.aspx  
578  In particolar, Art. 19, para. 3 of the Convention provides that: “The Parties shall consider the 
need for and modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate procedures, including, in particu-
lar, advance informed agreement, in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any liv-
ing modified organism resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the con-
servation and sustainable use of biological diversity”. For the full text of the article, see: 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/articles.shtml?a=cbd-19  
579  For a complete introduction on the Caratgena Protocol on Biosafety, see:  
http://www.cbd.int/biosafety  
580  For the full text of the article, see: http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/article.shtml?a=cpb-20  
581  For a complete introduction on the Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH) and its modalities of 
operation, see: http://bch.cbd.int/about  
582  McLean K., “Bridging the Gap between Researchers and Policy-Makers: International Colla-
boration through the Biosafety Clearing-House”, Environmental Biosafety Research, 2005, 
vol. 4, p. 123 et seq. 
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The Secretariat of the Convention, based in Montreal, Canada, has been estab-
lished to support the goals of the Convention, as well as of its Protocol. One of its 
main tasks is to provide administrative assistance to member governments in the im-
plementation of the various programmes of work, to coordinate with other interna-
tional organizations and, eventually, to collect and disseminate information.583 
On balance, some tangible, positive results have been shown through the estab-
lishment of so-called “National Focal Points” (NFP) to the CHM, who shall ensure 
the implementation of the Convention at different national-levels.584 
Finally, allowing a more comprehensive, objective appraisal of the goals effec-
tively attained by the organization, once a year the Secretariat reports on the opera-
tion of the Biosafety Clearing-House. In this context, primary data, such as the num-
ber and regional distribution of NFPs, as well as the account of records made availa-
ble through the BCH, are made freely accessible through a public online platform. In 
particular, here detailed reports on the activities and partnership arrangements that 
have been entered into, as well as feedback provided by Parties and other Govern-
ments on their experiences with the operation of the BCH, are also available.585 
This transparent approach permits an easy, straightforward appraisal of the use-
fulness and success of the clearinghouse mechanism in consideration, which - al-
though certainly investing a mere “enabling role” towards third party organizations 
wishing to access relevant technological data or, eventually, to enter into profitable 
partnerships - shall be ultimately “measured” against the tangible results effectively 
attained. 
2. CAMBIA’s Patent Lens 
As far as biotechnology matters are more closely concerned, there are specific life 
sciences search sites and databases, such as Patent Lens,586 offering a platform to 
gather biotechnology-related information worldwide. Said platform has been estab-
lished within the framework of the so-called CAMBIA’s BIOS (Biological Innova-
tion for Open Society) Initiative and provides a full-text searchable database of Eu-
ropean, US and PCT based patents in the domain of life sciences, eventually com-
plemented with educational and advisory services. 
 
583  For an outline of the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity and its tasks, see: 
http://www.cbd.int/secretariat  
584  The progress on the establishment of such national partnerships can be monitored on the BCH 
website at: http://www.cbd.int/chm/partners  
585  The public portal on BCH’s reports and reviews is freely accessible at:  
http://bch.cbd.int/about/reporting_bch.shtml  
586  For related information, see: http://www.cambia.org/daisy/bios/50 or  
http://www.patentlens.com/daisy/patentlens/patentlens.html  
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CAMBIA (acronym for “Centre for the Application of Molecular Biology to In-
ternational Agriculture”)587 is an international, independent, non-profit plant bio-
technology research institute, founded in 1992 and based in Canberra, Australia, 
whose stated goal is to create new enabling tools to foster innovation in life sciences 
while maintaining a spirit of collaboration.588 In fact, in Spanish and Italian, CAM-
BIA means “change”, and it might be assumed that this meaning shall be at the very 
heart of its mission.  
More specifically, CAMBIA's BIOS Initiative aimed at exploring new R&D pa-
radigms, practices and policies for addressing neglected priorities of disadvantaged 
communities by fostering local commitment to achieve long-lasting solutions for the 
challenges of food security, agricultural productivity, human and animal health and 
natural resource management.589 
Because open innovation starts with and depends on “transparency” in the patent 
system, CAMBIA's Patent Lens intend to provide tools to make the patent land-
scapes more intelligible, eventually to help focusing paths that lead to freedom of 
co-operation. Indeed, these tools include an independent, public good global re-
source which points to patent documents from the EPO, the USPTO and the PCT, 
covering more than 5,5 million documents in a format that is fully integrated and 
searchable, and receiving regular updates of additional patent applications by sub-
scriptions also from national offices and the WIPO.  
In the context of CAMBIA’s broader mission, Patent Lens ought to be integrated 
and coordinated with other important services offered by its umbrella organization 
in the biotechnology domain, such as BioForge and BiOS Licenses, to which we 
will dedicate the proper attention in the following.590  
Nevertheless, endorsing a certain dose of pragmatism, it is clear that the effective 
utility of this sort of initiatives, based on the exchange of information, greatly de-
pends on the quality and on the level of accuracy of the information collected, as 
well as on its coverage, both in terms of relevant technologies gathered and, even-
tually, of active users appealed. Unfortunately, on this fundamental level, it is diffi-
cult to make a comprehensive assessment, missing a reliable feedback.591 
 
587  For the official website, see: http://www.cambia.org  
588  The BIOS (Biological Innovation for Open Society) Initiative has been supported by public-
oriented institutions, in primis the Rockefeller Foundation.  
589  For a critical assessment of the underlying business model, see i.a.: Elkington J. et al., “Lead-
ing Sustainable and Scalable Change”, “Democratizing Technology”, In: “The Power of Un-
reasonable People: How Social Entrepreneurs Create Markets that Change the World - Lea-
dership for the Common Good”, Harvard Business Press, 2008, p. 137 et seq. 
590  For a descriptive overview, see: http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html  
591  This evaluation follows a personal attempt to gather tangible, practical evidence by specifical-
ly addressing the representatives of the organization in order to provide for reliable references 
supporting the institutional goals proclaimed. Regrettably, the feedback received has been 
evasive and non-satisfactory in this respect. 
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II. Technology Exchange Clearinghouse 
The second model identified is the so-called technology exchange clearinghouse, 
representing a more advanced stage with respect to the paradigm of a simple infor-
mation clearinghouse and basically inspired by the widespread Internet business-to-
business (B2B) basic scheme. B2B stands for transaction activities between two 
business entities, as generally opposed to B2C, i.e. business-to-consumer, involving 
a transaction between a business, on the one hand, and a consumer, on the other 
hand.592 Although the term B2B could also be used for conventional commerce, it 
normally refers to the exchange of goods or services between companies over the 
Internet, mostly in connection with e-commerce and advertising, when targeting 
businesses rather than end-consumers. B2B platforms may encompass not only 
commodity exchanges and wholesale supplies on the Internet, but virtual auctions, 
as well. 
In fact, a technology exchange clearinghouse represents a sort of further devel-
opment of the previous model, as described above.593 Indeed, such entity not only 
administers the collection and exchange of current information on available technol-
ogies in a given domain, so as to facilitate access and retrieval of relevant IP data, 
but also actively encourages the partnering between technology holders and prospec-
tive licensees by providing the input and professional counsel in order to initiate ne-
gotiations to reach a licensing agreement, coupled by optional more comprehensive 
mediating and managing services - thus reproducing a business-to-business (B2B) 
scheme, as outlined above.594 
1. BirchBob 
An example of global technology exchange model is BirchBob,595 an Internet 
platform established in 2003 that seeks to bring together offers and demands for in-
novative technologies, complemented by specific services devoted to tracking and 
facilitating contacts between patent holders and interested third party investors. The 
aim ultimately pursued is to assist corporations in identifying the innovations and 
 
592  For an outline on the B2B business method in as cooperative business model, see i.a.: De 
Maio H., “B2B and Beyond: New Business Models Built on Trust”, John Wiley and Sons, 
2001. 
593  For a clear outlook on the model at hand, see i.a.: Skorohod O., “Biotechnology Transfers and 
Models Facilitate Access to Biotechnological Inventions”, In: Friedman Y. “Best Practices in 
Biotechnology Business Development”, Logos Press, 2008, p. 127 et seq. 
594  For a broader analytical assessment on the model adopted, see i.a.: De George R., “The Ethics 
of Information Technology and Business”, Foundations of Business Ethics, 3, Wiley-
Blackwell, 2003. 
595  The name “BirchBob” shall be a tribute to Birch Bayh and Bob Dole, authors of the Bayh-
Dole Act (USA, 1980), as reported in: http://www.birchbob.com/corporate.htm. For the offi-
cial home page, see: http://www.birchbob.com/index.asp  
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technology partners to create strategic “R&D Alliances”, thereby fostering business 
developments. 
Specifically, BirchBob shall assist in purchasing, selling or licensing IP innova-
tions in the marketplace, respectively, as well as eventually structuring collaborative 
R&D projects by establishing “ad hoc” business partnerships. This institutional goal 
shall be facilitated through a network for active technology producers, available in 
52 countries, including corporate entities. Indeed, BirchBob's current database relies 
on more than 40.000 technologies from about 2,000 organizations worldwide.596 
Additionally, complementary services include prior art searches, valuation and ben-
chmarking of IP rights, incubation of R&D and spin-off projects, as well as their 
structuring and management. 
Eventually, such entity considers itself as a sort of “innovation gateway” using its 
global network to screen and foster new business or scientific opportunities, even-
tually providing professional expertise as well as operational support. 597 However, 
tangible evidence is missing as to which strategic R&D alliances, in concrete, were 
fostered as direct a result of BirchBob’s proclaimed endeavours. In fact, an attempt 
to gather some practical feedback in this respect was frustrated by the claimed need 
of protecting private, confidential information, which is not entirely convincing 
when considering the positive implications of such partnerships in terms of publicity 
and purported effectiveness of BirchBob’s engaged networking efforts.598 
2. Pharmalicensing 
Now, as far as specific healthcare technology platforms are concerned, both 
Pharmalicensing599 and TechEx600 shall be mentioned, as divisions of the UTEK 
Corporation, a leading, market-driven technology transfer firm specifically provid-
ing online support for partnering and licensing of biopharmaceutical solutions, ulti-
 
596  As reported in: Skorohod O., “Biotechnology Transfers and Models Facilitate Access to Bio-
technological Inventions”, In: Friedman Y. “Best Practices in Biotechnology Business Devel-
opment”, Logos Press, 2008, p. 129. 
597  For an outline of BirchBob’s R&D approach, see:  
http://www.birchbob.com/BBWEBMANAGE/page.asp?id={73BC571C-F6C0-4EC9-8E11-
D770F92EDE2C}  
598  This evaluation follows a personal attempt to gather tangible, practical evidence by specifical-
ly addressing the representatives of the organization in order to provide for reliable references 
supporting the institutional goals proclaimed, i.e. to assist corporations in identifying the in-
novations and technology partners to create strategic R&D alliances, thereby fostering busi-
ness developments.  Regrettably, the feedback received has been evasive and non-satisfactory 
in this respect, claiming the need of protecting private, confidential information.  
599  For the official site, see: http://pharmalicensing.com  
600  For the official site, see: http://www.techex.com  
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mately aimed at enabling public companies to acquire innovative technologies from 
universities and research laboratories601. 
The former is since January 2008 a unit of UTEK Europe Ltd., a business devel-
opment company based in York, in the UK, implementing an open innovation busi-
ness model to foster strategic partnerships. Mainly Pharmalicensing relies on a pa-
tent database where the profiled out-licensing and in-licensing needs shall reflect the 
current market demands, giving a real-time transparent representation of the partner-
ing opportunities being offered.602  
The advertised opportunities are provided directly by the participating companies 
themselves, who shall be able to “profile” their out-licensing capabilities in a cor-
responding directory using a standardized intelligible form.  
On the other hand, seekers of technology and IP products may use the website 
free of charge to identify their needs by searching the available offers, as well as to 
“profile” their in-licensing needs, thereby allowing potential technology owners to 
eventually identify new options for their licensing strategy.603  
In this way, interested parties shall be able to make direct contact, using the on-
line platform to exchange further information, evaluate each other, negotiate and 
conclude deals off-line.  
The model has in fact proven quite successful,604 as shown by the great numbers 
of publications and users of such facilities embracing a great variety of professionals 
from the IP field, including - aside from major pharmaceutical and biotech corpora-
tions - business development and licensing strategists, CEOs, intellectual asset man-
agers, brokers, IP consultants and patent lawyers, extending the range of possible 
business transactions.605 
 
601  Prandelli E. et al., “Collaborating with Customers to Innovate: Conceiving and Marketing 
Products in the Networking Age”, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008, p. 102. 
602  For a portrait of the organization and a detailed description of its approach and functioning, 
focusing on the benefits of early stage strategic partnerships and licensing outsourcing, see: 
Pharmalicensing, “Early Stage and Discovery Deals: Strategy, Structure and Payment 
Terms”, Pharmalicensing, 2 ed., 2006; Ranson P., “Legal Aspects of Outsourcing Contracts 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry: A practical guide”, Pharmalicensing, 2006. 
603  For an outline of the business model adopted, see i.a.: Austin M., “Business Development for 
the Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industry”, “Profiling and Searching for Opportuni-
ties”, Gower Publishing, 2008, p. 65 et seq. 
604  For a case-study report of successful business practices fostered by Pharmalicensing, see: 
http://pharmalicensing.com/files/pdf/Pharmalicensing_Case_Studies.pdf  
605  The business developments and the technology alliances promoted by the Pharmalicensing 
have been broadly outlined and analytically reported in: Pharmalicensing, “The Licensing 
Agreement in Pharmaceutical Business Development”, Pharmalicensing, 3 ed., 2007. 
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3. TechEx 
Like Pharmalicensing, TechEx, standing for “Technology Exchange”, operates on 
the basis of a network of assembled IP resources, offering an online technology ex-
change platform where members can identify and introduce innovative solutions that 
are available for partnering.606 However, it is characterized and distinguished by its 
major expertise in the biomedical industry.  
Founded at Yale University, TechEx has been acquired by UTEK Corporation in 
May 2002. Its peculiar business model is aimed at facilitating the identification and 
acquisition of external technologies by clients in exchange for their equity in order 
to obtain a strategic marketplace advantage, while allowing the research institutions 
concerned to enjoy 100% of the incoming royalties. 607  
In this respect, TechEx is a source for emerging technologies in the biomedical 
field built on a proprietary communication platform called ScienceMatch, which is 
embedded in the online exchange platform that is used by technology holders as an 
extension of their licensing and business development efforts. The technologies at 
hand are compared to the interests of biotechnology development organizations to 
ensure a fast communication of biomedical breakthroughs.  
Currently, the organization features thousands inventions from over 600 corpora-
tions and about 350 research institutions.608 In this respect, TechEx has been por-
trayed as an accomplished example of “virtual knowledge broker”,609 although tra-
ceable, tangible results in terms of biotechnologies, bearing a certain market value 
and developed pursuant to TechEx’s involvement in this domain, are not specifically 
identified.610 
4. PIPRA 
Finally, in the area of clearinghouse models promoting biotechnology exchange, a 
special attention is dedicated to PIPRA, standing for Public Intellectual Property Re-
source for Agriculture.611 PIPRA is in fact grouping universities, foundations and 
non-profit research institutions and its major purpose is to make agricultural tech-
 
606  For the official website, see: http://www.utekcorp.com  
607  For an accurate outline of its functioning, see i.a.: Kulakowski E. et al., “Research Admini-
stration and Management”, Jones & Bartlett Publishers, 2006, p. 741-742. 
608  Prandelli E. et al., supra, fn. 601, p. 103. 
609  Id., “Virtual Knowledge Brokers”, p. 93 et seq. 
610  This evaluation follows a personal attempt to gather tangible, practical evidence by specifical-
ly addressing the representatives of the organization in order to provide for reliable references 
supporting the institutional goals proclaimed, i.e. facilitating the identification and acquisition 
of biotechnologies by clients. Regrettably, the feedback received has been evasive and non-
satisfactory in this respect. 
611  For the official website, see: http://www.pipra.org  
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nologies more easily available,612 in particular for development and distribution of 
subsistence crops for humanitarian purposes in the developing world, on the one 
hand, and specialty crops in the developed world, on the other hand.613  
Subsequently, the organizational model adopted has been stretched to other 
neighbouring areas, encompassing also energy, water and healthcare new technolo-
gy applications,614 as well as providing, aside its core business, an extensive series 
of complementary services related to IP assessment and education, in order remain 
competitive by meeting the evolving needs of its growing institutional network.615 
PIPRA’s original mandate is enabling access to patented technologies in order to 
overcome burdensome barriers to new crop developments,616 where patenting of 
agricultural biotechnologies has expanded at a faster pace over the last decades. In-
deed, publicly supported research continues to play a primary role in this sector. 
This is particularly true in developing countries, where public sector research institu-
tions are nearly the exclusive innovative force. However, said institutions have not 
yet developed the basic skills and infrastructure to effectively manage their in-house 
IP resources, thus confronting them with the problem that their research programs 
are hampered at the application stage, being unable to actually transfer their devel-
oped technologies for private sector’s implementations. 
In this respect, PIPRA’s primary objective is to promote access to agricultural 
technologies developed by public or private non-profit research institutions for both 
humanitarian and neglected commercial purposes, seeking to solve large-scale intel-
lectual property issues through a collaborative approach among its member institu-
tions, basically based on a common agreement to share their technologies and re-
search tools with each other and, eventually, make them available for third interested 
parties on equitable and non-discriminatory conditions.617 In other words, PIPRA is 
an organization committed to the strategic management and administration of pa-
 
612  For an introduction of PIPRA and its underlying philosophy, see i.a.: Boettiger S., Schubert 
K., “Agricultural Biotechnology and Developing Countries: The Public Intellectual Property 
Resource for Agriculture (PIPRA)”, Biodiversity and the Law: Earthscan, 2007; Benkler Y., 
“The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom, Yale 
University Press, 2006, p. 338 et seq. 
613  For an outline on PIPRA’s business model, see i.a.: Blakeney M., “Public Intellectual Proper-
ty Resource for Agriculture”, “Intellectual Property Rights and Food Security”, CABI, 2009, 
p. 231 et seq. 
614  Although concrete of successful applications in this respect is still missing, on account of the 
relatively recent expansion of PIPRA in these new areas. 
615  A current overview and description of PIPRA’s range of activities can be found at:  
http://www.pipra.org/en/about.en.html. 
On the new broader approach adopted, see also: Boettiger, S. and B. Wright, “Opportunities 
and Challenges for Open Source in Biotechnology”, Innovations 1(4), MIT Press, 2007. 
616  On the problem of access to agricultural biotechnology and the contribution of PIPRA, see 
i.a.: McManis  C., “Biodiversity and the Law: Intellectual Property, Biotechnology and Tradi-
tional Knowledge”, Earthscan, 2007, p. 13 et seq. 
617  More in general see in this respect, i.a.: Atkinson R. et al., “Intellectual Property Rights: Pub-
lic Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management”, Science, 2003, p. 174 et seq. 
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tents owned by its member institutions whose inspiring guideline consists in encour-
aging the broadest possible applications of existing and emerging agricultural tech-
nologies, mostly promoting the use of genetically modified crops.618  
Nevertheless, PIPRA does not subscribe to a single philosophy or approach in 
addressing IP issues.619 Instead, PIPRA chooses to employ a wide range of available 
IP management strategies, including open sources or, eventually, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory licensing conditions. PIPRA pragmatically adopts a rather flexi-
ble “modus operandi” for each individual case and selects the best available tools to 
tactically achieve the goals of the specific project dealt with, recognizing that tech-
nologies may have to be sourced from a broad range of public and private technolo-
gy developers having their own strategic objectives and priorities to be met. 
At the outset, discussion about PIPRA started when the McKnight620 and Rock-
efeller Foundations,621 both of them philanthropic institutions, identified in some 
critical IP issues a potential, but severe impediment to the delivery of research re-
sults and information to their intended recipients, namely poor farmers in developing 
countries. In the course of this debate, it became apparent how the same problematic 
issues were having a restrictive impact on the flow of agricultural biotechnology 
when it comes to smaller specialty crops, which have historically been an important 
domain of study for public researchers.  
A deeper analysis of the situation came to the conclusion that indeed almost 25% 
of US biotechnology innovations in the field of agriculture had been created thanks 
to the successful efforts of public and non-profit institutions. In fact, whereas on the 
one hand their common “public values” spoke in favour of a positive perspective on 
a “collaborative solution” to tackle the increasingly evident problem outlined here, 
on the other hand the targeted portfolio of inventions was highly fragmented across 
said institutions.622  
The ensuing discussions favourably pointed to the benefits of “collaborative ef-
forts” to identify and consequently regroup these jeopardized IP rights in order to 
develop a common framework of new biotechnologies incorporating the relevant 
innovations originating from said public sector institutions. These deliberations 
eventually led to the creation of PIPRA, which was charged with the concrete reali-
zation of these high-level objectives. In fact, the view is taken that the success of 
 
618  Along the same line and supporting PIPRA’s collaborative approach, see i.a.: Tansey G. et 
al., “The Future Control of Food: A Guide to International Negotiations and Rules on Intel-
lectual Property, Biodiversity and Food Security”, Earthscan, 2008, p. 193 et seq. 
619  PIPRA Executive Committee, “PIPRA, the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agricul-
ture - A Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management: Enabling Access to In-
tellectual Property for the Development of Improved Crops”, Intellectual Property Manage-
ment in Health and Innovation - A Handbook of Best Practices, Sample Chapters, October 
2006, p. 113 et seq., also available at: www.ipHandbook.org  
620  For the official website, see: www.mcknight.org  
621  For the official website, see: www.rockfound.org  
622  Along this line, see: Atkinson R. et al., “Intellectual Property Rights: Public Sector Collabo-
ration for Agricultural IP Management”, Science, 2003, p. 174 et seq. 
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such initiative largely depends on the peculiarity of the agricultural sector, which is 
widely characterized by the support through public funding,623 that helps to over-
come what I would call the “valuation impasse”, i.e. the deadlock situation typical of 
private investors having committed important economical resources of their own to 
the technologies eventually developed and, therefore, being rather reluctant to enter 
into the assessment phase that is preceding a collaborative agreement. From this 
perspective, agriculture seems indeed to be a sort of “privileged niche” for the here-
by-tested experimental feasibility and prosperity of technology pooling and, more 
generally, cooperative models within the wider biotechnology domain.624  
Besides, we should not neglect the consideration, mostly taken for granted, that 
food, as the product of agriculture, is fundamental to serve primary humanitarian 
purposes, therefore calling in first place for collaborative solutions, which are, for 
this very reason, generally underpinned by substantial public assistance, eventually 
materializing in the collective frameworks under consideration here. Taking a 
slightly different, but complementary approach, some authors have expressed the 
view that “PIPRA’s framework was successfully adopted by so many universities in 
part because the financial stakes in agriculture are relatively low and Land Grant 
Universities have a long history of publicly minded technology transfer in this sec-
tor”.625  
The question now is whether incentives exist for non-profit research institutions 
to sustain such collaborative framework in a technology sector other than agricul-
ture, with higher stakes involved, such as most notably the biomedical sciences. Ac-
tually, in order to tailor an effective, profitable solution for the specificity of each 
situation, the development of collaborative IP management strategies targeting the 
needs of publicly funded research institutions is strongly recommended. Indeed, the 
view is taken that the path towards scientific innovation is going through large-scale, 
multi-institutional projects requiring the employment of collaborative schemes to 
profitably manage their IP outputs, while overcoming individual barriers to the 
access to key-technologies. Concretely, a starting point as a condition for some of 
the major publicly funded research projects may be to require the prior effective de-
velopment of multi-institutional strategies of IP management, going beyond the 
eventual acknowledgement of joint inventorship. Finally, IP-specialized agencies 
should generally start to pay greater attention to the necessary coordination to enable 
the broadest access of research outputs, thus fostering the establishment of technolo-
gy clearinghouses in sectors threatened by the emergence of “anti-commons”, to ul-
 
623  Graff G., et al., “The Public–Private Structure of Intellectual Property Ownership in Agricul-
tural Biotechnology”, Nature Biotechnology, 2003, vol. 21, p. 989 et seq. 
624  Graff G., et al., “Towards an Intellectual Property Clearinghouse for Agricultural Biotech-
nology”, “Agricultural Biodiversity and Biotechnology in Economic Development”, May 
2006, vol. 27, p. 387 et seq. 
625  Bennett A., et al., “Bayh-Dole: if we knew then what we know now - Anticommons effects”, 
Nature Biotechnology, March 2006, vol. 24, n. 3, p. 322. 
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timately ensure that the public may continue to fully benefit from the innovations 
generated by publicly funded research. 
Now, as far as PIPRA's activities are concerned, the main task assumed is ad-
dressing IP policy concerns all the way through the creative chain up to the devel-
opment and eventual commercialisation of the final IP asset, focusing on the priori-
ties of public research activities in both developed and developing countries. There-
fore, we are not dealing with an ordinary IP administrative entity here, as is the case 
with a typical clearinghouse, because PIPRA is also actively engaged in the patent 
policy debate concerning, to a broader extent, the equitable allocation of technology 
assets worldwide. Thus, the main benefit provided is the reduction of IP hurdles that 
exist along the path from research, through development to final distribution, conse-
quently minimizing diversion of valuable resources from the core R&D activities 
that are to be carried on.626 
From a practical standpoint, first of all PIPRA assists scientists by primarily pro-
viding easy access, through an up-to-date comprehensive database, to information 
concerning the ownership and current availability of key technologies, i.e. their li-
censing status, commonly employed in the area of agriculture. The collection of re-
levant scientific data is coupled by in depth professional assistance and counselling 
on IP related issues, such as preliminary valuation of intangible assets and analysis 
of the legal boundaries of patent claims.  
Moreover, PIPRA is committed to the widespread commercialisation of the pub-
lic research results contributed by its member organizations, thus actively marketing 
their IP portfolio and, consequently, assisting in the negotiations of licenses between 
the represented patent holders and potential third parties licensees. In fact, in re-
sponse to the previously mentioned emergence of “anti-commons” problems gener-
ated by scattered and fragmented IP rights in the hands of separate owners, the asso-
ciation is adopting an explicit policy of so called “publicly minded licensing”, em-
ployed to strategically address IP impediments to the research and development of 
subsistence crops for the poorest countries. Indeed, rightly recognizing the important 
incentives and legal guarantees provided by the patent system in promoting technol-
ogy transfer and commercialisation, PIPRA has provided its member institutions 
with the effective framework and operative tools to collaboratively manage their IP 
assets, reconciling both individual and public interests.  
However, the provided “assistance” is, as this term suggests, merely a comple-
mentary and optional service provided by the administering body, relying on a spe-
cific case-by-case request of the patent holder. In other words, PIPRA - reflecting 
the model role of a technology exchange clearinghouse, as previously outlined and 
illustrated by examples of the organizations above - does not take the place of patent 
holders in the negotiation process towards third parties, but merely acts on their side 
in an auxiliary role, with the declared intent of supporting licensing transactions 
leading to globally beneficial technology transfers. Under this profile, a substantial 
 
626  PIPRA Executive Committee, supra, fn. 619, p. 114.  
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point of general differentiation shall be highlighted between a clearinghouse, on the 
one hand, and a patent pool whose administrator, on the other hand, is typically em-
powered with contractual activities, having as their object the pooled technologies as 
a whole, on behalf and for the benefit of the patent holders constituting the consor-
tium. 
On the basis of the PIPRA database, opportunities for “complementary technolo-
gies” to be bundled together are identified in order to enable the stipulation of com-
bined licenses, i.e. “one stop licensing”, embracing all essential patents involved.627 
Whereas under this aspect strong resemblances with patent pools are evoked, as 
well, the two situations cannot be any further assimilated. In fact, here the technolo-
gies are not “necessarily bundled”, unlike in the case for a patent pool in which the 
IP contributions from the pool members to a “unitary package” represent a binding, 
constitutive condition of the consortium itself.628  
Besides promoting commercialisation, on the one hand, PIPRA is also committed 
to humanitarian applications of agricultural biotechnologies, on the side of develop-
ing countries.629 In fact, it is well recognized that purchasing IP rights increase the 
cost of product development, which in its turn makes it harder for private firms to 
sustain investments addressing the needs of smaller or unprofitable markets. In prac-
tice, when innovations developed with public funding are exclusively licensed to 
private companies, the latter will be frequently unable to make the product, which 
incorporates the technologies at issue, available for low-income markets. In order to 
face this problem, organizations, such as PIPRA, have adopted a range of licensing 
strategies, which reserve rights for humanitarian uses of patented technologies to 
support product developments and distributions also within less competitive mar-
kets.630 
Indeed, while addressing primary goals of public health and global economic 
well-being, PIPRA has used its membership base to develop and promote a licensing 
language aimed at the reservation of rights for humanitarian commercial develop-
ment benefiting poor and underserved societies. Accordingly, a peculiar “humanita-
rian use reservation of rights” approach has been introduced. To be specific, such 
clause is to be inserted in agreements concluded by PIPRA member institutions, 
 
627  As reported, i.a., in: Kloppenburg J., “First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Bio-
technology, 1492-2000 
Science and Technology in Society”, University of Wisconsin Press, 2005, p. 332. 
628  On the point, see i.a.: Reichman J. et al., “International Public Goods and Transfer of Tech-
nology Under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime”, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 
p. 300-301. 
629  Ronald P. et al., “Tomorrow's Table: Organic Farming, Genetics, and the Future of Food”, 
Oxford University Press US, 2008, p. 147. 
630  On the point: Hope J. et al., “Cooperative Strategies for Facilitating the Use of Patented In-
ventions in Biotechnology”, In: Rimmer M., “Patent Law and Biological Inventions”, Federa-
tion Press, 2006, Law in Context, vol. 24, p. 98-99. Along the same line, i.a.: Benkler Y., 
“The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom, Yale 
University Press, 2006, p. 338 et seq. 
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namely universities and non-profit entities, in order to particularly preserve “an irre-
vocable, non-exclusive right in the Invention/Germplasm for humanitarian purpos-
es”.  
Quoting the specific licensing language employed, “such humanitarian purposes 
shall expressly exclude the right for the not-for-profit organization and/or the devel-
oping country, or any individual or organization therein, to export or sell the 
germplasm, seed, propagation materials or crops from the developing country into a 
market outside of the developing country where a commercial licensee has intro-
duced or will introduce a product embodying the Invention/Germplasm. For avoid-
ance of doubt, “not-for-profit organization and/or the developing country, or any in-
dividual or organization therein, may export the Germplasm, seed, propagation ma-
terials or crops from the developing country of origin to other developing countries 
and all other countries mutually agreed to by licensor and licensee”. Ultimately, it is 
specified that: “Humanitarian Purposes means (a) the use of Invention/Germplasm 
for research and development purposes by any not-for-profit organization anywhere 
in the World that has the express purpose of developing plant materials and varieties 
for use in a Developing Country, and (b) the use of Invention/Germplasm for Com-
mercial Purposes, including the use and production of Germplasm, seed, propaga-
tion materials and crops for human or animal consumption, in a Developing Coun-
try”.631 Therefore, PIPRA’s licensing language uses a distinct “territorial division of 
rights” which separates commercial markets in developed countries from those in 
developing countries, where humanitarian use finds its way.632 
Finally, one should also mention the education and training activities in which 
PIPRA is involved, developing training materials and taking active part in work-
shops concerning both developed and developing countries IP matters. At present, 
the organization is engaged in facilitating the design and testing of a plant transfor-
mation vector with maximal freedom-to-operate, with as many components as poss-
ible either from the public domain or owned by PIPRA members with pre-arranged 
licensing terms, allowing the vector to be distributed on a royalty-free basis in order 
to realize humanitarian purposes. 
Now, as far as the impacts of PIPRA's activities are concerned, we should men-
tion that currently about 50 universities and non-profit institutions have joined the 
organization, showing a particularly strong presence in the US and a noticeable, in-
creasing trend in membership.633 Overall, the data representing the agricultural port-
folio of PIPRA's member institutions comprise over 7.000 patents and patent appli-
 
631  For the exact language, see: http://www.pipra.org/docs/HumResLanguagePIPRA.doc  
632  Actually, there exist also other options to achieve similar goals which have been carefully 
documented by the Science and Intellectual Property in the Public Interest (SIPPI) program, 
as outlined in: Brewster A., et al., “Facilitating Humanitarian Access to Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Innovation”, Innovation Strategy Today, 2005, vol. 1, p. 203 et seq.  
633  A full list of PIPRA current members and their Memorandum of Understanding can be found 
at: http://www.pipra.org/en/about.en.html#members  
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cations from more than 40 countries, searchable in the organization's database by a 
variety of fields, including their licensing status. 
Ending with some closing general remarks about PIPRA, we ought to highlight 
its role model function as an high-profile organization, that is active in the domain 
of agricultural biotechnology, which has the major aim to implement a practical 
framework to create “commons” of previously fragmented public sector IP portfo-
lios, ultimately in order to address goals of greater commercialisation, as well as 
reservation of rights to ensure that the humanitarian cause can be achieved. These 
high-profile objectives echoed throughout the international technology transfer 
community, so that PIPRA is now widely perceived as a model IP collective me-
chanism that may eventually be emulated in other technology sectors in general, and 
for life sciences in particular.634 
Nevertheless, to a more scrutinizing, result-oriented assessment, going beneath 
the “popularity” gained on account of the humanitarian goal proclaimed by such or-
ganization, which has certainly assumed noteworthy dimensions, practical and tra-
ceable evidence as to new technologies that have been actually brought to develop-
ing countries, showing a positive impact on their economies, could not be ga-
thered.635 In fact, although in this respect the direct inquiry addressed to the repre-
sentatives of the organization has been evaded, mostly on account of the merely 
“enabling” role function of PIPRA into facilitating networking initiatives aimed at 
making public sector’s technologies more accessible for the benefit of developing 
countries, it shall be undisputed that the establishment of successful practices in this 
area, as well as instances of positively applied technologies, resulting from PIPRA’s 
networking endeavours, would certainly confirm the effectiveness and usefulness of 
such initiative in the first place, which unfortunately this contribution cannot fully 
corroborate. 
III. Royalty Collection Clearinghouse 
The third model to be taken into consideration is the royalty collection clearing-
house,636 the most advanced one in terms of services provided, namely comprising 
 
634  Along the same line and for a wider policy perspective on PIPRA’s initiative and alike, see 
i.a.: Wright B., “Agricultural Innovation after the Diffusion of IP Protection”, “Institutional 
Initiatives to Encourage Biotechnology Innovations”, In:  Kesan J., “Agricultural Biotechnol-
ogy and Intellectual Property: Seeds of Change”, CABI Publishing Series, 2007, p. 12 et seq. 
635  This evaluation follows a personal attempt to gather tangible, practical evidence by specifical-
ly addressing the representatives of the organization in order to provide for reliable references 
supporting the institutional goals proclaimed, i.e. helping public sector technologies to have 
an impact on developing countries’ economy. Regrettably, the feedback received has been 
evasive and therefore non-satisfactory in this respect. 
636  Van Overwalle G., et al., “A Clearinghouse for Diagnostic Testing: the Solution to Ensure 
Access to and the Use of Patented Genetic Inventions?”, Bulletin of the World Trade Organi-
zation, 2006, vol. 84, issue 5, p. 352 et seq. 
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some fundamental features of the technology exchange prototype, i.e. partnering 
technology holders with prospective licensees and eventually initiating the respec-
tive negotiations, while combining them with the additional, peculiar prerogative of 
cashing royalty fees from users on behalf of IP holders.637  
Similarly to what happens in a patent pool, according to the comprehensive 
scheme characterizing such type of clearinghouse, the collected royalties will then 
be re-allocated by the managing entity to the individual patent holders pursuant to a 
pre-set proportional formula. However, while in a pool the aggregated patents are 
directly inter-connected with each other, ideally forming a unitary package of com-
plementary technologies, in a clearinghouse the administering entity typically 
represents the only “point of attachment” for the different right holders, who do not 
engage in any reciprocal right or obligation.  
Classic examples of royalty collection clearinghouses typically refer to the copy-
right rather than the patent domain, as is indeed the case for many national repre-
sentative agencies. Copyright collecting societies aim to represent right holders' in-
terests before prospective licensees, usually as part of a statutory scheme, by han-
dling the outsourced function of right management. The underlying idea is that indi-
vidual management and eventual enforcement is not always appropriate or effective, 
given the number and arisen complexity of uses involved, therefore right owners 
typically transfer rights to conclude non-exclusive licenses to collecting societies; 
collect and then re-distribute respective royalties; pursue enforcement; enter into re-
ciprocal arrangements with other collecting societies and act as lobbying interest 
groups. Just to quote some representative examples of copyright collecting societies, 
we may recall the ASCAP (American Society of Composers, Authors and Publish-
ers),638 the JASRAC (Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Pub-
lishers)639 and other country-based agencies, which are normally national members 
of the CISAC (International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Compos-
ers).640 
Taking into account the thriving experience matured by collecting societies in 
copyright management, it has been advocated that the model should also be exported 
into other IP sectors,641 by supporting the establishment of royalty collection clea-
ringhouses in the field of patents and genetic inventions.642 Unfortunately, at present 
 
637  Merges R., “Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations”, California Law Review, 1996, vol. 84, p. 1293 et seq. 
638  For the official website of ASCAP, see: http://www.ascap.com  
639  For the official website of JASRAC, see: http://www.jasrac.or.jp/ejhp/index.htm  
640  For the official website of CISAC, see: http://www.cisac.org  
641  For a broader debate on the topic, see: Reichman J., “Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and 
the Copyright Paradigms”, Columbia Law Review, 1994, p. 2432 et seq. 
642  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Genetic Inventions, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices - Evidence and Policies”, “Private and 
Public Approaches to Access”, 2002, p. 72 et seq., also available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf; 
Graff G. et al., “Towards an Intellectual Property Clearinghouse for Agricultural Biotechnol-
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no working example of the model actually exists, although a praiseworthy attempt to 
realize such institutional framework has been conduced through the design of the 
Global Bio-Collecting Society (GBS).643 In fact, the undertaken project to realize a 
royalty collection clearinghouse in life sciences did not materialize in the end be-
cause no consensus could be achieved among the right holders involved and the 
needed political support was missing. 
The Global Bio-Collecting Society was conceived as an international enforcement 
agency to coordinate operative work at a national level, functioning as a fair and 
equitable exchange model for indigenous knowledge between knowledge holders 
(i.e. indigenous group) and knowledge users (i.e. life science industry) in the com-
merce of biodiversity.644 Specifically, it was supposed to be a sort of private collec-
tive management institution monitoring the use of traditional knowledge and, conse-
quently, issuing licenses to users and redistributing the collected fees to the respec-
tive indigenous groups, as legitimate right holders, in proportion to the extent to 
which their knowledge is commercially exploited by others. In this regard, it has 
been rightly observed that even if, for instance, a biologist once described a commu-
nity’s use of the medical effects of a plant in an academic journal without asking 
permission, this does neither mean that the community has abandoned its property 
rights over that knowledge, which therefore cannot be treated as “public domain”, 
nor its responsibility to ensure that that knowledge is used in a culturally appropriate 
manner.645 
The project of a Biocollecting Society to manage and coordinate efforts at a glob-
al level was advanced by Prof. Drahos, of the Australian National University, who 
first suggested that a property rights-based institution should be established in order 
to reduce transaction costs, while improving the international enforcement over tra-
ditional knowledge and biodiversity related rights,646 thus generating trust in the 
market between the holders and prospective commercial users, i.e. licensees.  
As we mentioned, the Global Biocollecting Society has been shaped on the model 
of the collecting societies commonly operating in the copyright domain.647 However, 
while the latter are mostly active at the national level, the former shall have been an 
 
ogy”, Agricultural Biodiversity and Biotechnology in Economic Development, May 2006, 
vol. 27, p. 387 et seq. 
643  Drahos P., “Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-
Collecting Society the Answer?”, European Intellectual Property Review, 2000, vol. 6, p. 245 
et seq. 
644  Van Overwalle G. et al, supra, fn. 636, p. 352 et seq. 
645  Dutfield G., “Protecting Traditional Knowledge: Approaches and Proposals”, Feb. 2003, vol. 
7, issue 1, p. 13 et seq. 
646  For the protection of biodiversity, see also: Straus J., “Biodiversity and Intellectual Property”, 
in: Hill K.M., Takenaka T. and Takeuchi K. (Eds.), Rethinking International Intellectual 
Property -Biodiversity & Developing Countries, Extraterritorial Enforcement, the Grace Pe-
riod and other Issues, CASRIP Publication Series No. 6, Seattle, 2001, p. 141 et seq. 
647  Reichman J., supra, fn. 641, p. 2432 et seq. 
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international institution.648 From a legal perspective, its peculiar mandate would be 
the implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity’,649 particularly in re-
lation to the protection of traditional knowledge itself. The Convention at issue was 
in fact adopted at the World Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and entered into force 
one year later. For the first time in international law, it recognized that the conserva-
tion of biological diversity is “a common concern of humankind”, as well as an 
integral part of the development process. Its three main goals are the conservation of 
biological diversity (or biodiversity); the sustainable use of its components; and, fi-
nally, the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from genetic resources.650  
From a practical perspective, the Global Biocollecting Society shall have been a 
repository of community knowledge voluntarily submitted by traditional groups and 
communities: submissions would foster a dialogue between the public involved and 
interested companies to gain access to relevant information, eventually resulting in 
fair commercial transactions allowing the lawful exploitation of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge in the hands of indigenous populations. Finally, to im-
prove the chances of successful negotiations to benefit local communities, the Glob-
al Biocollecting Society could have also provided a range of additional services, 
such as the market monitoring for the effective commercial uses of the traditional 
knowledge at issue, as well as an independent dispute settlement body to sort out 
eventual controversies.651  
In general, although the Global Biocollecting Society model was constructed to 
encourage arrangements between indigenous groups and industries exploiting the 
traditional knowledge at issue and, as we have seen, never actually came to substan-
tial application, it has been argued that the advanced concept could be re-read more 
broadly and implemented into the more classical IP holder and IP user, i.e. licensee, 
situation.652 
The crucial question that eventually caused the collapse of the project was, in 
fact, mainly the one of finding the needed funds:653 in this regard, initial reference 
 
648  Drahos P., supra, fn. 643, p. 245 et seq. 
649  Convention on Biological Diversity, June 1992, available at:  
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf 
650  For policy-related issues, visit the Convention’s official website homepage at:  
http://www.biodiv.org; for a broader debate on the topic, see i.a.: Pena-Neira S., Dieperink C. 
et al.; “Equitability Sharing Benefits from the Utilization of Natural Genetic Resources : The 
Brazilian Interpretation of the Convention on Biological Diversity”, presented at the 6th Con-
ference of the Parties of the CBD in The Hague, 19th of April 2002. 
651  Dutfield G., supra, fn. 645, p. 13 et seq. 
652  Van Overwalle G. et al., “Models for Facilitating Access to Patents on Genetic Inventions”, 
Nature Reviews - Genetics, Nature Publishing Group, February 2006, vol. 7, p. 143 et seq. 
653  Leesti M. et al., “Institutional Issues for Developing Countries in Intellectual Property Policy 
Making, Administration and Enforcement”, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
2002, Study Paper 9, also available at: http://www.iprcommission.org/home.html. In this 
wide-ranging study of institutional issues related to IP in developing countries, it was shown 
that institutional organizations, such as the WIPO, the EPO and the World Bank were provid-
ing some significant development assistance, but more could be done to improve donor co-
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was made to key institutions, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO),654 the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)655 
or the World Bank,656 to build up a joint initiative. Besides, inspiration was drawn 
from said institutions, as well as from classic copyright collecting societies, to the 
extent that such entities are able to independently earn incomes from the services 
provided to the private sector, thus carving out an autonomous way for auto-
financing themselves. Nevertheless, the lack of the strong political support necessary 
in the initial process at last determined the breakdown of the undertaking.657 
From an overall perspective, a royalty collection clearinghouse mechanism may 
be more complicated to establish, in comparison to the less engaging clearinghouse 
models previously analysed. However, once in place, it could operate more effec-
tively by facilitating the collection and distribution of IP royalties, which would take 
place within a centrally managed, comprehensive procedure. Still, the clearinghouse 
model under consideration would only be fruitful, from a business viewpoint, if on 
the one hand there is an effective need to carry on commercial transactions involving 
the patent rights administered by the clearinghouse, i.e. within the technological sec-
tor at issue, and, on the other hand, a significant number of patent holders or, ideally, 
an entire branch of industry would participate.658 
IV. Open Source Clearinghouse 
Another approach to the “anti-commons” issue, dealing with the fundamental 
problem of access to overly scattered and fragmented IP rights in the hands of sepa-
rated, multiple patent owners, is modelled on the “open source” paradigm, which 
has notoriously first gained popularity within the software industry. In fact, institu-
tions sympathising with such alternative model generally provide “open”, i.e. royal-
ty-free, access to targeted assembled technologies, eventually also patented ones, 
through an “open source” license, which namely subtracts the technologies at issue 
from private, exclusive appropriation by building a “commons” of contributed IP 
rights under the terms of the agreement, typically strengthened by a “grant-back” 
 
ordination. The specific recommendations on the point were in fact used as a reference when 
addressing the creation of a Global Biocollecting Society. 
654  For the official website, see: http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en  
655  For the official website, see: http://www.fao.org  
656  For the official website, see: http://www.worldbank.org  
657  Drahos P., “Towards an International Framework for the Protection of Traditional Group 
Knowledge and Practice”, UNCTAD-Commonwealth Secretariat Workshop on Elements of 
National Sui Generis Systems for the Preservation, Protection and Promotion of Traditional 
Knowledge, Geneva, February 2004 
658  See in this sense: Van Overwalle G. et al., supra, fn. 652, p. 143 et seq. 
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provision, thereby further expanding the initial technology pool and consequently 
preventing the emergence of eventual blocking patents on improvements.659 
1. Science Commons - A Creative Commons’ project 
Now, although not specifically limited to biotechnology, a peculiar and remarka-
ble model of worldwide technology exchange promoting the implementation of 
“open source”, i.e. royalty-free approach, in the scientific field is certainly 
represented by the Science Commons.660 Since this project, launched in early 2005, 
has been brought into existence thanks to a successful initiative of the Creative 
Commons,661 with which it indeed shares many significant resemblances deriving 
from the same fundamental inspiring principles, we will start introducing the lat-
ter.662 
Expressing an innovative approach to copyrights, Creative Commons (CC) is ac-
tually a non-profit organization, whose tools, since its inception in 2002 and in re-
sponse to the stand-off between the content industries and the online communities, 
are provided completely for free. They offer “flexible” copyright licenses for crea-
tive works, basically substituting the rigid “all rights reserved” default-concept of 
traditional copyright with an open and far more adaptable “some rights reserved” 
principle, following the by contrast called “copy-left” approach.663  
Indeed, the spectrum of possibilities between full copyright, i.e. “all rights re-
served”, and the public domain, i.e. “no rights reserved”, can be readily defined on a 
case-by-case basis through a “some rights reserved” approach, pursuant to the artist's 
individual choice between the standardized licensing options provided within the 
Creative Commons platform, under which an author basically agrees to give away 
its work for free, on the condition that, if he so wishes, some of his exclusive rights 
remain preserved. These could typically be resumed in the following points: the 
 
659  Boettiger S., Burk D.L., “Open Source Patenting”, Journal of International Biotechnology 
Law, 2004, vol. 1, p. 221 et seq. According to the authors: “The open source and free soft-
ware movements have used self-perpetuating copyright licenses to maintain open access to 
publicly distributed software. This model of licensing has now migrated to the field of bio-
technology, where patents rather than copyrights dominate proprietary rights. Consequently, a 
model for open source patenting or free biotechnology presents a constellation of legal issues 
not typically found in previous open source licensing. This paper discusses several of these 
issues, including the nature of the rights transferred, the activities that may trigger the terms 
of the license, and the legal prohibitions on certain forms of licensing”. 
660  For the official website, refer to: http://sciencecommons.org  
661  For the official website, refer to: http://creativecommons.org  
662  Indeed, also from an institutional standpoint, Science Commons - which is housed at and 
receives material support from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), with whom 
it shares space, staff and inspiration - is overseen in its activities by members of the Creative 
Commons board. 
663  For a general outline, see: Garlick M., “A Review of Creative Commons and Science Com-
mons”, Educause Review, September/October 2005, vol. 40, no. 5, p. 78 et seq. 
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right of attribution, the prohibition of unauthorized commercial use or derivative 
works and, eventually, the obligation to distribute derivative works only under li-
censing terms that are identical to the original ones.664 Practically, through sites and 
databases linked to Creative Commons a user can search for audio, images, text, 
video and educational material that can be freely shared online without restriction, 
using means of digital distribution, like Peer-to-Peer networks, with the author's giv-
en consent, and thus completely legally.665 
Beyond copyrights, Science Commons aims to expand the Creative Commons’ 
mission into the realm of scientific and technical data. Indeed, as the latter does with 
copyright issues regarding the use of protected material, the former primarily aims 
to encourage technology transfer by stimulating IP owners to take up standardized 
licensing terms inspired to transparency and openness in the use of biotechnologies, 
thus mostly implementing a royalty-free approach, basically inspired by the same 
“open source” community ethos which is gaining more and more ground within the 
software industry. For this reason, Science Commons may be seen as a model, in 
which technology exchange and an open source clearinghouse are combined: in fact, 
said organization does not merely link offer and demand, i.e. partnering technology 
holders and prospective licensees by providing the setting to eventually initiate ne-
gotiations, as all other considered examples of technology exchange clearinghouses 
do, but it additionally pursues the goal of promoting the adoption of standardised, 
transparent technology licensees, to a large extent conforming to a so-called “open 
access” approach, on a global scale.666 
Concretely, Science Commons’ constitutive intent is "promoting innovation in 
science by lowering the legal and technical costs of the sharing and reuse of scientif-
ic work" and by “removing unnecessary obstacles to scientific collaboration by 
creating voluntary legal regimes for research and development”.667 Their overall 
goal is therefore to encourage stakeholders to create – through standardized licenses 
and other means that we will properly consider in the following – common areas of 
free access and inquiry, i.e. a so called “science commons”, built out of private 
agreements. 
Among other things, the Science Commons Data project668 explores ways to 
promote broader access to scientific data, taking greater advantage of the World 
Wide Web. In fact, promoters of this initiative have voiced some concerns about 
current expansive trends in intellectual property law as far as databases are con-
cerned, mainly intervening through the creation of "sui generis" protection systems, 
 
664  For more details, refer to: http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses  
665  For more details on the licensing terms adopted, see, for example, for the distribution of mu-
sic: http://www.jamendo.com/en/static/artists_why  
666  For an overview on the particular debate on the important role of universities and research 
institutions for access to medicines, see: Nelsen L., “The Role of University Technology 
Transfer Operations in Assuring Access to Medicines and Vaccines in Developing Coun-
tries”, Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics, 2003, vol. 3, p. 301 et seq. 
667  For the exact opening quotation from their official website, see: http://sciencecommons.org  
668  For more details, see: http://sciencecommons.org/data  
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thus imposing new legal limits on the sharing of data both among scientists and with 
the general public.  
Where IP protection applies to databases,669 the Scientific Commons aim at en-
couraging the adoption of Creative Commons licenses, as examined in more detail 
above, subject to the right holder's consent, in order to foster the royalty-free diffu-
sion to scientific data. Besides, one major goal in enhancing access to scientific data 
has been identified in the coordination of technical resources and research opportun-
ities in a digitally networked environment so as to maximize the data’s public utility.  
This may be partly achieved by developing network standards670 to facilitate re-
search cooperation and by creating a collaborative platform linking to relevant data-
bases covering targeted scientific domains.  
In fact, Science Commons are not building a self-administered database of free-
licensed content, as they believe in the Internet rather than a centralized information 
bank controlled by a single organization.671  
Accordingly, they are not collecting content for a new, central database, but are 
building tools so that the semantic web can identify and sort databases, providing 
free access to users, in a coherent decentralized manner.  
Increasingly, various sorts of data are indeed being stored in formats that comput-
ers can understand and manipulate, allowing databases, through particular web inter-
faces, to communicate. This enables the extraction and interpretation of data from 
different sources and the creation of entirely new data products and services. 
In biotechnology research, for instance, rather than creating centralized monolith-
ic databases, scientists could interrogate existing databases, wherever the data are 
held, weaving together, in hypothesis, all the relevant data on a species, from its tax-
onomy and genetic sequence to its geographical distribution.  
Moreover, such decentralization would help to solve the problem that databases 
are often the fruits of individual or lab research projects that unfortunately are vul-
nerable to the vagaries of funding. Accordingly, although discipline-specific data-
bases have an indisputable role, science also needs to capitalize on large common 
 
669  About the problem of data access, the Journal of the American Medical Association published 
a study in 2002 describing a world where 47% of academic geneticists had been rejected in 
their efforts to secure access to data or materials related to research by other academics. This 
represented an increase from 34% from a previous study in the mid 1990s. For the integral 
study, see: Campbell E., et al., “Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a 
National Survey”, Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), April 2002, 287, p. 
1939 et seq. 
670  For an overview on the legal and policy debate on the merits of promoting IP in connection 
with network standards, see most recently, i.a.: Mackenrodt M., “Assessing the Effects of IP 
Rights in Network Standards”, In: Drexl J. ed.: Research Handbook on Intellectual Property 
and Competition Law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2008, p.  
80 et seq. 
671  See: Benkler Y., “The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedom”, Yale University Press, 2006. 
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repositories for data, whose preservation is guaranteed, and in which the data can 
easily be used by anyone. 
However, the functioning of such web services is certainly also dependent on 
computers being able to freely retrieve data, without access barriers, in real time. On 
the one hand, scientists can be well justified in wanting to retain privileged access to 
data in the collection of which they have heavily invested, with publications mostly 
pending; on the other hand, there are also huge amounts of data which do not need 
to be kept behind walls and which could be, in hypothesis, made available under a 
Creative Commons licence, allowing their seamless access by computers, without 
prejudices for their owner.672 
2. BioBricks Foundation 
The BioBricks Foundation (BBF)673 - a not-for-profit organization founded by 
engineers and scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
Harvard, and the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF) with significant 
experience in biotechnology research - provides for an example applying the free, 
collaborative Science Commons’ philosophy to data access, thus also reflecting the 
model of an open source clearinghouse.  
The BBF encourages the development and use of technologies based on Bio-
Bricks, i.e. standard DNA parts that encode basic biological functions. Using Bio-
Bricks, they claim that a synthetic biologist or biological engineer can already, to 
some extent, program living organisms in the same way a computer scientist can 
program a computer. In conformity with the Science Commons’ philosophy, the 
DNA sequence information and other characteristics of BioBricks are made availa-
ble to the public, free of charge, via the MIT's Registry of Standard Biological 
Parts.674  
Indeed, BBF's stated goals are to encourage the development of codes of standard 
practices for the access of scientific data, as well as to implement legal strategies to 
ensure that BioBricks remains freely available to the public both to use and improve 
existing sequences and to contribute to new developments, thereby contrasting the 
growing trend of biotechnologies being tied up through patents held by different 
companies, which makes the design of integrated biological systems, that use these 
technologies, very difficult.  
Finally, BBF believes that having a shared pool of basic biotechnology functions 
would help innovation and growth in the life sciences industry as a whole. In fact, 
although there is no “Microsoft” of biological engineering to fight, as is instead the 
case for the Open Source Community within the strongly bi-polarized structure of 
 
672  Editorial, “Let data speak to data”, Nature, December 2005, vol. 438, p. 531 et seq. 
673  For the official website, see: http://bbf.openwetware.org  
674  For the website, see: http://parts.mit.edu/registry/index.php/Main_Page  
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845226316, am 02.12.2021, 16:18:52
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
193 
the software industry, supporters of the Science Commons ethos still hope to see bi-
ological engineering develop differently than the latter: in this respect, early estab-
lishment of a biological commons to be shared by industry as well as individual re-
searchers might help to prevent the “us vs. them” attitude that occurred for software. 
Nevertheless, concrete evidence about successful BioBricks-based technological 
applications is maintained as confidential and, therefore, a more far-reaching as-
sessment on the practical merits of such initiative could not be reached within the 
scope of this contribution.675 
3. CAMBIA’s Biological Open Source (BiOS)  
The Biological Open Source (BiOS) initiative676 falls under the institutional um-
brella of CAMBIA,677 the same Australian-based, not-for-profit plant biotechnology 
research centre that has also boosted the Patent Lens678 free-accessible biotechnolo-
gy database, which has been already briefly outlined when analysing some illustra-
tive, practical applications of the simpler information clearinghouse scheme within 
the domain of life sciences. 
The present initiative aims to build a “protected commons” of biotechnologies, 
i.e. a collaborative environment to share and contribute to innovations,679 by adopt-
ing non-exclusive, royalty-free licensing terms and thereby attempting to extend the 
so called “open source” paradigm, as already broadly established in the software in-
dustry, to the domain of life sciences.680  
In fact, the open source model can be seen, in general terms, as a business prac-
tice based on the free sharing of technologies among all those who agree to stick to 
non-restrictive contractual terms, also as far as further related improvements are 
 
675  This conclusion follows a personal attempt to gather tangible, practical evidence by specifi-
cally addressing the representatives of the organization in order to provide for reliable refer-
ences supporting the institutional goals proclaimed. Regrettably, the feedback received has 
been evasive and therefore non-satisfactory in this respect. 
676  For the official website, see: http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/home.html  
677  For the official website, see: http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/home.html  
678  For the official website, see: http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/patentlens/patentlens.html  
679  Nevertheless, a personal attempt to gather tangible, practical evidence by specifically address-
ing the representatives of the organization in order to provide for reliable references support-
ing the institutional goals hereby proclaimed has remained unfulfilled. Indeed, the feedback 
received has been evasive and non-satisfactory in this respect. 
680  The term “open source” refers to software whose source code - i.e. the human readable code 
as opposes to the only computer readable binary “object code” - is published and made avail-
able to the public under a license that permits users to study, change, and improve the soft-
ware, and to redistribute it in modified or unmodified form. It is often developed in a public, 
collaborative manner. For more information, see: http://opensource.org; For a thorough anal-
ysis on the open source model and ethics, see i.a.: Hope J., “Biobazaar: The Open Source 
Revolution and Biotechnology”, Harvard University Press, 2008; Raymond E., “The Cathe-
dral and the Bazaar”, O'Reilly Media, 1999. 
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concerned and towards all who have subscribed to the same conditions, i.e. within 
the community.681 Besides, promoters of the initiative under consideration, aside 
from actively fostering a collaborative work environment among researchers, are 
advancing their tenets directly by making their own IP rights in the area of plant bio-
technology available according to the same terms of their BiOS licenses.682 
In other words, scientists adopting BiOS licenses may still own patents on their 
inventions, but cannot keep others from employing or eventually building innovative 
solutions based on the core-technologies at issue, i.e. they agree not to assert exclu-
sive rights against the licensor or other licensees within the “protected commons”.683 
In fact, instead of paying royalties, contractual parties to the BiOS project are to ad-
here to legally binding conditions, at the outset, in order to obtain a license and 
access to the shared technology platform: in brief, what is provided with open access 
has to be further maintained and redistributed on the same terms, as licensees shall 
not appropriate the fundamental “kernel” of the technologies at issue exclusively for 
themselves. The underlying idea of the employed licensing scheme is in fact expli-
citly inspired to the widely employed open source software’s General Public License 
(GPL),684 actually taken as a benchmark by the BiOS promoters.  
However, from a critical point of view and pursuant to its self-perpetuating cha-
racter, alongside similar models, the GPL has been described by its opponents as be-
ing “viral”, because its conditions require that all modified versions of the software 
must in turn be licensed under the GPL.685 Besides, if licensors adhering to the “pro-
tected commons” scheme should desist from claiming royalties for all innovations 
based on BiOS technologies - by the way, regardless of the substantial weight the 
latter actually had on the subsequent invention - then the arising question shall be 
the one of whether there are any incentives left to spur further innovations at all, 
with the connected non-negligible research and development costs. In other words, 
if we cut out the regular sources of income coming from prospective licensing fees, 
how can valuable R&D expenditure, aside from considerable patent expenses, be 
covered in the first place? In fact, even maintaining that research barriers are lo-
wered because of the free access provided by the sharing platform in place, high pa-
tenting costs cannot be neglected, and this aspect seems to have been quite under-
 
681  For a general overview, see: Perens B., “Open Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revo-
lution”, O'Reilly Media, 1999; Lerner J., Tirole J., “Some Simple Economics of Open 
Source”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 2002, vol. 50, no. 2, 197 et seq. 
682  Sheridan C., “Out to Break Biotech’s IP Stranglehold”, Science Business, June 2006, p. 1 et 
seq. 
683  For an outline on BiOS’ business model, see i.a.: Van Caenegem W. et al., “Biological Inno-
vation for Open Society”, “Intellectual Property Policy Reform: Fostering Innovation and 
Development”, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009, p. 143 et seq. 
684  For the General Public License terms, see GNU’s official website at:  
http://www.gnu.org/licenses  
685 Mundie C., “The Commercial Software Model”, Speech Transcript, Prepared Text of Re-
marks, The New York University Stern School of Business, May 2001, also available at: 
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/craig/05-03sharedsource.mspx  
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mined when affirming that the BiOS platform is also perfectly suitable for patented 
technologies.686  
Ultimately, the claim of the BiOS supporters that companies can make money out 
of the end product and services as an alternative to the licensing of the underlying IP 
(which they call mere “tools of innovation”)687 seems quite naive, as it completely 
overlooks the fact that when a newly released biotechnology is left to the free dis-
posal of others, competitors may well come out with very similar, if not identical, 
products taking a rather unfair advantage of the long and costly research and devel-
opment already done by others. In fact, here a key difference to the software indus-
try is that it is actually hard to make money out of the end product or services, i.e. 
the developed biotechnology, without enforcing the underlying IP rights, as one is 
closely connected with the other;688 the successful business enterprises based on the 
open source software model, on the other hand, seemingly found a real opportunity 
of success in the fact that, although software and hardware are closely inter-related, 
the latter has a market on its own and represents a commercially viable means of 
distribution for the former, as the IBM case  proves.689 
Moreover, although BiOS licenses are purportedly available at no cost, for-profit 
licensees are anyway charged with maintenance fees which are due to access the 
BiOS platform, as it is expressly claimed that “it is costly to maintain an exchange 
of materials and improvements, and to develop […] an information technology 
commons so that licensees can share biosafety and improvement data and collabo-
rate on working around barriers to innovation. Thus, BiOS licenses are associated 
with a Technology Support Agreement, in which we ask for-profit licensees to pay 
some of these costs, at rates related to size of the enterprise […]. Other than cost re-
covery for material handling non-profits are not asked to contribute”.690 This state-
ment appears quite inconsistent with the otherwise at first glance widely advertised 
“free access” to the technologies at issue and it seems to apply different measures to 
the higher costs associated with the patenting, on the one hand, and to the claimed 
service delivery costs, which are certainly lower, on the other hand, resulting in the 
exclusive unjustified sacrifice of the former. 
Ultimately, a great deal of confusion seems to have been misleadingly introduced 
as far as the use of the term “open access” is concerned. Indeed, “open” and “free” 
access are not necessarily synonyms,691 as licenses may well be open to all interest-
ed parties, for instance under fair and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms, without 
therefore having to be definitely royalty-free. Both business types can in fact co-
 
686  For details, see: CAMBIA BiOS Initiative - Proposal, Implementation Phase 2006 - 2008, 
January 2006, available at: http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/2029/version/1/part/4/data  
687  CAMBIA BiOS Initiative - Proposal, Implementation Phase 2006 - 2008, January 2006, p. 4, 
available at: http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/2029/version/1/part/4/data 
688  Bearing otherwise the risk of so-called “free-riders” misappropriating your invention. 
689  For more information, see: http://www-128.ibm.com/developerworks/ibm/library/i-osource1  
690  For the reference, see: http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/licenses/398/2535.html  
691  For more details, see the definition of free software, as opposed to mere open source soft-
ware, available at: http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html 
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exist in a competitive environment, and the condition of being “open” is certainly 
not a prerogative of the free model only. 
Finally, a few words still need to be said regarding the fundamental differences 
between such a peculiar mechanism - hereby assimilated to an open source clearing-
house - and a patent pool. In this regard, BiOS promoters contend that while patent 
pools are usually open only to a selected group of players who already own enough 
technology to trade it against others for privileged access, thus purportedly being 
inaccessible to any player or industry that does not have any leverage, the BiOS pa-
tent portfolio, by contrast, shall be available for anyone agreeing on the BiOS licens-
ing terms.692  
In fact, this assumption seems to be strongly misleading because it appears to put 
technology contributors (i.e. pool members) and third parties (i.e. licensees) on the 
same plan. Indeed if, on the one hand (i.e. as far as pool members are concerned), it 
is true that a patent pool needs to target only defined market players in order to 
ideally include only essential, complementary technologies, thereby avoiding anti-
trust issues, on the other hand (i.e. as far as licensees are concerned), it is not equally 
true that a patent pool makes any difference as to the third parties with whom it 
eventually enters into routine bilateral licensing agreements, where fair and non-
discriminatory (RAND) terms are typically implemented to comply with competi-
tive conditions. 
In this respect, the most apparent difference between a patent pool and a BiOS-
alike platform is that, in the latter, there is no real distinction of treatment between 
initial contributors and interested licensees: as soon as you wish to get access the so 
called “protected commons”, you are asked to subscribe to the same participation 
terms of its contributors: namely, in exchange for according you the right to view, 
use and eventually modify the technologies at issue - instead of charging you with 
royalty fees - they ask you to endorse the obligation of granting back to the Com-
munity all improvements deriving from the BiOS technologies under the same con-
ditions.693 
On the other hand, in a patent pool, so called “grant back” clauses, if at all, apply 
exclusively to the patent pool’s members and are typically limited to essential, com-
plementary technologies that directly relate to the pooled package; third party licen-
sees, instead, are not concerned with such obligations, as their only commitment 
consists in complying with the negotiated royalties according to the standards terms 
of the bilateral agreement. In this perspective, the BiOS platform appears as a sort of 
“floating pool”, encompassing all derivative improvements based on the originally 
contributed applications, therefore progressively expanding its “technological 
mass”. 
 
692  CAMBIA BiOS Initiative - Proposal, Implementation Phase 2006 - 2008, January 2006, p. 
29, available at: http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/2029/version/1/part/4/data 
693  CAMBIA BiOS Initiative - Proposal, Implementation Phase 2006 - 2008, January 2006, p. 28 
et seq., available at: http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/2029/version/1/part/4/data 
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In this respect, the view is taken that a collaborative consortium, as a patent pool, 
proposing affordable and non-discriminatory licensing terms, may well achieve ob-
jectives at least partly comparable to those of an open source clearinghouse, i.e. en-
suring wide (i.e. “open”, but not necessarily also “free”) access to the relevant tech-
nologies for the benefit of interested third parties. However, at the same time, patent 
consortia other than the examined open source model are also employing auto-
financing mechanisms to recoup the costs undergone independently, through their 
own generated royalty flow, without having to rely on some alternative forms of 
public funding to subsidize their own existence in the first place. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions: the Way Forward 
Confronted with the several and somehow inevitable “flaws” encountered in the 
different patent regimes, whose seamless functioning is frequently hampered by an 
intricate web of overlapping rights, the view is here represented that licensing strat-
egies involving the cooperation of multiple patent owners may well represent a con-
structive solution to clear the way through the “patent thicket”,694 by enabling partic-
ipating parties to gain “freedom to operate” within closely interrelated technological 
domains. 
While much of the otherwise engaged discussions call for the need of legislative 
interventions, involving an “external”, whole-comprehensive reform of the delicate 
patent system’s architecture,695 this contribution invites to focus on “internal” strate-
gies that can be carried forward by the patent holders themselves, by tactically join-
ing their forces.696  
Indeed, while on the one hand, legislative interventions aimed at improving the 
patent “bureaucracy”, for instance by advocating a faster and more selective grant-
ing procedure,697 remain more difficult to put in place, mostly due to their broader 
 
694  Patent pools have been expressly proposed as a way firms can address the overlapping pa-
tents’ problem by a number of authors, among which the most notorious are Priest (1977), 
Merges (1999) and ultimately Shapiro (2000), this latter having coined the term “patent 
thicket” itself. See in this respect: Shapiro C., “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Li-
censes, Patent Pools and Standards-Setting”, University of California at Berkeley, March 
2001, also available at:  http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/~shapiro/thicket.pdf  
695  For a current and comprehensive study on the current patent reform and harmonization efforts 
in place, see i.a.: Straus J., and Klunker N., “Harmonisierung des internationalen Paten-
trechts”,  In:  GRUR Int., 2007, Nr.  2, p.  91 et seq. 
696  Along the same line, i.a.: Hope J. et al., “Cooperative Strategies for Facilitating the Use of 
Patented Inventions in Biotechnology”, In: Rimmer M., “Patent Law and Biological Inven-
tions”, Federation Press, 2006, Law in Context, vol. 24, p. 87. Quoting the reported author’s 
main statement: “At the outset, we assume that wholesale reform of the patent system is both 
inappropriate and impractical. Rather, a measured approach is necessary, reflecting the deli-
cate balance of innovation […] We see a benefit in expanding patent owners’ repertoire to in-
clude industry-driven mechanisms that may be more finely tuned to the needs of particular 
industry participants or group of participants. Such mechanisms may be adjusted to take ac-
count of trial and error learning in specific industry contexts, and may engender greater com-
mitment on the part of industry than involuntary, ‘top down’ regulation”. 
697  Indeed, the need of improving the overall administration of the patent offices’ filtering patent 
application procedure worldwide, which is certainly more than consistent, have been again 
recently and persuasively advocated i.a. by: Straus J., “Is There a Global Warming of Pa-
tents”, The Journal of World Intellectual Property, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 58 et seq .  
In particular, sharing a widely felt pragmatic approach, there the author argues against the 
critical comparison between the raise into patent applications and a “global warming of pa-
tents”, fundamentally disputing that since the growing patent trends registered worldwide 
have some strong economic and legal grounds, the solution to contain the final output shall 
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scope and inevitable political strings, on the other hand, patent pools and similar col-
laborative business strategies are hereby embraced as a convenient, more flexible 
alternative to overcome the unwanted impasses of our patent regime.  
In this respect, the view is taken that sustainable improvements can effectively be 
achieved aside from legislative reforms, when right holders choose to link their re-
sources into cooperative licensing strategies, thus clearing “pathways” through the 
“patent thicket”. Given their “voluntary” nature, such solutions evidently offer sub-
stantial advantages over a complex, often politically influenced legislative reform, 
entailing a lengthier and more rigid procedure. 
Therefore, since the problem of “blocking patents” and “holding up” situations, 
more and more often encountered in highly concentrated technological domains, 
could not be easily obviated at the source, through a radical reform of the patent sys-
tem, this contribution purposely embraces the current market trends, in the attempt 
to define and bring forwards “best practices” for collaborative business strategies. 
Accordingly, within the delineated scope of this dissertation, while in principle 
different types of collaborative IP models can be envisaged in the technological do-
main, the focus is specifically brought on patent pools and clearinghouses mechan-
isms, where selected patterns established in both domains are more closely analysed.  
In comparison, drawing some conclusions from the practical applications out-
lined, patent pools appear to offer an additional advantage when confronted with 
technology clearinghouses. In fact, although a pool may have to pass a closer anti-
trust scrutiny in order to prove pro-competitive, as of today it basically remains the 
only model soundly set up. Indeed, the real value and effectiveness of most clea-
ringhouse mechanisms remain to be proved when applied to patent rights, since 
practical, tangible evidences of successful innovations and/or partnerships fostered 
through the networking endeavours of such institutions are not easily traceable.698 
In the context of collaborative IP applications, at the core of this contribution spe-
cial attention is dedicated to strategic business alliances promoting access to key in-
novations within life sciences. Here, the concrete prospects of implementing such 
cooperative schemes have brought into the limelight the potential for new rewarding 
opportunities.  
In this domain, the motivations for cooperation lay at hand: as IP portfolios of 
flourishing biotechnology industries are taking shape, transactional costs of increas-
ing technology transfer begin to account for a non-affordable portion of an average 
company’s precious research and development expenditures. In fact, expensive ne-
gotiations, and the threatening exposure to even higher potential litigation’s fees, 
 
not consist in a general overhaul of the patent system, but in a more efficient management of 
its international administration. 
698  This evaluation follows a personal attempt to gather tangible, practical evidence by specifical-
ly addressing the representatives of the organizations outlined in order to provide for reliable 
references supporting the respective institutional goals proclaimed. Regrettably, the feedback 
received has been evasive and therefore non-satisfactory in this respect. 
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constitute a serious economic inefficiency that may dislocate fundamental resources 
from the “core-business” of biotechnology.  
Nevertheless, it has been shown that the patent pool’s stereotype that has emerged 
in the electronic and communication industries699 cannot be blindly transposed on a 
one-to-one basis in the biotechnology sector, considering the peculiarity of the in-
dustry at issue. Accordingly, elements of novelty have been properly outlined in the 
assessment and application of the general collaborative IP formula in the domain of 
life sciences.  
In this respect, some illustrative “first hand” experiences of biotechnology patent 
pools and clearinghouse mechanisms have been reported, although most of these 
projects may still be classified as in a “pilot” phase, since few cases have reached 
the necessary “maturity” for a conclusive judgement on the sustainability of such 
implementations. 
The case studies hereby outlined, covering some selected examples of both rela-
tively established and experimental collaborative IP practices involving patented 
technologies, have been evaluated within the relevant regulatory framework on the 
base of the competitive parameters at hand.  In particular, the legal analysis engaged 
has covered both the EU and the US regimes, in an attempt to find a common 
ground for the comparative assessment of patent pooling mechanisms. 
In fact, in consideration both of the intertwined effects of national regulations and 
of the business importance gained by such collaborative practices, whose impact 
tends to go beyond individual geographical borders, the undergone evaluation has 
been primarily developed through a comparative perspective.  
In the US the relevant legislative reference is the Department of Justice and Fed-
eral Trade Commission’s Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of IP (“IP Guide-
lines”), issued in April 1995.700 These marked the beginning of a progressively ma-
tured and more balanced approach towards pooling agreements, thereby overcoming 
the preconception of patent pools as “legal monopolies”701 and eventually introduc-
ing a new evaluation procedure based on the so-called “Rule of Reason”.702  
 
699  Aoki R. et al., “Coalition Formation for a Consortium Standard through a Standard Body and 
a Patent Pool: Theory and Evidence from MPEG2, DVD and 3G”, Institute of Innovation Re-
search Working Paper, 2005. 
700  U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Li-
censing of IP, April 1995, available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm  
701  The preconception of patent as “legal monopolies” can today be rejected as false and mislead-
ing on the base of the factual consideration that, other than in the true case of a legal monopo-
ly, alternative technologies that do not infringe the patent may well coexist in the market-
place, as provided by competitors. For an overview on the issue, see i.a.: Serafino D., “Early 
Pools Associated with Monopolies and Cartels (1856-1919)” in “Survey of Patent Pools De-
monstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures”, Knowledge Ecology Interna-
tional Studies, June 2007, p. 9, at: http://www.keionline.org/content/view/69/ 
702  This advocates the adoption of a contextual and pragmatic approach in the evaluation of the 
overall pro- and anti-competitive effects of a patent pooling agreement. On the “Rule of Rea-
son”, see: Sec. 4 “General principles concerning the Agencies' evaluation of the rule of rea-
son” of the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines 
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These IP Guidelines, complemented by a joint report dedicated to “Antitrust En-
forcement and IP Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition”, released in April 
2007,703 outline the competitive approach of the US federal antitrust agencies with 
regard to technology licensing issues. Such Guidelines, being the first of their kind, 
clearly represent the modern “archetype” on which the assessment of patent pools is 
still based nowadays.  
The position endorsed is indeed based on the cardinal assumption that preserving 
the incentive for both creative efforts (trough patent law) and competition (trough 
antitrust) is fundamental for the progress of society. This principle of balance was 
indeed already incardinated in the FTC’s report of October 2003: “To Promote In-
novation: the Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law”,704 according to 
which: “competition and patent stand out among the federal policies that influence 
innovation”,705 thus in a reciprocally complementary role. 
Analogously, in the EU the analysis is essentially centred on Art. 81 of the Euro-
pean Community Treaty (EC Treaty), addressed to undertakings, which basically 
prohibits certain anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices to the extent 
that they may significantly affect trade between EC member states, thereby delineat-
ing the power of intervention of the European Commission in the first place. The 
agreements caught by such prohibition shall be automatically void, except if they 
can be individually exempted pursuant to the criteria of the last paragraph, when 
fundamentally it can be proved that the long term pro-competitive effects of the 
agreement outweigh its first accused anti-competitive restraints, thus resulting into 
an overall positive balance.706 
However, because such case-by-case exemption entails a lengthy and costly pro-
cedure, the European Commission eventually has issued a “Technology Transfer 
Block Exemption Regulation” (TTBER),707 which entered into force on the 1st of 
 
for the Licensing of IP, April 1995, available at:  
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm  
703  U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, “Antitrust Enforcement and IP 
Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition”, Joint Report, April 2007, available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/ 
P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf 
704  Federal Trade Commission, “To Promote Innovation: the Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law”, Report, October 2003, available at:  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf  
705  See: Executive Summary, p. 1 et seq. in: Federal Trade Commission, “To Promote Innova-
tion: the Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law”, Report, October 2003, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf 
706  With respect to said“efficiency goal” of Art. 81 and 82 EC, the complementarity of IP and 
competition law’s protection has been recently supported also by: Kolstad O., “Competition 
Law and IP Rights – Outline of an Economic-Based Approach”, In: Drexl J. ed.: Research 
Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, 
MA, USA, Edward Elgar, 2008, p.  3 et seq. 
707  Commission regulation (EC) No. 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Art.81(3) 
of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ 2004 L 123/11 (TTBER), 
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May 2004, where all agreements falling within the so called “safe harbour” of said 
regulation are exempted in “block”, so altogether and automatically, thereby over-
coming the need of separate, individual exemptions.  
Nevertheless, since the TTBER only applies to technology transfer agreements 
involving two undertakings, patent pools represented by more parties could not di-
rectly benefit from the block exemption and were therefore subsequently covered by 
some Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology 
Transfer Agreements.708 Basically, these were inspired by the same principles under-
lying the TTBER, which sustain the whole delicate architecture on which the com-
petitive assessment of patent pools and similar practises is built. As observed 
throughout the comparative analysis hereby conducted, such Guidelines are in line 
with the fundamental approach anticipated by the US federal antitrust authorities. 
As it has become apparent when taking into consideration the legislative frame-
work for the assessment of patent pooling mechanisms, the focal point keeps on 
turning around the interface between intellectual property rights and antitrust law. In 
fact, the strive towards an “equilibrium” between patent and competition law, whose 
evolution has been retraced along with the legislative history of the multiparty li-
censing agreements in consideration, represents the aim of this contribution. 
In this respect, when retracing the legal treatment of patent pools and similar col-
laborative practices under the major patent regimes considered, the attempt to 
achieve a balanced assessment, by weighing the different underlying interests in-
volved, has been indeed a constant common challenge. 
Nowadays, a positive signal may be detected in the internal consistency among 
the antitrust regulations of the systems outlined, where the view is taken that a given 
proximity may be perceived.709 In fact, fundamentally the relevant provisions at is-
sue seem aligned on similar principles, thereby overcoming most of the conflicts 
traditionally ascribed to IP and antitrust law.     
Nevertheless, just as the antitrust authorities are catching up with the assessment 
of patent pools and assimilated multiparty agreements in their simplest form, these 
are becoming increasingly complex, thus giving way to new, still unexplored issues. 
In this respect, in order to be prepared and keep pace with common arising chal-
 
available at:  
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&m
odel=guicheti&numdoc=32004R0772  
708  Commission Notice - Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Tech-
nology Transfer Agreements, O.J. C 101 , 27 April 2004, Section 4 “Technology Pools”, 




709  This view was also expressed in: Armillotta M., “Japanese Guidelines on Standardization and 
Patent Pools Arrangements: Practical and Legal Considerations under the Current Antimono-
poly Act – A Global Perspective”, Institute of Intellectual Property, Book Series, October 
2008. 
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lenges, the view is taken that it is of outmost importance that the competent bodies 
present a united front, keeping aligned in order to reach consistent solutions.  
Indeed, only through coordinated endeavours, inspired to a certain dose of prag-
matism and reaching beyond the peculiarity of individual cases and national borders, 
the solutions provided may prove truly viable on the long-term, thereby better serv-
ing the fundamental cause of innovation also on a global scale. 
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